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Introduction
Over the course of a decade, Dr. Sherman Sorensen performed thousands
of unnecessary heart procedures after falsely telling patients that they were at
high risk of a stroke. He performed the procedures at two hospitals, St. Mark’s
and Intermountain. The hospitals knew about the unnecessary procedures
because (i) Dr. Sorensen performed ten to twenty times more of these procedures
than is typical, and (ii) other doctors at Intermountain and University of Utah
Hospital pointed out that many of the procedures were unnecessary.
With actual knowledge of the misconduct, the hospitals decided not to
notify patients that their heart procedures had been unnecessary. Instead,
Dr. Sorensen and the hospitals created false documents and medical charts to
conceal the misconduct, including documenting false medical conditions. They
billed and accepted payment from insurance companies and patients. And they
supplied Dr. Sorensen with the staff, facilities, and resources needed to perform
these procedures at a highly suspect volume.
Intermountain eventually suspended Dr. Sorensen for his misconduct in
light of complaints from other doctors, but still chose to conceal rather than to
disclose the misconduct to patients. St. Mark’s chose neither to suspend
Dr. Sorensen nor to disclose the misconduct. Instead, St. Mark’s permitted
Dr. Sorensen to continue because its cardiac catheterization lab had become
financially dependent upon the high volume of unnecessary procedures. As a
1

result, Dr. Sorensen’s patients remained unaware of his misconduct—or the
concealment—until they saw attorney advertising and spoke with an attorney.
The hospitals and Dr. Sorensen assert not only that they should escape
liability for the unnecessary heart procedures because they successfully
concealed their misconduct until the four-year statute of repose expired, but also
that the patients are not entitled to any discovery to learn precisely all the ways
in which the hospitals fraudulently concealed and facilitated the misconduct. In
their view, the patients must know all of the details at the pleading stage to plead
fraud with particularity. Fortunately, that is not the law in Utah.
The statute describes two circumstances in which a one-year statute of
limitation applies, instead of the four-year statute of repose. Utah Code
§ 78B-3-404. The first circumstance is when the health care provider fraudulently
conceals the misconduct. The second circumstance is when the health care
provider wrongfully leaves a foreign object in the patient. Both are in play here.
As to the fraudulent concealment exception, the statute describes what
allegations are necessary. The statute requires that the patients allege only that
they were prevented from discovering the misconduct because of affirmative acts
to fraudulently conceal it. Each patient here made the required allegation. And
on the face of the complaint, the patients all filed within one year of discovering
the fraudulent concealment, making a motion to dismiss directed at the
timeliness of the claim procedurally unavailable. That should end the inquiry.
2

But the patients did more. They provided details of how Dr. Sorensen
fraudulently concealed that the heart procedures were unnecessary, how
Dr. Sorensen and the hospitals conspired to falsify records to conceal the
misconduct (and get the insurance companies to pay for it), and how the
hospitals decided to conceal rather than disclose the misconduct.
Based on these allegations, the patients’ complaints are sufficient to
advance past the pleading stage. This can be accomplished in two ways. First,
this court can affirm the district courts’ rulings that the pleadings are sufficient
so discovery can proceed. Second, this court can reiterate the rule that motions to
dismiss that target exceptions to limitation periods should be converted to
motions for summary judgment to allow discovery targeted at the exception. In
the summary judgment proceedings, the courts can consider evidence to decide
whether the patients filed claims within a year of discovering the concealment.
As to the foreign object exception, this court in 1968 adopted the rule that a
malpractice claim cannot expire until the patient discovers a foreign object in her
body and knows that this gives rise to a “right of action.” Christiansen v. Rees, 436
P.2d 435, 436 (Utah 1968). This court has recognized that the legislature codified
that rule in 1972, and again in 1976 in the Healthcare Malpractice Act where it
now resides. Day v. Meek, 1999 UT 28, ¶ 16 n.5, 976 P.2d 1202. The patients here
discovered that the devices were wrongfully left in their hearts within a year of
filing their lawsuits, so the foreign object one-year exception also is in play.
3

Statement of the Issue
Issue: Whether the district courts correctly ruled that a complaint alleging
medical malpractice filed after the repose period will survive a motion to dismiss
if the complaint alleges the bases for the statutory fraudulent concealment
exception and the statutory foreign object exception to the statute of repose.
Standard of Review: When reviewing a court’s denial of a motion to
dismiss, this court interprets the allegations in the complaint, and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Russell
Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, ¶ 34, 108 P.3d 741. The propriety of a
motion to dismiss is a question of law that this court reviews for correctness. Id.
Preservation: This issue is preserved. [T.R.734-35; M.R.402-03; B.R.380-82.1]

The patients use “T.R.” to refer to the record in Lisa Tapp’s case, “M.R.” for
Pia Merlo-Schmucker’s case, and “B.R.” for Johannah Bright’s case.
1
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Statement of the Case
Over a thousand medical malpractice actions are pending against
Dr. Sorensen and the hospitals where he performed heart procedures. [T.R.124;
M.R.98; B.R.84.] The allegations in each lawsuit are substantially the same.
[T.R.124; M.R.98; B.R.84.]
Dr. Sorensen engaged in misconduct by permanently installing medical
devices in his patients’ hearts even though the procedures were medically
unnecessary. [T.R.126,132,138; M.R.102,107; B.R.88,94,97,99.] He and the hospitals
then fraudulently concealed his misconduct by telling patients that the heart
procedures were necessary. [T.R.124-27; M.R.98-101; B.R.84-87.]
After discovering the fraudulent concealment, the patients sued
Dr. Sorensen and the hospitals. This appeal involves three of those cases:
 Lisa Tapp against Dr. Sorensen and IHC Health
Services, Inc. [T.R.122];
 Pia Merlo-Schmucker against Dr. Sorensen and
St. Mark’s Hospital [M.R.96]; and
 Johannah Bright against Dr. Sorensen and
St. Mark’s Hospital [B.R.82].
Each of the defendants filed motions to dismiss based on the four-year
statute of repose in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. [T.R.327,347;
M.R.158,190; B.R.196,228.] Each court denied the motion because the patients had
alleged the basis to apply the statutory fraudulent concealment exception instead
of the statute of repose. [T.R.734-35; M.R.402-03; B.R.379-83.]
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Because this appeal involves the denials of motions to dismiss, the
operative facts are the allegations in the complaints. Russell Packard Dev., Inc. v.
Carson, 2005 UT 14, ¶ 34, 108 P.3d 741.
For additional background on the relevant events, the court can consult
United States ex rel. Polukoff v. St. Mark’s Hosp., 895 F.3d 730, 745 (10th Cir. 2018),
in which the Tenth Circuit reversed the dismissal of fraud claims under the False
Claims Act based upon many the same operative facts at issue here.2 The Polukoff
opinion is at Addendum I.
1.

Dr. Sorensen Fraudulently Misrepresents to the Patients that They Need
to Undergo Heart Procedures
These medical malpractice cases involve a particular type of heart

procedure that closes a small opening in the heart called a “patent foramen
ovale” (PFO) or an “atrial septal defect” (ASD). [T.R.124; M.R.98; B.R.84.] The
procedure requires a device to be permanently implanted in the heart.
[T.R.126,132,138; M.R.102,107; B.R.88,94,97,99.]

In reversing a dismissal for the failure to plead fraud with particularity, the
Tenth Circuit held that “’in determining whether a plaintiff has satisfied Rule
9(b), courts may consider whether any pleading deficiencies resulted from the
plaintiff’s inability to obtain information in the defendant’s exclusive control.’”
United States ex rel. Polukoff v. St. Mark’s Hosp., 895 F.3d 730, 745 (10th Cir. 2018)
(quoting George v. Urban Settlement Servs., 833 F.3d 1242, 1255 (10th Cir. 2016)).
The court then recognized that this “reflects the principle that ’Rule 9(b) does not
require omniscience; rather the Rule requires that the circumstances of the fraud
be pled with enough specificity to put defendants on notice as to the nature of
the claim.’” Id. (quoting Williams v. Duke Energy Int’l, Inc., 681 F.3d 788, 803 (6th
Cir. 2012)).
2

6

The well-accepted medical consensus is that a PFO or ASD normally does
not require treatment. [T.R.125; M.R.99; B.R.85.] Indeed, about 25% of healthy
adults have these small openings in their hearts and will never need treatment.
[T.R.125; M.R.98; B.R.84.] A PFO closure is instead appropriate only in the rare
circumstances in which the patient has had a particular type of stroke—recurrent
cryptogenic strokes. [T.R.125; M.R.99; B.R.85.]
None of the patients here had recurrent cryptogenic strokes or any other
medically accepted indications that would justify a PFO or ASD closure.
[T.R.132-33; M.R.102-03; B.R.88-89.] Yet Dr. Sorensen concealed this fact from the
patients by advising them to undergo the procedure, and he permanently
installed the devices in each of their hearts, despite the lack of medical need.
[T.R.126,132-38; M.R.101-02,107; B.R.88,94,97,99,202.]
To obtain their consent, Dr. Sorensen misrepresented to each patient that
she had an “extreme risk of debilitating stroke,” that the heart procedure was
necessary to reduce that risk, and that the procedure was safe and recommended
in the medical community. [T.R.128,134-36; M.R.100,103-04; B.R.86,90-91.]
Those statements were false. [T.R.128,134-36; M.R.100,103-04; B.R.86,90-91.]
And over the course of a decade, Dr. Sorensen recommended—and performed—
more than 4,000 of these heart procedures, creating a substantial profit for
himself and the hospitals where he worked. [T.R.126-28; M.R.99-101; B.R.85-87.]

7

He performed the three heart procedures at issue here in 2008, 2009, and
2010. [T.R.136 (2008); M.R.101 (2010); B.R.88,202 (2009).]
2.

The Hospitals Decide to Conceal the Truth from the Patients
Both of the hospitals, Intermountain and St. Mark’s, knew that

Dr. Sorensen was performing unnecessary heart procedures. Dr. Sorensen
performed these procedures at a rate that dwarfed the rates in the rest of the
country by a factor of ten-to-twenty fold. [M.R.99; B.R.85.] The sheer volume of
Dr. Sorensen’s heart procedures—heart procedures that should be performed
rarely—provided the hospitals knowledge that he was performing them on
patients who did not need them. [T.R.126-27; M.R.99; B.R.85.]
Confirming for the hospitals that Dr. Sorensen’s heart procedures were
unnecessary, Intermountain and St. Mark’s received numerous complaints—
including complaints from doctors at the University of Utah Hospital and
internal complaints from Intermountain doctors—that Dr. Sorensen was
“regularly performing unnecessary, invasive cardiac procedures on his patients.”
[T.R.127,129; M.R.99-100; B.R.85-86.]
In 2011, Intermountain finally had to take action. After conducting an
internal audit, Intermountain stated that Dr. Sorensen had performed “multiple,
medically unnecessary” heart procedures and that he was a “threat to the health
and safety of the patients treated at IHC.” [T.R.127.] Intermountain suspended
Dr. Sorensen’s cardiac privileges. [T.R.127.] Intermountain then moved to
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suspend Dr. Sorensen from practicing medicine, and Dr. Sorensen soon resigned.
[T.R.129-30.]
St. Mark’s received notice that Intermountain had suspended Dr. Sorensen
for performing unnecessary heart procedures. [M.R.100; B.R.86.] But unlike
Intermountain, St. Mark’s decided to allow Dr. Sorensen to continue to perform
the unnecessary heart procedures at St. Mark’s. [M.R.100; B.R.86-87.]
In fact, St. Mark’s continued to advertise and promote Dr. Sorensen to the
public and to profit from his work. [M.R.101; B.R.87.] St. Mark’s continued to
mislead the public about Dr. Sorensen because its cardiac catheterization
laboratory had become financially dependent on the volume of Dr. Sorensen’s
heart procedures. [M.R.101; B.R.87.]
Despite knowing that most of the heart procedures Dr. Sorensen
performed were medically unnecessary, both hospitals decided to conceal this
information from the patients who had undergone the procedures and from the
insurance companies who had paid for them. [T.R.137; M.R.105; B.R.87,92.]
In 2014, Intermountain sent a letter to all of the patients who had
undergone the heart closure procedure, warning them about a problem with the
device that had been permanently installed in them. [T.R.138.] Yet even then—
after Intermountain had concluded its investigation, had actual knowledge that
most of the heart procedures were medically unnecessary, and that Dr. Sorensen
had resigned from the hospital in the face of threats to his medical license for this
9

very reason—Intermountain drafted the letter in a way that deliberately failed to
inform these same patients that the heart procedures were medically
unnecessary and that their consent was obtained fraudulently. [T.R.138.]
Instead, both hospitals created false medical records to make the heart
procedures appear to be medically necessary. [T.R.128; M.R.100; B.R.86.] These
false records not only concealed Dr. Sorensen’s misconduct by misrepresenting
material facts, but also induced the patients’ insurance companies to pay for the
unnecessary procedures, allowing Dr. Sorensen and the hospitals to profit.
[T.R.5,16,128; M.R.5,15,100,105; B.R.5,16,86.] Had the insurance companies
denied the claim after reviewing accurate medical records, the patients would
have been alerted that something was wrong with their heart procedures.
3.

The Patients Finally Discover the Truth and File Lawsuits
The patients eventually found out what Dr. Sorensen and the hospitals had

done. They discovered the truth, not from the hospitals, but after they saw an
attorney advertisement and talked with an attorney. [T.R.145; M.R.105; B.R.92.]
Each of them filed complaints shortly thereafter, in 2017—within one year
of finding out about the fraudulent concealment and that the heart procedures
were unnecessary. [T.R.1; M.R.1; B.R.1.] They alleged claims including
negligence, negligent credentialing, and fraud. [T.R.138-42; M.R.106-10;
B.R.93-97.] Their complaints are at Addenda D, E, and F.
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The patients recognized that their filings were beyond the four-year statute
of repose, so they alleged the basis to trigger the fraudulent concealment
exception. The exception provides as follows:
[I]n an action where it is alleged that a patient has been
prevented from discovering misconduct on the part of a
health care provider because that health care provider
has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the
alleged misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless
commenced within one year after the plaintiff or patient
discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence,
should have discovered the fraudulent concealment,
whichever first occurs.
Utah Code § 78B-3-404(2)(b).
In accordance with the statutory language, the patients alleged in their
complaints that they were prevented from discovering the misconduct because
Dr. Sorensen and the hospitals had affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal
the misconduct from them. [T.R.145-46; M.R.112; B.R.99-100.]
Specifically, the patients alleged that Dr. Sorensen and the hospitals “took
affirmative steps to conceal [the] cause of action.” [T.R.145; M.R.112; B.R.99.]
They similarly alleged that Dr. Sorensen and the hospitals “created false
statements and documents to conceal the fact that Sorensen was performing
medically unnecessary closures,” including falsifying the patients’ medical
charts. [T.R.128; M.R.100; B.R.86.]
The patients alleged that these affirmative steps prevented them from
discovering their claims. [T.R.145; M.R.112; B.R.99.] And each complaint stated
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that the defendants’ conduct “constitutes fraudulent concealment,” and that the
one-year period in the exception governs instead of the four-year repose period.
[T.R.146; M.R.113; B.R.110.]
The patients also alleged that, despite having actual knowledge that most
of the PFO and ASD closure procedures that Dr. Sorensen performed had been
unnecessary, both Dr. Sorensen and the hospitals affirmatively decided to
conceal that fact from the patients who had undergone the heart procedures and
from all of the insurance companies who paid for the unnecessary heart
procedures. [T.R.5,16,34,137; M.R.5,16,101,105; B.R.5,15,87,92.]
4.

Dr. Sorensen and the Hospitals Argue that the Patients Were Too Late
The hospitals and Dr. Sorensen believed that they could avoid liability

because they concealed their misconduct for more than four years. They filed
motions to dismiss in each case, alleging that the patients’ claims should be
dismissed for a variety of reasons, three of which are relevant to this appeal.
Fraudulent concealment exception - First, Dr. Sorensen and the hospitals
argued that the claims were time-barred under the four-year statute of repose.
[T.R.332-33,358-60; M.R.168-70,206-08; B.R.207-09,245-47.] In so doing, they
attempted to avoid the effect of the statutory fraudulent concealment exception.
Dr. Sorensen and the hospitals recognized that the patients had included
the allegation required by statute and that they needed limited discovery to learn
precisely what the hospitals had done, but they argued that something more was
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required. Specifically, Dr. Sorensen and the hospitals argued that the exception
could not apply because, under the “heightened pleading requirement” in rule
9(c), the patients had failed to make the allegation “with particularity.” [T.R.33640,371-73; M.R.177-79,203-05; B.R.215-17,242-45.]
Of course, because the patients have not yet been able to conduct even
limited discovery, they have not yet discovered the particular details regarding
how Dr. Sorensen and the hospitals concealed the misconduct from them. Only
Dr. Sorensen and the hospitals have that information, and their success in
concealing it for more than four years should not allow them to escape liability.
Fraud – Second, Dr. Sorensen and the hospitals argued that, under rule
9(c), the patients’ independent fraud claims should be dismissed as well.
[T.R.333-36,361-70; M.R.172-76,202-03; B.R.211-15,247-48.] Similar to their
arguments about the statutory exception to the statute of repose, they argued
that the fraud claims should be dismissed because the patients did not plead
their independent fraud claims with particularity. [T.R.333-36,361-70; M.R.17276,202-03; B.R.211-15,247-48.]
Negligent credentialing –Third, Dr. Sorensen (but not the hospitals)
argued that the negligent credentialing claims should be dismissed because, in
2011—several years before the patients filed their claim, but after the
unnecessary heart procedures—the Utah Legislature declared that negligent
credentialing was no longer a cause of action. [T.R.328; M.R.201; B.R.240.]
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5.

The District Courts Deny the Motions and Allow Limited Discovery
The courts below were unanimous in their analysis of the fraudulent

concealment exception and the sufficiency of the fraud claims. Only one court
dismissed the negligent credentialing claim.
Fraudulent concealment exception – All three district courts denied the
motions to dismiss the patients’ claims as time-barred. [T.R.737; M.R.403;
B.R.388.] The courts agreed that adjudicating the timeliness was inappropriate on
a motion to dismiss because the complaints alleged the basis to put the
fraudulent concealment exception in play. [T.R.735; M.R.402-03; B.R.380.] A
motion to dismiss, of course, must rest solely on the contents of the complaint.
The courts agreed that the patients were entitled to discovery on the
concealment. [T.R.735; M.R.403; B.R.380.] As one court put it, “[t]he issue of
whether the plaintiff[s] can prove fraudulent concealment required under [the
statutory exception] will have to be based upon what we learn factually in
discovery and to be decided at summary judgment or at trial.” [T.R.735.]
The courts agreed that rule 9(c) does not apply at the pleading stage to the
patients’ allegations related to the statutory exception to the statute of repose.
[T.R.734-35; M.R.402-03; B.R.380.] As one court explained, “[i]t is important to
note that there is a distinction here between the fraud associated with the 2008
surgery and any alleged fraud that took place thereafter that is relevant to [the]
statute of limitation/repose.” [T.R.736.] In other words, a cause of action alleging
fraud falls under 9(c), but an exception to an affirmative defense does not.
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Fraud – The courts also agreed that rule 9(c) did apply to the patients’
affirmative causes of action concerning fraud, even though rule 9(c) did not
apply to their allegations concerning the exception to the statute of
repose. [T.R.736; M.R.403; B.R.386-87.] They ruled that the patients had failed to
plead with particularity a fraud claim against either of the hospitals, and
dismissed those claims on that basis. [T.R.736; M.R.403; B.R.386-87.] But they also
agreed that the patients’ fraud claims against Dr. Sorensen survived. [T.R.736;
M.R.403; B.R.386-87.]
Negligent credentialing – Only one court ruled on Dr. Sorensen’s
argument that the negligent credentialing claim against the hospitals should be
dismissed. That court dismissed Ms. Bright’s negligent credentialing claim
against St. Mark’s by applying retroactively the 2011 statute eliminating the
cause of action. [B.R.384.] This ruling is incorrect. On remand, Ms. Bright will
challenge that ruling to revive that claim.
The appeals - Dr. Sorensen and the hospitals filed petitions under rule 5 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This court granted the petitions and
consolidated the appeals. The defendants filed three opening briefs, and the
patients submit this single brief in response to all three opening briefs.
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Summary of the Argument
The district courts followed the proper procedure for adjudicating motions
to dismiss. The defendants did not ask to convert the motions to motions for
summary judgment, and the courts did not abuse their discretion in failing to do
so sua sponte. On the face of the complaints, the patients’ claims were not filed
more than one year from the time they discovered the fraudulent concealment,
so motions to dismiss for untimeliness were procedurally unavailable.
In addition, the statute of repose does not apply because the patients
properly alleged the applicability of the one-year limitation periods in the
statutory exceptions. The first exception allows a patient to file a claim within
one year of discovering that the health care provider fraudulently concealed
misconduct. Utah Code § 78B-3-404(2)(b). The second exception allows a patient
to file within one year of discovering that a foreign object was wrongfully left in
the patient. Id. § 78B-3-404(2)(a). Both exceptions are in play here.
Fraudulent concealment exception - The legislature codified the
fraudulent concealment exception to the four-year statute of repose for good
reason. The exception protects patients whose health care provider conceals
misconduct and thereby prevents the patients from discovering their claims until
the statute of repose expires. It recognizes that a health care provider should not
escape liability from misconduct with more misconduct.
Here, the district courts correctly ruled that the complaints contain the
allegations required by the statute to place the fraudulent concealment exception
16

in play. The complaints allege that Dr. Sorensen and the hospitals affirmatively
acted to conceal their misconduct. They also allege that Dr. Sorensen and the
hospitals “created false statements and documents to conceal the fact that
Sorensen was performing medically unnecessary closures,” and then falsified the
patients’ medical charts. These allegations of affirmative acts satisfy the statute.
The complaints also allege that, despite having actual knowledge that most
of Dr. Sorensen’s heart procedures were unnecessary, both Dr. Sorensen and the
hospitals affirmatively decided—and acted—to conceal this information from the
patients, rather than to inform any of them. St. Mark’s continued to advertise
Dr. Sorensen’s services after knowing that he was performing unnecessary heart
procedures. Under Utah law, these decisions were additional affirmative acts
that the fraudulent concealment exception.
Rule 9(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does not change the fact that
these allegations are all that the statute requires. The particularity requirement in
rule 9(c) applies to claims and defenses, not to exceptions to affirmative defenses.
A plaintiff has no obligation to anticipate affirmative defenses when
drafting a complaint. E.g., Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 59 (Utah 1991).
It would be difficult to impose a particularity requirement on allegations that
anticipate affirmative defenses that have not yet been, and may never be, pled.
Indeed, when a plaintiff files a complaint, she need not—and often cannot yet—
provide all of the evidence to support that allegation.
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But even if the court adopts the approach of a few jurisdictions that require
a plaintiff to plead fraudulent concealment with particularity when it is an
exception to an affirmative defense, the court should nonetheless affirm because
the allegations here were sufficient under the standard adopted by a majority of
jurisdictions.
Where, like here, the defendants have exclusive control over the
information that would allow for the fraud to be described with particularity,
this court requires that the motion to dismiss be converted to a motion for
summary judgment to allow for targeted discovery on the fraud. To achieve the
same result, this court could adopt the approach in many jurisdictions, which is
to consider fraud to have been pled with sufficient particularity if any pleading
deficiencies are the result of the defendant’s having exclusive control over the
information detailing the specifies about the fraud.
Under the rules, a patient should have an opportunity to obtain discovery
before a court adjudicates the timeliness of the claim. This explains why motions
to dismiss are procedurally unavailable to adjudicate statutory exceptions to the
statute of repose, unless the face of the complaint shows that it was filed more
than a year after the patient discovered the fraudulent concealment. Under Utah
law, the courts here could have adjudicated such motions only if they were
converted to motions for summary judgment. But the district courts here were
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not asked to do so, and they did not abuse their discretion in declining to do so
sua sponte.
Foreign object exception - This court also may affirm under the foreign
object exception. The exception codifies this court’s rule that a medical
malpractice claim cannot expire until the patient learns that a foreign object was
left in her body, and that leaving that object in the body gives rise to a “right of
action.” Christiansen v. Rees, 436 P.2d 435, 436 (Utah 1968). Here, the exception
applies because the patients filed their claims within a year of discovering that
Dr. Sorensen wrongfully left useless devices in their hearts.
Negligent credentialing - Finally, the district court adjudicating
Ms. Merlo-Schmucker’s claims did not err in refusing to dismiss her negligent
credentialing claim against St. Mark’s. Although the Utah Legislature eliminated
the cause of action in 2011, this court has been clear that the elimination was not
retroactive.
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Argument
1.

The District Courts Correctly Denied the Motions to Dismiss
The district courts correctly declined to dismiss the complaints as time-

barred under the four-year statute of repose. As discussed below, the complaints
alleged that Dr. Sorensen and the hospitals affirmatively acted to conceal their
misconduct, which is all the statute requires.
The statute first sets forth a two-year statute of limitation and a four-year
statute of repose in subsection (1):
A malpractice action against a health care provider shall
be commenced within two years after the plaintiff or
patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable
diligence should have discovered the injury, whichever
first occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date of
the alleged act, omission, neglect, or occurrence.
Utah Code § 78B-3-404(1).3 The statute then describes two exceptions to
subsection (1). These two exceptions do not toll the four-year repose period the
defendants urge here, but instead impose their own one-year limitation periods.
The patients will discuss these exceptions in reverse order.
Fraudulent concealment - One exception is the fraudulent concealment
exception. That exception applies when a health care provider fraudulently
conceals the misconduct from the patient:
Notwithstanding Subsection (1) . . . in an action where it
is alleged that a patient has been prevented from
discovering misconduct on the part of a health care
Because the relevant portions of the statute have not been amended since the
statute was enacted, the patients cite to the current version of the Utah Code.
Compare 1976 Utah Laws 93-94, with Utah Code § 78B-3-404(2)(b).
3
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provider because that health care provider has
affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged
misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless
commenced within one year after the plaintiff or patient
discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence,
should have discovered the fraudulent concealment,
whichever first occurs.
Id. § 78B-3-404(2)(b).
The allegations here put the fraudulent concealment exception in play.
Under the plain language of the exception, the patients had to allege only that “a
health care provider” fraudulently concealed the misconduct. Dr. Sorensen did
that when he lied to the patients that the heart procedure was medically
necessary. Dr. Sorensen and the hospitals did that when they falsified medical
records, intentionally concealed medical information from patients, and
otherwise conspired to conceal the misconduct.
Foreign object - The other exception is the foreign objection exception.
That exception applies when the health care provider wrongfully leaves a foreign
object in the patient’s body:
Notwithstanding Subsection (1): in an action where the
allegation against the health care provider is that a
foreign object has been wrongfully left within a
patient’s body, the claim shall be barred unless
commenced within one year after the plaintiff or patient
discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence
should have discovered, the existence of the foreign
object wrongfully left in the patient’s body, whichever
first occurs
Id. § 78B-3-404(2)(a).
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The foreign object exception also is in play because Dr. Sorensen
wrongfully left a device (a foreign object) in each patient’s heart, and the patients
did not discover that the foreign objects were left in their bodies wrongfully until
much later. This court should affirm.
1.1

The One-Year Limitation for Fraudulent Concealment Applies
Instead of the Repose Period

The district courts correctly ruled that the patients’ allegations were
sufficient to place the fraudulent concealment exception in play. The exception
protects patients whose health care providers conceal misconduct and thereby
prevent patients from discovering the medical misconduct until the statute of
repose expires. The fraudulent concealment exception recognizes that a health
care provider should not escape liability for misconduct by committing more
misconduct.
Protecting the patients comes at a cost, but not the cost the defendants
articulate. It denies some health care providers the benefit of the certainty and
predictability that statutes of repose are designed to guarantee. Lee v. Gaufin, 867
P.2d 572, 576 (Utah 1993). And it does so even though this predictability was one
of the Utah Legislature’s express purposes in enacting the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act. As the legislature explained, “[i]n enacting this act, it is the
purpose of the Legislature to provide a reasonable time in which actions may be
commenced against health care providers while limiting that time to a specific
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period for which professional liability insurance premiums can be reasonably
and accurately calculated.” Utah Code § 78B-3-402(3).
But health care providers are denied that protection only when the
misconduct was fraudulently concealed from the patient. Id. § 78B-3-404(2)(b).
The fraudulent concealment exception reflects the legislature’s balancing of
competing policies: when a health care provider fraudulently conceals
misconduct, the patient’s right to pursue a remedy beyond the four-year period
outweighs the policies underlying the statute of repose.
This explains why the legislature included the fraudulent concealment
exception from the time it first enacted the statute of repose. Compare 1976 Utah
Laws 93-94, with Utah Code § 78B-3-404(2)(b).
The legislature’s balancing is consistent with Utah case law. Indeed, this
court weighed the same policies—and reached the same conclusion—in the
similar context of the statutory discovery rule. Russell Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson,
2005 UT 14, ¶ 28, 108 P.3d 741. The court expressly “refuse[d]” to adopt a rule
that would “reward a defendant’s fraudulent and deceptive misbehavior by
depriving an innocent plaintiff of a reasonable period within which to act.” Id. As
the court explained, “[t]o permit one practicing a fraud and then concealing it to
plead the statute of limitations when, in fact, the injured party did not know of
and could not with reasonable diligence have discovered the fraud would be not
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only subversive of good morals, but also contrary to the plainest principles of
justice.” Id. (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).
Indeed, the court has long recognized that it would “be imprudent to
adopt a rule that might tempt some health care providers to fail to advise
patients of mistakes that have been made and even to make efforts to suppress
knowledge of such mistakes in the hope that the running of the statute of
limitations would make a valid cause of action nonactionable.” Foil v. Ballinger,
601 P.2d 144, 148 (Utah 1979).
Thus, like the Utah Legislature, this court has recognized that while
statutes of repose serve an important purpose, that purpose is outweighed by
ensuring that wrongdoers do not escape liability by fraudulently concealing their
misconduct.
Plain language - Dr. Sorensen nonetheless asserts giving effect to the plain
language would render “meaningless” the statute of repose. (Sorensen Op. Br. at
33-37.) He argues that, if there are exceptions to the repose period, doctors will
face stale claims and “could never enjoy a repose.” (Sorensen Op. Br. at 35-36.)
But doctors will face stale claims only if they fraudulently conceal their
misconduct. An exception mitigating the harshness of a rule does not render the
rule meaningless.
Next, Dr. Sorensen asserts that the fraudulent concealment exception is not
an exception to the statute of repose. (Sorensen Op. Br. at 26-37.) He asserts that
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the exception applies instead only to the two-year statute of limitation. His
assertions make no sense because he gets it backward.
To begin, Dr. Sorensen’s position contradicts the statutory language. The
statute expressly states that the exception applies to the statute of repose.
Specifically, the statute sets forth the statute of repose in subsection (1), then
expressly states that “Notwithstanding Subsection (1),” a plaintiff who alleges
that the health care provider fraudulently concealed misconduct may file an
action within one year of discovering the fraud. Utah Code § 78B-3-404. The
statute unambiguously applies the exception to the four-year statute of repose.
In fact, this court has held that the exception applies only to the repose
period and not to the limitation period. In Day v. Meek, this court considered
“whether subsection (a) is an exception to the four-year period only or an
exception to both the two- and the four-year periods.” 1999 UT 28, ¶ 11, 976 P.2d
1202. The court concluded that the fraudulent concealment exception applies
only to the four-year repose period. Id. ¶ 22. The court reasoned that “it makes
no sense” to apply the exception to the limitation period, as the exception would
have the effect of shortening the limitation period. Id. ¶ 18.
Indeed, a patient ordinarily has two years to sue after discovering her
claim. But under the fraudulent concealment exception, she instead would have
only one year to file if she discovered fraud concealing the misconduct right
away. Id. Thus, “the one-year limitation on cases involving fraudulent
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concealment makes sense only if it comes into play after the expiration of the
four-year repose period, which would otherwise cut off all causes of action.” Id.
¶ 20.
The fraudulent concealment exception cannot apply to the two-year
limitation period. Indeed, the two-year limitation period does not begin to run
until the patient discovers her injury. Utah Code § 78B-3-404(1). At the same time
the patient discovers the fraud, both the two-year and the one-year limitation
periods would begin, so there is no two-year limitation period to except.
This court subsequently confirmed this analysis and conclusion. Jensen v.
IHC Hosps., Inc. (Jensen III), 2003 UT 51, ¶ 77, 82 P.3d 1076. In Jensen III, the court
stated squarely that “the statutory fraudulent concealment exception applies
only when a claim is brought after the statute of repose.” Id. Dr. Sorensen does
not acknowledge this precedent, let alone challenge it.
Changed language – Instead of dealing with this court’s case law,
Dr. Sorensen asserts that, because the statutory language has changed, this
court’s opinions no longer govern. (Sorensen Op. Br. at 27-28 n.2.) The prior
version of the statute (interpreted in Day and Jensen III) stated that the limitation
and repose periods were applicable “except that” the exceptions might apply.
Day, 1999 UT 28, ¶ 5. In 2008, the Utah Legislature replaced “except that” with
“Notwithstanding Subsection (1).” 2008 Utah Laws 403. Dr. Sorensen asserts that
the replacement changed the meaning of the statute.
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But Dr. Sorensen does not suggest how “notwithstanding” might mean
something different from “except.” Nor does Dr. Sorensen explain how the logic
of this court’s cases makes sense when the statute says “except” but not when the
statute says “notwithstanding.” In fact, the exception still makes sense only as an
exception to the repose period. Jensen III, 2003 UT 51, ¶ 77; Day, 1999 UT 28, ¶ 10.
Applying it to the limitation period (as Dr. Sorensen suggests) still “makes no
sense” because it could only shorten the period rather than extend it. Day, 1999
UT 28, ¶ 18.
Diligence - Finally, Dr. Sorensen argues that the exception cannot apply
because the patients were not diligent in attempting to discover his misconduct.
(Sorensen Op. Br. at 58-64.) Of course, the patients did not discover that the heart
procedures were unnecessary because Dr. Sorensen lied to them when he told
them they were necessary. Dr. Sorensen does not explain how reasonable
diligence requires one to assume or suspect that her doctor is lying.
Regardless, Dr. Sorensen cites opinions discussing the equitable discovery
rule, under which a plaintiff is charged with knowledge of her cause of action if
she “by reasonable diligence and inquiry should know” the relevant facts. E.g.,
Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 2007 UT 25, ¶ 17, 156 P.3d 806 (internal
quotation marks omitted). He then concludes that the fraudulent concealment
exception cannot protect the patients here because “nothing shows that they
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made any inquiry into whether they had a cause of action.” (Sorensen Op. Br. at
64.)
But the statute here requires only that the claim be “commenced within
one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable
diligence, should have discovered the fraudulent concealment, whichever first
occurs.” Utah Code § 78B-3-404(2)(b). The patients all filed within a year of
seeing the advertisement about the unnecessary heart procedures, which thereby
alerted the patients that Dr. Sorensen and the hospitals fraudulently concealed
that fact from them.
And this court has been clear that a statutory discovery rule operates
differently from the equitable discovery rule. Russell Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson,
2005 UT 14, ¶¶ 25-26, 108 P.3d 741. To obtain the benefit of the equitable
discovery rule, a plaintiff must have been diligent in discovering her claim. Id.
¶¶ 25-26. But the equitable discovery rule “applies only where a statute of
limitations does not, by its own terms, already account for such circumstances—
i.e., where a statute of limitations lacks a statutory discovery rule.” Id. ¶ 25.
Where, like here, the statute contains an exception—indeed, an alternative
one-year statute of limitation—what matters is when the plaintiff discovered or
reasonably should have discovered the fraudulent concealment. Id. ¶ 26. That is
why this court has held, for example, that a malpractice claim was timely even
though it was filed eleven years after the misconduct. Chapman ex rel. Chapman v.
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Primary Children’s Hosp., 784 P.2d 1181, 1185-87 (Utah 1989). The claim was
timely because it was filed within a year of when the patients discovered that the
health care providers had fraudulently concealed misconduct for a decade. Id. at
1184.
The rule makes sense. The statute protects patients who do not—and
cannot—know that they have a cause of action because the doctor has
fraudulently concealed his malpractice. Until they discover the fraudulent
concealment, they have no reason to believe they have been harmed. It is difficult
to understand how or why these patients would have “made any inquiry into
whether they had a cause of action,” as Dr. Sorensen asserts. (Sorensen Op. Br. at
64.) The patients here are the patients that the statutory exception is designed to
protect. This court should reject Dr. Sorensen’s attempt to escape liability for
unnecessary heart procedures because his fraud was so effective.
1.2

The Patients’ Allegations Were Sufficient to Require the Exception
to Be Adjudicated Based on Evidence

The district courts also correctly ruled that the allegations in the patients’
complaints were sufficient to survive the motions to dismiss. The statute requires
a patient only to “allege[]” that the doctors fraudulently concealed their
misconduct. Utah Code § 78B-3-404(2)(b). When she files a complaint, she need
not—and often cannot yet —provide all of the evidence to support that
allegation. Under the statute (and the opinions interpreting it), a patient has an
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opportunity to obtain discovery before a court adjudicates the timeliness of the
claim.
Affirmative acts - The statutory language is clear. The exception applies
“in an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented from
discovering misconduct on the part of a health care provider because the health
care provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged
misconduct.” Id. (emphasis added). Here, the courts correctly ruled that each of
the patients’ complaints included the required allegations.
Dr. Sorensen and the hospitals assert that the complaints failed to allege an
affirmative act. (Intermountain Op. Br. at 19-20; St. Mark’s Op. Br. at 21, 29-30;
Sorensen Op. Br. at 47-49, 52-53.) They assert that the complaints allege only a
“failure to disclose” the misconduct, and that the choice to remain silent is never
an affirmative act. They also assert that the complaints only allege fraud related
to the initial procedure, not any subsequent fraud that concealed the causes of
action. (Intermountain Op. Br. at 10, 14; Sorensen Op. Br. at 51-53.)
Their position overlooks the allegations in the complaint. Each complaint
alleged that Dr. Sorensen and the hospitals “took affirmative steps to conceal
[the] cause of action.” [T.R.145; M.R.112; B.R.99.] The rule does not require
allegations explaining how they took affirmative steps to conceal or what
precisely those steps were, but the patients provided those allegations anyway.
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Each complaint also alleged that Dr. Sorensen and the hospitals “created
false statements and documents to conceal the fact that Sorensen was performing
medically unnecessary closures,” and then falsified the patients’ medical charts.
[T.R.128; M.R.100; B.R.86.] And each complaint alleged that these affirmative
steps prevented the patients from discovering their causes of action. [T.R.145;
M.R.112; B.R.99.] Each complaint expressly stated that the defendants’ conduct
“constitutes fraudulent concealment” so the alternative one-year statute of
limitation applies, not the four-year statute of repose. [T.R.146; M.R.113; B.R.100.]
The Decision to Conceal – The position of Dr. Sorensen and the hospitals
also overlooks Utah law. While the allegations set forth above are sufficient, the
complaints contain additional allegations that further satisfy the exception.
Indeed, contrary to Intermountain and Dr. Sorensen’s position, the patients’
allegations concerning the defendants’ “failure to disclose” the malpractice also
are sufficient to satisfy the exception to the statute of repose.
Specifically, the patients alleged that despite having actual knowledge that
most of the PFO and ASD closure procedures that Dr. Sorensen performed were
unnecessary, both Dr. Sorensen and the hospitals decided to modify the medical
charts and conceal from rather than inform any of the patients who had received
them. [T.R.132,145; M.R.101,112; B.R.87,92,99.]
Under Utah law, this allegation asserts an affirmative act, and a further
basis to apply the fraudulent concealment exception to the repose period. Indeed,
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in the related context of the statutory discovery rule, this court has held that
fraudulent concealment occurs when “one with a legal duty or obligation to
communicate certain facts remain silent or otherwise acts to conceal material
facts known to him. . . . The party’s silence must amount to fraud, i.e., silence
under the circumstances must amount to an affirmation that a state of things exists
which does not exist.” Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc. (Jensen I), 944 P.2d 327, 333 (Utah
1997) (citing 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud & Deceit § 145 (1968) (emphasis added)).
When one has actual knowledge in those circumstances, “silence is equivalent to
a false representation.” 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud & Deceit § 197 (2019).
This makes sense. While the failure to discover and expose misconduct
does not constitute an affirmative act, the decision not to expose known
misconduct can, and does here. Actual knowledge (not imputed knowledge) of
the misconduct requires one to decide whether to disclose it, an affirmative act.
Without actual knowledge of the misconduct, one only fails to discover the
misconduct. This may not satisfy the exception, but is not what happened here.
Once health care providers discover misconduct, they not only have a duty
to communicate that information to their patients, but also to make the conscious
decision whether to disclose or instead conceal it. Indeed, “[c]ourts have long
characterized the duty physicians [and other health care providers] have to their
patients as fiduciary.” Sorensen v. Barbuto, 2008 UT 8, ¶ 15, 177 P.3d 614. And
doctors have a fiduciary duty to their patients to disclose “any material
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information concerning the patient’s physical condition.” Daniels v. Gamma W.
Brachytherapy, LLC, 2009 UT 66, ¶ 51, 221 P.3d 256 (internal quotation marks
omitted). For this reason, the hospitals’ actual knowledge is key.
Thus, in Jensen I this court recognized that, once a doctor has actual
knowledge of malpractice, a doctor’s duty to his patients renders his silence
about the malpractice fraudulent concealment of the patient’s cause of action. 944
P.2d at 333. The decision to conceal rather than disclose amounts to an
affirmation—an affirmative act. Id.
This court should expressly adopt the same interpretation of the statutory
fraudulent concealment exception and hold that a health care provider’s decision
to remain silent can be an affirmative act when the health care provider has
actual knowledge of misconduct and decides to conceal it rather than to disclose
it. The court need not do so in this case, however, because the hospitals also
falsified medical records and affirmatively continued to advertise with actual
knowledge that Dr. Sorensen was performing unnecessary heart procedures.
Just like fraudulent concealment in the context of the discovery rule, the
statutory exception here requires affirmation—it applies if the “health care
provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal” the malpractice. Utah
Code § 78B-3-404(2)(b) (emphasis added). And to the extent the language is
ambiguous as to whether an “affirmation” described in Jensen I means the doctor
has “affirmatively acted” under the statute, the court should resolve the
33

ambiguity with the reading that avoids absurd consequences. Bagley v. Bagley,
2016 UT 48, ¶ 27, 387 P.3d 1000.
It would produce absurd consequences to construe a health care provider’s
decision to conceal (rather than to disclose) misconduct as a decision that
involves no affirmative act. It would allow health care providers to avoid liability
if—for four years—they decide to conceal misconduct when otherwise
communicating with the patients. This would place health care providers who
breach two duties to their patients in a better position than health care providers
who breach only one duty. The legislature did not intend to shield a heath care
provider who engages in additional misconduct, but to expose the health care
provider who chooses not to conceal its misconduct.
This court rejected a similar absurd reading in Day. As the court explained,
“health care providers accused of malpractice could conceivably assert their own
fraudulent concealment as a bar to the suit, thus perversely converting their own
misconduct into an affirmative defense. The legislature could not have intended
such a result.” Day v. Meek, 1999 UT 28, ¶ 19, 976 P.2d 1202.
The Jensen I reading likewise avoids this absurdity. The court should
conclude that a health care provider “affirmatively acted to fraudulently
conceal” the malpractice if, after it learned of misconduct, it decided to conceal
the information from the patient.
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Here, the patients alleged that Dr. Sorensen and the hospitals had actual
knowledge that the heart procedures were unnecessary because of their highly
suspicious volume and because other doctors alerted them to the unnecessary
heart procedures. And yet after learning that most of the heart procedures were
unnecessary, the hospitals chose to conceal that information instead of disclosing
it both to the thousands of patients who underwent the heart procedures and to
the insurance companies who paid for them. The court should hold that, if
allegations of affirmative acts are required, then these allegations here are
sufficient to trigger the exception.
1.3

The Motions to Dismiss Were Procedurally Unavailable

The statute requires only an allegation of fraudulent concealment, and not
more. This makes sense. At the pleading stage, most patients have not
discovered precisely how the hospitals and the doctors chose to conceal the
misconduct from them. In this case, only Dr. Sorensen and the hospitals have the
evidence to complete that picture.
Nor can district courts apply the exception until the parties have engaged
in limited discovery on the fraud. Here, the district courts cannot adjudicate
whether Dr. Sorensen and the hospitals did, in fact, fraudulently conceal the
patients’ causes of action without evidence. Indeed, these “are all highly factdependent legal questions” which makes it inappropriate to resolve them prior
to discovery. Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 53 (Utah 1996).
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This explains why the motions to dismiss were procedurally unavailable to
raise defendants’ arguments. Indeed, a plaintiff’s complaint must contain the
facts necessary for her causes of action, but it is well-settled that she has no
obligation to anticipate affirmative defenses. Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d
49, 59 (Utah 1991). In particular, a plaintiff need not anticipate and refute a
defendant’s potential assertion of a statute of repose defense. Nunnelly v. First
Fed. Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 154 P.2d 620, 632-33 (Utah 1944).
Intermountain asserts that Utah courts “routinely apply Rule 9 when fraud
is pled as a possible way around an affirmative defense.” (Intermountain Op. Br.
at 17.) But in support, Intermountain cites only one opinion, Norton v. Blackham,
669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983). But Norton is a summary judgment case. The plaintiff in
Norton alleged that, after a car accident, the defendant fraudulently induced her
into entering into an agreement releasing him. Id. at 858. She made these
allegations in response to the defendant’s affirmative defense, not in the
complaint. Id.
The Norton court affirmed summary judgment on the basis that the
plaintiff’s evidence of fraud was legally insufficient. Id. at 859. Yet the court also
stated that “the issue was not properly pleaded” under rule 9—a statement that
makes little sense given the procedural posture of the case (summary judgment)
and the fact that the court weighed evidence (not allegations). Id. at 858. The
court did not acknowledge the well-settled law that the plaintiff had no
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obligation to anticipate the affirmative defense, let alone overturn it. The Norton
opinion does not change Utah law.
And under Utah law, because a complaint need not include allegations
related to an exception to a statute of repose defense, the defense is premature if
asserted in a motion to dismiss (like Dr. Sorensen’s and the hospitals’ motions
here). Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 54, ¶ 7, 53 P.3d 947.
There is an exception to the rule. A motion to dismiss may properly raise a
statute of limitation or repose defense when “the complaint on its face shows the
existence of [the] affirmative defense.” Id. ¶ 8 (internal quotation marks omitted).
A complaint shows the facts necessary to establish an affirmative defense when it
contains all the dates necessary to understand when the cause of action arose,
and to establish that the limitation or repose period has elapsed. Id.
This happens, for example, when a complaint alleging malpractice shows
not only the date of a surgery, but also the date the patient found out that his
surgeon removed the wrong part of his body. E.g., Roth v. Pedersen, 2009 UT App
313, *2, 2009 WL 3490974 (Mem. Dec.). Under those circumstances, a defendant
can assert a statute of limitation or repose defense in a motion to dismiss because
no exception to the affirmative defense is in play. Id.
Dr. Sorensen and the hospitals argue that the exception to motions to
dismiss being procedurally unavailable applies here. (Sorensen Op. Br. at 44-46;
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Intermountain Op. Br. at 10; St. Mark’s Op. Br. at 30-36.) They assert that the
complaints, on their faces, establish that the claims are time-barred.
But the motions to dismiss were not procedurally available here. The face
of each complaint does not show that the patient filed more than a year after
discovering the fraudulent concealment. Ms. Tapp’s complaint alleges that she
discovered her legal injury in 2017, the year she filed her complaint.
[T.R.145,147.] Ms. Tapp’s complaint therefore shows only that she filed it within
the one-year period provided by the fraudulent concealment exception. And
Ms. Bright’s and Ms. Merlo-Schmucker’s complaints do not provide the date
upon which they discovered their legal injuries. [M.R.96-114; B.R.82-101.]
None of the complaints contain the allegation necessary to establish an
affirmative defense that the claims are untimely as a matter of law at the motion
to dismiss stage. The motions to dismiss were procedurally unavailable, and the
district courts correctly denied them.
The district courts agreed that the timeliness question was inappropriate
for a motion to dismiss and should instead be adjudicated on summary
judgment or, depending upon the evidence discovered, at trial. [T.R.735;
M.R.403; B.R.380.] And they agreed that the patients are entitled to discovery on
facts related to the exception. [T.R.735; M.R.403; B.R.380.] As one court put it,
“[t]he issue of whether the plaintiff[s] can prove fraudulent concealment
required under [the statutory exception] will have to be based upon what we
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learn factually in discovery and to be decided at summary judgment or at trial.”
[T.R.735.]
The district courts were correct. Under Utah law, Dr. Sorensen and the
hospitals could—and should—have raised the statute of repose defense in a
summary judgment motion. E.g., Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 47 (Utah 1996).
But because they instead filed motions to dismiss, the courts could have
adjudicated the motions only if they treated the motions as motions for summary
judgment. Tucker, 2002 UT 54, ¶ 11. And the courts were not required to convert
the motions.
This court has been clear about the rule: “where a plaintiff’s complaint
describes events which establish when a statute of limitations begins to run but
fails to explicitly set forth the relevant date on which those events occurred, a
defendant may raise a statute of limitations defense in a motion to dismiss under
rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provided that the trial court treats
the motion as one for summary judgment, thus giving all parties the ‘reasonable
opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion.” Id.
(quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)) (emphasis added).
The rule allows the non-moving party to respond to the motion by
requesting limited discovery to obtain evidence to oppose the defense. Utah R.
Civ. P. 56(d)(2). This allows the statutory exception to the statute of repose to be
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adjudicated at the beginning of the lawsuit, but only after all of the evidence is
brought to light.
This practice is consistent with this court’s case law. For example, in
Tucker, the defendant asserted a statute of limitation defense in a motion to
dismiss. 2002 UT 54, ¶ 10. The district court exercised its discretion to treat the
motion as one for summary judgment. Id. And in doing so, “the trial court
became able to ascertain the relevant date for statute of limitations purposes.” Id.
The trial court followed the same procedure in Colosimo. The defendants
asserted a statute of limitation defense in motions to dismiss. Colosimo v. Roman
Catholic Bishop, 2007 UT 25, ¶ 7, 156 P.3d 806. The district court adjudicated the
timeliness issue, but only after treating the motions to dismiss as summary
judgment motions and considering evidence in the form of affidavits. Id. ¶ 8.
But here, neither Dr. Sorensen nor the hospitals asked the courts to treat
their motions as motions for summary judgment. Nor do they argue on appeal
that the courts abused their discretion in declining to do so sua sponte. The
district courts were correct in declining to adjudicate the exception to the
affirmative defense at the pleadings stage.
1.4

The Allegations Are Sufficient Because Rule 9(c) Does Not Apply

The district courts also correctly ruled that the patients did not need to
plead with particularity their allegations related to the exception. [T.R.734-35;
M.R.402-03; B.R.380.]
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Rule 9 states that, “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Utah R. Civ. P.
9(c). Dr. Sorensen and the hospitals assert that the patients’ complaints “alleg[ed]
fraud” related to the fraudulent concealment exception to the statute of repose.
But the particularity requirement applies to affirmative causes of action
and affirmative defenses, not to allegations related to an exception to a statute of
repose. This makes sense because a plaintiff has no obligation to anticipate any
affirmative defenses when drafting a complaint. E.g., Brehany, 812 P.2d at 59. It
would be difficult to impose a particularity requirement on allegations that
anticipate affirmative defenses that have not yet been, and may never be, pled.
And rule 9 goes on to clarify that allegations related to a statute of
limitation defense “may be alleged generally”—i.e., not with particularity:
In pleading the statute of limitations it is not necessary
to state the facts showing the defense but it may be
alleged generally that the cause of action is barred by
the statute.
Id. R. 9(i). It is difficult to understand why the burden would be greater in a
complaint responding to this defense before it is raised.
The position of Dr. Sorensen and the hospitals conflates the requirements
for the patients’ causes of action (which must be pled with particularity) with the
requirements for their allegations related to the exception to the statute of repose.
The particularity requirement in rule 9(c) applies only to the allegations required
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in rule 8, and rule 8 does not require allegations related to exceptions to
affirmative defenses.
Specifically, rule 8 describes what must be alleged in pleadings—claims,
defenses to claims, and affirmative defenses. Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a)-(c). Rule 9 then
specifies how those allegations must be made if they are related to fraud claims
or defenses. Rule 9 provides that, “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must
state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Id. R.
9(c). The rule “supplements but does not supplant Rule 8[‘s] notice pleading”
standard. U.S. ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 186 (5th Cir. 2009). In
other words, rule 9 clarifies how fraud must be alleged when an allegation of
fraud is required under rule 8. It does not add to the list of what must be alleged.
Instead, the statute governs what must be alleged. It provides that a patient
must allege that she “has been prevented from discovering misconduct on the
part of a health care provider because that health care provider has affirmatively
acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged misconduct.” Utah Code § 78B-3404(2)(b). The statute does not require the fraudulent concealment to be pled
with particularity. Nor does it require the patient to describe how the health care
provider fraudulently concealed the misconduct. It requires only an allegation
that the health care provider fraudulently concealed the misconduct.
The minimal requirement makes sense at the pleading stage, when the
patient has not yet discovered the full details of the fraud. Once the patient
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alleges that the health care provider fraudulently concealed the misconduct, the
one-year fraudulent concealment exception is in play. The patient, after
discovery, must later prove that she commenced the claim within one year after
the patient “discover[ed], or through the use of reasonable diligence, should
have discovered the fraudulent concealment, whichever first occur[ed].” Id.
This court’s case law draws the same distinction between claims and
exceptions to statutes of repose. Jensen III, 2003 UT 51, ¶ 35 n.10. As this court put
it, “[t]he term ‘independent fraud claim’ refers to plaintiffs’ cause of action for
fraudulent concealment. This cause of action is separate from plaintiffs’
allegations of fraudulent concealment for purposes of tolling the statute of
limitations.” Id.
This explains why the district courts here ruled that the patients’
allegations of fraudulent concealment for purposes of the exception were
sufficient, yet dismissed their causes of action for fraud against the hospitals as
insufficiently pled under rule 9(c). [T.R.734-36; M.R.402-03; B.R.380,386-87.] As
one of the courts correctly explained, “[i]t is important to note that there is a
distinction here between the fraud associated with the 2008 surgery and any
alleged fraud that took place thereafter that is relevant to [the] statute of
limitation/repose.” [T.R.736.]
Dr. Sorensen and the hospitals, however, argue that that Utah courts have
dismissed complaints that fail to allege with particularity fraudulent
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concealment that is an anticipatory response to a statute of repose defense.
(Intermountain Op. Br. at 16-19; Sorensen Op. Br. at 53-58; St. Mark’s Op. Br. at
18-26.) The opposite is true. No opinion from this court has ever held that the 9(c)
requirement applies to allegations concerning the statutory exceptions.
Most of the opinions cited by Dr. Sorensen and the hospitals explain that
the 9(c) requirement applies to all fraud-based causes of action, including
“misrepresentations, omissions, or other deceptions covered by the term ‘fraud’
in its broadest dimension”—an issue that is not raised or disputed here. Williams
v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982); (Intermountain Op. Br. at
16).4
Dr. Sorensen also cites Christensen v. Board of Review of Industrial
Commission as explaining the pleading requirements for a fraud claim. (Sorensen
Op. Br. at 54 (citing 579 P.2d 335, 338 (Utah 1987)).) But the quote comes from a
dissenting opinion in the case, which affirms findings made by a board of review
of an industrial commission. 579 P.2d at 335, 338. It is neither a holding of this
court nor relevant to any of the issues presented here.

See also Precision Vascular Sys., Inc. v. Sarcos, L.C., 199 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 119192 (D. Utah 2002) (Sorensen Op. Br. at 53); State v. Apotex Corp., 2012 UT 36, ¶ 22,
282 P.3d 66 (Intermountain Op. Br. at 16 n.19); Armed Forces Ins. Exch. V. Harrison,
2003 UT 14, ¶¶ 16-18, 50 P.3d 35 (Sorensen Op. Br. at 54); Robinson v. Robinson,
2016 UT App 33, ¶¶ 49-50, 368 P.3d 105 (St. Mark’s Op. Br. at 20); Fid. Nat’l Title
Ins. Co. v. Worthington, 2015 UT App 19, ¶ 18, 344 P.3d 156 (Sorensen Op. Br. at
55; St. Mark’s Op. Br. at 19); Shah v. Intermountain Healthcare, Inc., 2013 UT App
261, ¶¶ 10-12, 314 P.3d 1079 (St. Mark’s Op. Br. at 20, 25-26).
4
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A few of the other opinions that Intermountain cites explain that the 9(c)
requirement applies to the defenses asserted in a defendant’s answer—another
issue not raised or disputed here. GDE Constr., Inc. v. Leavitt, 2012 UT App 298,
¶¶ 13-14, 294 P.3d 567 (Intermountain Op. Br. at 16 n.19); Otsuka Elecs. (USA, Inc.)
v. Imaging Specialists, Inc., 937 P.2d 1274, 1278 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)
(Intermountain Op. Br. at 16 n. 19).
Similarly, although Intermountain asserts that the Federal Practice &
Procedure treatise “makes clear allegations of fraudulent concealment meant to
toll a limitations period ‘fall within the heightened pleading requirement of Rule
9(b),’” the quoted section of the current version of the treatise in fact addresses
only the requirements of a defendant’s answer. (Intermountain Op. Br. at 18-19.)
Intermountain does not quote the current version, so it is unclear whether
a prior version conflated the rule as Intermountain suggests. (Id.) But the current
version is clear and addresses only the requirements for a defendant’s answer. It
explains that, “inasmuch as the defense of fraud cannot be raised in an answer
under a general denial because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) requires that
defense to be pleaded affirmatively, the assertion of such a defense is an
allegation of fraud and is subject to the heightened pleading requirements of
Rule 9(b).” 5A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. §1297 (4th ed. 2019). It therefore does not
apply here.
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The remaining opinions from Utah courts cited by Dr. Sorensen and the
hospitals are more directly on point but do not change the result. (Intermountain
Op. Br. at 17; Sorensen Op. Br. at 54; St. Mark’s Op. Br. at 24.) For example, in
Chapman ex rel. Chapman v. Primary Children’s Hospital, this court held that the
plaintiff’s allegations of fraudulent concealment were sufficient to establish the
applicability of the fraudulent concealment exception even though the same
allegations were insufficient to support the independent causes of action for
fraudulent concealment against some of the defendants. 784 P.2d 1181, 1184-86
(Utah 1989). Notably, the appeal was before the court on summary judgment, not
after the denial of a motion to dismiss. Id. at 1185.
In Chapman, the plaintiffs alleged a cause of action for fraudulent
concealment against several health care defendants. Id. at 1185-86. Although the
plaintiffs filed the complaint more than a decade after the malpractice, the
plaintiffs did not include in the complaint separate allegations related to the
statutory exception. Id. at 1184.
Nonetheless, this court held that the statutory exception was properly
invoked—and satisfied—by the allegations supporting the independent cause of
action. Id. at 1184-85. As the court explained, the “plaintiffs’ allegations of
fraudulent concealment bring their causes of action under section 78-14-4(1)(b),”
the prior codification of the statutory exception. Id. at 1184. The court construed
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the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and concluded that the
exception applied and the lawsuit “was therefore timely.” Id. at 1184-85.
In determining whether the exception applied, the court did not analyze
the 9(c) pleading requirements. Id. Nor did it suggest that they would apply to
the exception. Id. Intermountain is therefore mistaken when it asserts that in
Chapman, “[t]his Court applied Rule 9 to the statute at issue here.”
(Intermountain Op. Br. at 17 (emphasis omitted).)
The Chapman court instead analyzed and applied the 9(c) pleading
requirements only with respect to the affirmative claims for fraud. Chapman, 784
P.2d at 1185-87. In so doing, the court held that, under rule 9(c), the allegations
against the doctor and the hospital were sufficient, but the allegations against the
remaining defendants were not. Id. at 1187.
Of course, those were the same allegations that the court deemed sufficient
to render the complaint timely. Id. at 1184-85. The Chapman opinion therefore
confirms that rule 9(c) applies to independent causes of action but not to the
fraudulent concealment exception.
The second opinion is Roth v. Pedersen, an unpublished memorandum
decision from the court of appeals. 2009 UT App 313, 2009 WL 3490974 (Mem.
Dec.). (Intermountain Op. Br. at 18; Sorensen Op. Br. at 53; St. Mark’s Op. Br. at
22.) Unlike this court’s opinion in Chapman, the panel in Roth did suggest that
rule 9(c) applies to the statutory exception. Roth, 2009 UT App 313, at *3. But the
47

panel did so only in dicta—the particularity requirement did not form the basis
for the decision. Id.
Instead, the panel held that the plaintiff’s malpractice action against a
doctor was time-barred because he filed it more than four years after he became
aware of the malpractice. Id. at *2. There was no question that the plaintiff
immediately understood he had been harmed. Id. Indeed, the surgeon removed
the wrong part of the plaintiff’s body and he had to undergo “corrective
surgery” to remove the correct part. Id. The question was only whether the
plaintiff’s cause of action against the doctor simultaneously accrued. Id.
The panel held that the cause of action accrued for both defendants at the
same time, and thus the complaint was time-barred. Id. “It is clear from the
pleadings that [the plaintiff] was aware that a legal injury had occurred at least
by the time he initiated legal action against the general surgeon in May 2006.
Thus, [he] knew both that he had suffered a legal injury and that it had
happened during the resection surgery. That awareness triggered the statute of
limitations regardless of whether [he] knew the precise identity of the
wrongdoer. . . . Accordingly, we conclude that the grant of the motion for
judgment and subsequent dismissal were appropriate because [the plaintiff]
failed, as required by the Act, to commence litigation within two years of
discovery of his legal injury, which occurred, at the very latest, in May 2006.” Id.
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The panel discussed the applicability of rule 9(c) to the fraudulent
concealment exception only after reaching this conclusion. Id. at *3. The
discussion in the memorandum decision is therefore dicta. And it is inconsistent
with the opinions from this court. It has no precedential value.
Under Utah law, rule 9(c) does not apply to exceptions to affirmative
defenses. Those should be adjudicated on summary judgment, where all the facts
can come to light through discovery.
1.5

The Allegations Are Sufficient Even if Rule 9(c) Applies

Even if the court adopts the approach of a few jurisdictions that require a
plaintiff to plead fraudulent concealment with particularity when it is an
exception to an affirmative defense, 5 the court should nonetheless affirm because
the allegations here were sufficient under the standard adopted by a majority of
jurisdictions.
Where, like here, the defendants have exclusive control over the
information that would allow for the fraud to be described with particularity,
this court requires that the motion to dismiss be converted to a motion for
summary judgment to allow for targeted discovery on the fraud. Tucker v. State
Summerhill v. Terminix, Inc., 637 F.3d 877, 880 (8th Cir. 2011) (Intermountain
Op. Br. at 19 n.22); Gulley v. Pierce & Assocs., P.C., 436 F. App’x 662, 664 (7th Cir.
2011) (Intermountain Op. Br. at 19 n.22); Ballen v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 23
F.3d 335, 337 (10th Cir. 1994) (Intermountain Op. Br. at 19 n.22); Armstrong v.
McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 88 (2d Cir. 1983) (Intermountain Op. Br. at 19 n.22);Conerly
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 623 F.2d 117, 120 (9th Cir. 1980) (applying California
law) (Intermountain Op. Br. at 19 n.22); Chafin v. Wisconsin Province of Soc’y of
Jesus, 917 N.W.2d 821, 825 (Neb. 2018) (Sorensen Op. Br. at 54).
5
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Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 54, ¶ 7, 53 P.3d 947. To achieve the same result,
this court could adopt the approach in many jurisdictions, which is to consider
fraud to have been pled with sufficient particularity if any pleading deficiencies
are the result of the defendant’s having exclusive control over the information
detailing the specifies about the fraud.
As the Tenth Circuit recently held in reviewing allegations outlining the
fraud of Dr. Sorensen and the hospitals in a False Claims Act case, “’in
determining whether a plaintiff has satisfied Rule 9(b), courts may consider
whether any pleading deficiencies resulted from the plaintiff’s inability to obtain
information in the defendant’s exclusive control.’” United States ex rel. Polukoff v.
St. Mark’s Hosp., 895 F.3d 730, 745 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting George v. Urban
Settlement Servs., 833 F.3d 1242, 1255 (10th Cir. 2016)). The court then recognized
that this “reflects the principle that ’Rule 9(b) does not require omniscience;
rather the Rule requires that the circumstances of the fraud be pled with enough
specificity to put defendants on notice as to the nature of the claim.’” Id. (quoting
Williams v. Duke Energy Int’l, Inc., 681 F.3d 788, 803 (6th Cir. 2012)). The Tenth
Circuit is not an outlier. 6
United States ex rel. Vatan v. QTC Med. Servs., Inc., 721 F. App’x 662, 663–64
(9th Cir. 2018); United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 501 F.3d 493,
512 (6th Cir. 2007); Hill v. Morehouse Med. Assocs., Inc., No. 02-14429, 2003 WL
22019936, at *3 (11th Cir. Aug. 15, 2003); United States ex rel. Russell v. Epic
Healthcare Mgmt. Grp., 193 F.3d 304, 308 (5th Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds
by United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 556 U.S. 928, 937 (2009);
Emery v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 134 F.3d 1321, 1323 (7th Cir. 1998); In re Burlington
Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1417–18 (3d Cir. 1997); Wexner v. First
6
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While this court may not want to adopt this approach for all types of fraud
claims, it should adopt this approach when the fraud is an exception to an
affirmative defense. For fraud claims more generally, the plaintiff often will
obtain discovery on a non-fraud (often negligence or breach of contract) claim,
and when the details of the fraud are discovered, the plaintiff can amend the
complaint to include the fraud claim and allege it with particularity. But when
the fraud is an exception to a statute of repose, the plaintiff will never uncover
the fraud because the case will be dismissed at the pleading stage. The relaxed
pleading standard therefore makes sense when the fraud is a defense to a statute
of repose and the facts detailing the fraud, like the facts here, are within the
exclusive control of the defendants.
In this case, the patients’ allegations are sufficient to satisfy the relaxed
rule 9(c) standard because the details of the fraud are within the exclusive control
of the defendants and the defendants understand the nature of the patients’
claims. With the relevant hospital files and notes, as well as the depositions of
employees, the particularities of the fraud will become clear. Therefore, even if
this court concludes that the patients had to satisfy rule 9(c) in alleging an
exception to the statute of repose, the court should hold that patients did so
because the relaxed standards applies.

Manhattan Co., 902 F.2d 169, 172 (2d Cir. 1990); New England Data Servs., Inc. v.
Becher, 829 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir. 1987); In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc., 32 B.R.
199, 203 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
51

2.

The Foreign Object Exception to the Statute of Repose Is Also in Play
Under the Allegations in These Cases
This court also may affirm the district courts’ denials of the motions to

dismiss on the other statutory exception, the foreign object exception. The
exception applies because the patients filed their complaints within a year of
discovering that Dr. Sorensen had implanted the devices in their hearts
wrongfully.
The foreign object exception applies if a foreign object was wrongfully left
in a patient’s body. It provides as follows:
in an action where the allegation against the health care
provider is that a foreign object has been wrongfully left
within a patient’s body, the claim shall be barred unless
commenced within one year after the plaintiff or patient
discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence
should have discovered, the existence of the foreign
object wrongfully left in the patient’s body, whichever
first occurs.
Utah Code § 78B-3-404(2)(a).
The exception is a codification of a rule crafted by this court prior to the
enactment of the Health Care Malpractice Act. The rule requires both knowledge
of the foreign object in the body and knowledge of the right of action stemming
from the leaving of the foreign object in the body.
In 1968, in Christiansen v. Rees, this court overturned precedent to the
contrary, adopted the view that a plaintiff must know “of his injury and right of
action,” and held that “where a foreign object is negligently left in the body of a
patient during an operation and the patient is ignorant of the fact, and
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consequently of his right of action for malpractice, the cause of action does not
accrue until the patient learned of the presence of such foreign object in his
body.” 436 P.2d 435, 436 (Utah 1968).
In 1971, the Utah Legislature codified the discovery rule articulated in
Rees. 1971 Utah Laws 614 (“after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of
reasonable diligence, should have discovered the injury”). And this court
recognized that the prior rule was then “codified” in the 1976 Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act. Day v. Meek, 1999 UT 28, ¶ 16 n.5, 976 P.2d 1202.
The foreign objection exception therefore codifies the rule set forth in Rees,
which requires knowledge of both the presence of the foreign object and of a legal
injury. The unnecessary heart procedures here left an unnecessary medical
device in each patient’s body without informed consent. Dr. Sorensen
fraudulently concealed that the procedures were unnecessary when he falsely
told the patients that heart procedures were necessary. And the patients brought
their claims within a year of discovering that the foreign objects had been placed
and left in their bodies wrongfully.
This court can affirm on the alternative ground based upon the foreign
object exception. The patients raised this argument below, even though it did not
form the basis of the district courts’ rulings. (T.R.539-40; B.R.689-95; M.R.660-61);
Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ¶ 10, 52 P.3d 1158 (appellate courts may affirm “on
any legal ground or theory apparent on the record”) (citation omitted).
53

Dr. Sorensen and the hospitals may argue that the devices were not foreign
objects because they were intentionally placed in the bodies. [T.R. 750.] This
argument fails because the plain meaning of “foreign object” in this context is an
object that does not exist naturally in the body.
The reasoning of other courts confirms that the devices here were foreign
objects. For example, the Tennessee Supreme Court rejected the argument that an
object that was intentionally placed in a patient’s body could not satisfy
Tennessee’s foreign objection exception. Chambers v. Semmer, 197 S.W.3d 730, 733
(Tenn. 2006). Like the defendant here, the defendants in Chambers argued “that a
surgical hemoclip intentionally placed in a patient’s body with the intent that it
permanently remain cannot be a ‘foreign object’ that establishes an exception to
the one-year statute of limitations or the three-year statute of repose . . . even if
the surgery is performed negligently.” Id.
Even though the Tennessee statute required that the foreign object be
negligently left in the patient’s body—while Utah’s exception more broadly
extends to objects wrongfully left—the court rejected the defendants’ argument.
The court first cited prior cases holding that the foreign object exception “was
intended to apply to cases where the defending health care provider was in some
way responsible for the initial presence of the foreign object complained of.” Id.
at 734. The court then held that “all that is required under [the foreign object
exception] is that an object be ‘negligently left in a patient’s body’” and that to
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determine whether that has happened, “a court must look beyond whether a
surgical object or device is designed to be used intentionally and to remain
permanently and must fully consider the circumstances of each case.” Id. at 736.
The Georgia Court of Appeals reached a similar result. Norred v. Teaver,
740 S.E.2d 251, 254 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013). The Norred court held that “the limitation
period begins to run upon the discovery of an object not originating in the
person’s body that is caused or allowed to remain in the body. It is immaterial
under the plain meaning of this language whether the object is caused to remain
intentionally or unintentionally.” Id.
For the same reason, an Ohio court held that an IUD could be a foreign
object that can trigger the exception even though it was intentionally placed—
depending on whether the placement was wrongful. Beatman v. Gates, 521 N.E.2d
521, 523 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987). The court recognized that whether an IUD was a
foreign objection hinged upon “whether appellee indicated to appellant while he
was examining and treating her that the IUD had repositioned itself within her
body, or whether he failed to notify her of such occurrence thereafter; and when
appellant knew or should have known that the IUD had migrated from its
original location within her body.” Id.
These jurisdictions, and many others, struggle with distinguishing
between foreign objects negligently left in the body and foreign objects
intentionally left in the body because their statutes use the word “negligently.”
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E.g., Hershley v. Brown, 655 S.W.2d 671, 675 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (interpreting
exception that requires “the act of neglect complained of is introducing and
negligently permitting any foreign object to remain within the body”). But Utah’s
statute avoids this issue because it uses the broader term “wrongfully,” which
encompasses both negligent and intentional wrongdoing.
Because the devices here were wrongfully left in the patients’ bodies, the
only issue is whether the patients commenced their actions within one year of
discovering “the existence of the foreign object wrongfully left in the patient’s
body.” Utah Code § 78B-3-404(2)(a). As discussed above, this statute codifies the
rule from Rees and requires knowledge of both the foreign object and the right of
action. Day, 1999 UT 28, ¶ 16 n.5. The patients here satisfied that standard
because they filed their claims within a year of learning that the devices were
wrongfully left in their bodies.
Dr. Sorensen and the hospitals may argue that Day was wrongfully
decided and that the foreign object exception does not codify the rule from Rees.
Specifically, they may argue that the foreign object exception requires only
discovery of the object, not that the object was wrongfully left in the body. If the
defendants assert that the statute is ambiguous on this point, the court should
reject the defendants’ interpretation because it leads to an absurd consequence.
Bagley v. Bagley, 2016 UT 48, ¶ 27, 387 P.3d 1000 (recognizing the canon of
resolving ambiguities to avoid absurd consequences).
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It is absurd to allow medical providers (i) to place and leave unnecessary
objects in patients by lying to patients about the need for the procedure, and then
(ii) to escape liability because the patients do not discover that the procedures
were wrongful for more than four years. As the Chambers court explained, this
interpretation will not “eviscerate the statute of limitations and the statute of
repose in cases where any object is intentionally inserted into a patient’s body
with the intent that it permanently remain in the patient,” such as “pacemakers
. . . and implants.” Chambers, 197 S.W.3d at 733. If the object is wrongfully left in
the body, but it takes more than four years to discover that the object should not
have been there in the first place, the patient should be allowed to bring a claim.
It would be absurd to interpret the Utah Legislature to have intended otherwise.
This court can therefore affirm on the alternative ground that the patients
have sufficient pled the foreign object exception.
3.

The Merlo-Schmucker Court Correctly Declined to Dismiss the
Negligent Credentialing Claim
The district court adjudicating Ms. Merlo-Schmucker’s claims properly did

not dismiss her negligent credentialing claim against St. Mark’s. Although the
Utah Legislature eliminated the cause of action in 2011, this court has been clear
that the elimination was not retroactive.
In all three district courts, Dr. Sorensen (but not the hospitals) argued that
the negligent credentialing claims should be dismissed. Dr. Sorensen noted that
in 2011—after the malpractice here—the Utah Legislature declared that negligent
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credentialing was no longer a cause of action. [T.R.328;M.R.201; B.R.240.] The
statute provides as follows:
It is the policy of this state that the question of negligent
credentialing, as applied to health care providers in
malpractice suits, is not recognized as a cause of action.
Utah Code § 78B-3-425.
Only one court ruled on Dr. Sorensen’s argument. That court—the court
adjudicating Ms. Bright’s claims—dismissed her negligent credentialing claim
against St. Mark’s by applying retroactively the 2011 statute. [B.R.384.] St. Mark’s
now argues that the court adjudicating Ms. Merlo-Schmucker’s claims erred in
declining to do the same. (St. Mark’s Op. Br. at 39-40.)
But the Merlo-Schmucker court did not err. The statute eliminates the
cause of action only for claims that accrued after the statute’s effective date,
May 10, 2011. Utah Code § 78B-3-425.; Waddoups v. Noorda, 2013 UT 64, ¶ 13, 321
P.3d 1108. Because the patients’ claims accrued before the statute’s effective date,
the statute does not eliminate their causes of action for negligent credentialing.
Conclusion
This court should affirm the denials of motions to dismiss filed by
Dr. Sorensen and the hospitals so these cases can proceed to discovery to
uncover the particular details of the fraudulent concealment of more than a
thousand unnecessary heart procedures.
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DATED this 8th day of May, 2019.
ZIMMERMAN BOOHER

/s/ Troy L. Booher
Troy L. Booher
Beth E. Kennedy
FLEMING, NOLEN & JEZ, L.L.P.
Rand Nolen
David Hobbs
Attorneys for Appellees
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Addendum A

The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: August 09, 2018
/s/ BARRY LAWRENCE
10:29:54 AM
District Court Judge

Rhome D. Zabriskie
ZABRISKIE LAW FIRM, LLC
899 North Freedom Blvd, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84604
Tel: (801) 375-7680
Fax: (801) 375-7686
Email: rhomelawyer@yahoo.com

Counsel for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT – SALT LAKE CITY

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LISA TAPP,

PROPOSED ORDER

)
)

Case No. 170904956
Judge Barry Lawrence

)
Plaintiff,

)
)

v.

{01724935.RTF / 2}

)

1

00732
August 09, 2018 10:29 AM

1 of 8

)
SHERMAN SORENSEN, M.D.;
)
SORENSEN CARDIOVASCULAR
GROUP; AND IHC HEALTH SERVICES, )
INC.,
)
)
Defendants.

)
)

This matter having come before the Court on May 25, 2018 before the Honorable Judge
Barry Lawrence. Rand Nolen, David Hobbs, and Rhome Zabriskie appeared on behalf of
Plaintiff Lisa Tapp. Alan Bradshaw and Jack Nelson appeared on behalf of Defendant IHC
Health Services, Inc., and Michael Miller and Kathleen Abke appeared on behalf of Defendants
Sherman Sorensen and Sorensen Cardiovascular Group. The matter before the Court was a
hearing on Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ amended complaint.
The Court notes the relevant procedural history. After plaintiff filed her Complaint, a
motion to dismiss was filed, followed by a request to file an amended complaint. On February
20, 2018, the Court held argument on the motion to amend and rejected defendants’ futility
arguments in an Order dated March 7, 2018. After the Amended Complaint, was filed another
set of motions to dismiss were filed; they were heard on May 14, 2018. The Court announced its
ruling in a telephone conference on May 25, 2018. That ruling is reflected herein; but to the
extent that ruling differs from this Order, the oral ruling should control.
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Having considered the motions, the Court dismisses the fraud/misrepresentation claims
against IHC Health Services, Inc. and the conspiracy claim as to all Defendants. Other than that,
the Court denies the motions, leaving the negligence claims against Dr. Sorensen, the negligence
claims against IHC Health Services, Inc., and the fraud/misrepresentation claims against Dr.
Sorensen.
The Court concludes that it cannot rule on the statute of limitation/repose defense based
on the pleadings. Plaintiff is not obligated to plead with particularity in her complaint facts in
response to the statute of limitation/repose defense. The Plaintiff is not obligated to meet a
heightened pleading requirement relating to facts that would serve to defeat an impending
defense. Zoumadakis v. Uintah Basin Med. Ctr., Inc., 2005 UT App 325, ¶ 6, 122 P.3d 891,
893–94 (“the burden of pleading the inapplicability of [privilege] is not initially on the plaintiff,
and it is not incumbent on the plaintiff or party filing a complaint to anticipate an affirmative
defense which the answer may disclose”).
The Court is not persuaded by the Defendants’ argument to the contrary, and there is a
distinction for cases where the complaint is “facially invalid” or untimely. The Court reads
Defendants’ cited cases as standing for the proposition that when all the facts necessary to
determine an affirmative defense are stated in the complaint, then the affirmative defense can be
resolved in a Rule 12 motion. That is not the case here where the facts of fraudulent concealment
are not in the complaint and can’t be unless the issue is before the Court in full.
In Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 54, ¶ 8, 53 P.3d 947, all of the
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applicable dates were in the complaint and so the court ruled as a matter of law. There was no
assertion of a defense to the defense of statute of limitation, and so it was not inappropriate for
the court to rule. Again, it appears to the Court that all facts necessary to decide the Rule 12
motion were in the complaint, which again is a far cry from this case. Van De Grift v. State, 2013
UT 11, 299 P.3d 1043 was dismissed on immunity grounds because there is immunity for claims
that arise based on fraud and the complaint alleged facts of fraud. Bivens v. Salt Lake City Corp.,
2017 UT 67 involved exhaustion of remedies, which is a jurisdictional issue. There the complaint
made clear that there was no exhaustion. And, in footnote the Bivens court said: “We do not hold
today that a plaintiff’s complaint must affirmatively plead exhaustion of legal remedies.” And in
Lowery v. Brigham Young University, 2004 UT App 182, the complaint on its face reflected
when the plaintiff discovered his claim, which meant that as a matter of law, the discovery rule
could not apply and, therefore, the court could rule on the pleadings. None of these cases stand
for the proposition that a plaintiff in the first instance has the obligation to state facts necessary
to defeat a statute of limitations defense at all, let alone with a degree of particularity. The issue
of whether the plaintiff can prove fraudulent concealment required under § 78B-3-404 will have
to be based upon what we learn factually in discovery and to be decided at summary judgment or
at trial. Accordingly, the Court DENIES all of the statute of limitations issues raised by the
Defendants.
The Sorensen Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims should be consolidated into one
medical malpractice claim. While the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act does have a broad
definition of what a malpractice claim is for procedural purposes, the Court is not aware of any
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authority that prevents a plaintiff from asserting alternative facts of fraud or negligence against
Dr. Sorensen, and the elements of each would have to be proven at trial. However, the Court
notes that it appears that there are multiple claims of negligence and multiple claims of fraud,
and The Court will not dismiss those at this time. The plaintiff is certainly entitled to pursue its
claims. But ultimately at trial, there will be one negligence claim against Dr. Sorensen and one
fraud claim and if the standard of care encompasses various things that’s fine, but those are not
separate claims. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Sorensen Defendants’ motion.
IHC Health Services, Inc.’s motion to dismiss the misrepresentation claims is
GRANTED. It is important to note that there is a distinction here between the fraud associated
with the 2008 surgery and any alleged fraud that took place thereafter that is relevant to statute of
limitation/repose. The allegations of IHC Health Services, Inc.’s fraud in inducing Ms. Tapp to
have surgery are non-existent. There is nothing but conclusory statements where the plaintiff
lumps the “defendants” in together and there is not one fact in the complaint that would support
that IHC Health Services, Inc. was somehow involved in a fraud in 2008. There is no fact stated
in the complaint that even alleges, let alone with any degree of particularity, as required under
Rule 9, U.R.C.P., that IHC Health Services, Inc. was involved in a fraud on Plaintiff in 2008. So
that claim against IHC Health Services, Inc. is DISMISSED. The fraud claim against Dr.
Sorensen will survive and the motion DENIED. There are ample allegations of facts supporting
this fraudulent inducement theory in 2008 by Dr. Sorensen. But there is absolutely nothing
demonstrating any fraud by IHC Health Services, Inc. or any sort of illegal conduct or wrong by
IHC Health Services, Inc. and the predicate for a conspiracy claim has not been alleged. There
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are no facts alleged against IHC Health Services, Inc. of fraud and conspiracy at the time the
surgery was done.
The conspiracy claim, like the fraud claims, is governed by Rule 9 and Rule 9 requires a
showing of particularity. Williams v. State Farm, 656 P.2d 966 (1982); Coroles v. Sabey, 2003
UT App 339, 79 P.3d 974 (2003); Fidelity Nat. Title Ins. Co. v. Worthington, 2015 UT App 19,
344 P.3d 156. Having dismissed fraud claims against IHC Health Services, Inc. the Court is
compelled to dismiss the conspiracy claim between the Defendants as well. (Having dismissed
the underlying predicate for the conspiracy claim (i.e., the fraud claim), there can be no
conspiracy claim as a matter of law.). The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions as to
conspiracy and DISMISSES the conspiracy claim against all Defendants.
In summary, the Court:
GRANTS IHC Health Services, Inc.’s motion as to the misrepresentation claims and
DISMISSES the Third; Fifth; and Sixth Claims for Relief against IHC Health Services, Inc.;
GRANTS the Defendants’ motions as to the conspiracy claim and DISMISSES the Seventh
Claim for Relief against all Defendants; and otherwise
DENIES the motions to dismiss.
***Executed and entered by the Court as indicated by the date
and seal at the top of the first page***
-------------------------------------------END OF DOCUMENT-------------------------------------------Approved as to form:
ZABRISKIE LAW FIRM
/s/ Jack T. Nelson (signed with permission on behalf of David Hobbs)
David Hobbs
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW & BEDNAR
/s/ Jack T. Nelson
Alan C. Bradshaw
John T. (Jack) Nelson
Attorneys for IHC Health Services, Inc.
STRONG & HANNI
/s/ Jack T. Nelson (signed with permission on behalf of Michael J. Miller)
Michael J. Miller
Attorneys for Sorensen Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that that a true and exact copy of the foregoing has been served on the following
via email on 31st day of July 2018:
David Hobbs
ZABRISKIE LAW FIRM, LLC
899 North Freedom Blvd, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84604
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Alan C. Bradshaw
John (Jack) T. Nelson
Manning, Curtis, Bradshaw & Bednar PLLC
136 East South Temple, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Phone: 801-363-5678
Fax: 801-364-5678
abradshaw@mc2b.com
jnelson@mc2b.com
Attorneys for IHC Health Services, Inc.
Michael J. Miller
Strong & Hanni
102 South 200 East, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
mmiller@strongandhanni.com
Attorney for Defendants Sherman Sorensen, M.D. and Sorensen Cardiovascular Group
/s/ Jack T. Nelson
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Addendum B

The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: June 28, 2018
/s/ PATRICK CORUM
12:58:05 PM
District Court Judge

Rhome D. Zabriskie
ZABRISKIE LAW FIRM, LLC
899 North Freedom Blvd, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84604
Tel: (801) 375-7680
Fax: (801) 375-7686
Email: rhomelawyer@yahoo.com

Counsel for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT – SALT LAKE CITY

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PIA MERLO-SCHMUCKER,

)

ORDER

)
)
Plaintiff,

)

Case No. 170906130
Judge Patrick Corum

)
v.

)
)

SHERMAN SORENSEN, M.D.;
1
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SORENSEN CARDIOVASCULAR
GROUP; AND ST. MARK’S HOSPITAL,

)
)
)

Defendants.

)
)
)

Following full briefing, this matter came before the Court for hearing and argument on
May 1, 2018. On May 18, 2018, Rand Nolen, David Hobbs, and Rhome Zabriskie appeared on
behalf of Plaintiff Pia Merlo-Schmucker; Eric Schoonveld and Drew Warth appeared on behalf
of Defendant St. Mark’s Hospital (“St. Mark’s”); and Michael Miller and Kathleen Abke
appeared on behalf of Defendants Sherman Sorensen and Sorensen Cardiovascular Group
(“Sorensen Defendants”) for a telephonic ruling, which is reduced to writing here and is the
Order of the Court.
The matters before the Court are St. Mark’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended
Complaint and the Sorensen Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint. St.
Mark’s Motion to Dismiss will be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, and the
Sorensen Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss will be DENIED.
Both St. Mark’s and the Sorensen Defendants moved to dismiss all claims in the
Amended Complaint under Rule 12(b) on the grounds that all claims therein were barred by the
four-year statute of repose found in 78B-3-404(1) and (2) of Utah’s Medical Malpractice Act.
Those provisions require that claims be brought within four-years of the date of the alleged act,
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omission, neglect, or occurrence unless a patient has been prevented from discovering
misconduct on the part of a health care provider because that health care provider has
affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged misconduct.
It is not clear from the Amended Complaint whether any Defendant acted affirmatively
within the meaning of the statute to fraudulently conceal anything. The word “affirmatively” was
presumably and advisedly put into the statute—78B-3-404(1)—with meaning, and it appears to
have a meaning different from the common law. Under the statute, some affirmative act of
concealment is necessary to maintain an otherwise time-barred action. Defendants’ argument
that inaction or omission by a defendant is not sufficient to overcome the time bar appears to be
well taken.
That being said the Court is not convinced this issue is procedurally ripe at the Rule 12(b)
stage and questions whether the Plaintiff is obligated to combat an affirmative defense, however
likely or inevitably it is to be raised, in its initial pleading.
The Defendants have presented cases that clearly indicate that the Court has discretion to
address these issues under a 12(b) motion, however those cases are distinguishable in the Court’s
view. Roth v. Pederson was a judgment on the pleadings so the procedural context is similar, but,
based on what the Court can tell from the opinion, the relevant allegations in the Roth complaint
regarding fraudulent concealment were extremely sparse and entirely conclusory. 2009 UT App
313, 2009 WL 3490974 (unpublished). That is not the case here; the allegations have more detail
and more substance than what was apparently pled in Roth. Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. is more on point than Roth as it was a Rule 12(b) motion, converted into a Rule 56 Motion.
Tucker clearly gives a court discretion to entertain statute of limitations defenses in a motion to
3
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dismiss but did so under limited circumstances, which are not present here. 2002 UT 54, ¶ 8, 53
P.3d 947. In Tucker the plaintiff did not appear to offer any argument to counter the application
of the statute of limitations and there did not appear to be any dispute as to whether it would
have in fact barred the action, the plaintiff only argued that issue should not have be decided at
that stage. It is a close call, but the Court feels the Plaintiff in this case has done enough to move
her case into the next stage. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motions on the statute
of limitations/repose issue.
Defendants also seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s fraud-based claims for failure to allege them
with particularity as required by Rule 9(c). First, as to Plaintiff’s claim for negligent
misrepresentation, the Court finds the Amended Complaint contains no particular allegations as
to misrepresentations made by St. Mark’s Hospital. Similarly, Plaintiff’s fraud and fraudulent
concealment claims (as opposed to the exception to the statute of repose) also fail as to St.
Mark’s for failing to satisfy Rule 9(c). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS St. Mark’s Hospital’s
motion and DISMISSES the negligent misrepresentation (Count III), fraudulent concealment
(Count V), and fraud (Count VI) claims as to St. Mark’s Hospital. As to the Sorensen
Defendants, the Court finds the Amended Complaint alleges with particularity the fraud-based
claims. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motions to dismiss the negligent misrepresentation,
fraudulent concealment, and fraud claims as to the Sorensen Defendants. Further, the Court finds
the Amended Complaint adequately alleges civil conspiracy and therefore DENIES the motions
to dismiss the civil conspiracy (Count VII) claims as to all Defendants.
The Sorensen Defendants further argue that all of Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed
under the doctrine of claim preclusion due to the dismissal of the separate qui tam action, which
4
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involved claims by a relator under the federal False Claims Act. That dismissal is currently on
appeal with the Tenth Circuit. I find that the issues in the qui tam and this action are not
identical. Further, the parties are not identical, the parties are not in privity, and there has not
been a final judgment in the qui tam action. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Sorensen
Defendants’ motion to dismiss all claims under the doctrine of claim preclusion.
Finally, the Sorensen Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims for negligence, negligent
misrepresentation, fraud, and civil conspiracy are not cognizable as claims distinct from
Plaintiff’s medical negligence claim. While the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act does define a
malpractice action to include any action against a health care provider, whether in contract, tort,
breach of warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise, based upon alleged personal injuries relating to
or arising out of health care rendered or which should have been rendered by the health care
provider, it does so to identify the causes of action governed by the Act. But the Act does not
foreclose a plaintiff from pleading different causes of action or create one omnibus cause of
action. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Sorensen Defendants’ motion.

The Court’s

signature appears at the top of the first page of this order.
***Executed and entered by the Court as indicated by the date
and seal at the top of the first page***
-------------------------------------------END OF DOCUMENT--------------------------------------------
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Addendum D

Rhome D. Zabriskie
ZABRISKIE LAW FIRM, LLC
899 North Freedom Blvd, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84604
Tel: (801) 375-7680
Fax: (801) 375-7686
Email: rhomelawyer@yahoo.com
Counsel for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT – SALT LAKE CITY
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LISA TAPP,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
v.
SHERMAN SORENSEN, M.D.;
SORENSEN CARDIOVASCULAR
GROUP; AND IHC HEALTH SERVICES,
INC.,
Defendants.

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
(Tier 3 Filing)
(Jury Demanded)

Case No. 170904956
Judge Barry Lawrence

COMES NOW Plaintiff, by and through counsel, and hereby complain for causes of action
against the above-captioned Defendants, alleging as follows:
PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE
1.

Plaintiff Lisa Tapp is, and at all relevant times has been, a resident of Salt Lake

County, State of Utah.
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2.

Defendant SHERMAN SORENSEN, M.D. was, at all relevant times, a licensed

physician providing health care services in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
3.

Defendant SORENSEN CARDIOVASCULAR GROUP (SCG), was at all material

times, a Utah professional corporation in the business of providing health care services to residents
of Utah. Defendant SCG’s principal place of business is located at 5169 Cottonwood Street, No.
610, Murray, Utah. Defendant Sherman Sorensen owned and operated SCG as his primary medical
practice.
4.

Defendant IHC Health Services, Inc. (IHC) is a not-for-profit corporation based in

Salt Lake City, Utah with its principal place of business and corporate office at 36 S. State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111. IHC operates several healthcare facilities under d/b/a’s, including
Intermountain Medical Center, which has its principal place of business and corporate office at
5100 South State Street, Murray, Utah. IHC’s Registered Agent for Service is Anne D. Armstrong,
36 South State St. Suite 2200, Salt Lake City, UT 84111.
5.

Upon information and belief, at all material times, each of the Defendants were, or

may have been, an agent, servant, employer, employee, joint venture, partner, and/or alter ego of
one or more of each of the remaining Defendants, and were at all times acting within the purpose
and scope of such agency, servitude, joint venture, alter ego, partnership, or employment, and with
the authority, consent, approval, and/or ratification of each remaining Defendant.
6.

At all material times, Defendants were health care providers within the meaning of

the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-401 et seq., and each Defendant
provided health care services to Lisa Tapp.
7.

This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-5-

102.
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8.

Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-307.

9.

In bringing this action, Plaintiff complied with all statutory requirements regarding

pre-litigation review of this matter as set forth in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code
Ann. § 78B-3-416.
BACKGROUND
10.

This case is one of more than a thousand cases that are presently working their way

through the prelitigation process, which involve the medically unnecessary heart surgery by Dr.
Sherman Sorensen related to two kinds of holes in the heart. One is called an atrial septal defect
(ASD), and the other is a patent foramen ovale (PFO). Both are holes in the wall of tissue (septum)
between the left and right upper chambers of the heart (atria). An ASD is considered a birth defect
and is a failure of the septal tissue to form between the atria, PFO’s can only occur after birth when
the foramen ovale fails to close.1
11.

Life threatening ASD’s are generally discovered at birth and corrected

immediately. However, there are billions of adults who have small openings between the left and
right atriums of their hearts.2 The foramen ovale is an opening located in the wall separating the
two upper chambers of the heart, the atrial septum, which is used during fetal circulation to redirect
blood through the heart. In 75% of the population, the foramen ovale closes at birth when increased
blood pressure on the left side of the heart forces the opening to close. In those cases, where the
foramen ovale does not close at birth, a patent foramen ovale (PFO) results.

1

Dr. Sorensen at times earlier in his career referred to these two conditions interchangeably, but
for insurance reimbursement purposes decided that all PFO’s were ASD’s later in his practice.
Either way, and no matter what he called them, he closed holes indiscriminately and without
medical justification on thousands of people including the Plaintiff.
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12.

Approximately 25% of the healthy population have a PFO and will never require

any treatment or evaluation. Apart from extremely rare cases, patients with a PFO remain
completely unaware of the presence of the PFO because it’s almost never associated with
symptoms. Persistent patency of the foramen ovale is considered a normal anatomic variation.
13.

Only if a patient has a recurrence of cryptogenic (originating from unexplained

causes) stroke or transient ischemic attack (TIA), likely due to paradoxical embolization through
a PFO, and despite optimal medical therapy, may it be appropriate to close the PFO. Generally,
this closure is performed through a percutaneous surgical procedure. In the percutaneous
procedure, a patient undergoes a cardiac catheterization to determine the size and location of the
PFO.
14.

There has long been general agreement in the medical community—as far back as

2003—that PFO closure is not medically necessary, except in the limited circumstances where
there is a confirmed diagnosis of a recurrent cryptogenic stroke or TIA, despite optimum medical
management. At all material times, no widely accepted medical group specializing in cardiology
in the United States has ever recommended, advised, or suggested that closure is appropriate for
stroke or migraine prevention to patients that have not had recurrent crypotogenic strokes.
15.

In 2011, Defendant IHC adopted internal Guidelines for Percutaneous Closure of

Septal Defects of the Atrium that mirrored those promulgated by the American Heart
Association/American Stroke Association (AHA/ASA). The Guidelines state that “PFO closure
may be considered for patients with recurrent cryptogenic stroke (CS) despite optimal medical
therapy.” The IHC Guidelines note that PFO closure is only appropriate for “recurrent, confirmed,
clinical cryptogenic TIA or stroke.”
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16.

PFO could also, under Defendant IHC’s Guidelines, be considered for “patients

with a single well-documented significant stroke or systemic emboli in a high-risk patient who has
been comprehensively evaluated for alternative cause of embolic stroke.”

Under either

circumstance, the Guidelines require that the cardiologists ensure that the diagnosis of PFO and
cryptogenic stroke or embolism is confirmed by an independent neurology consult or a brain CT
or MRI, a MRA of the head and neck, an ambulatory telemetry monitor for atrial fibrillation, and
a TTE with bubbles to confirm the diagnosis. Defendant IHC’s Guidelines make clear that PFO
closure is never indicated for migraine headaches.
17.

Defendant IHC’s Guidelines are clear that PFO closure for migraine can only be

performed in the clinical trial setting and that there is currently “no RCT [randomized clinical
trials] to support use of PFO closure in the treatment of migraine headaches or asymptomatic
white-matter lesions.” These latter two categories of symptoms are precisely what Defendant
Sorensen treated Plaintiff for with a PFO closure.
18.

Defendant Sorensen frequently touted his excessive volume, touting that he has

more than a “10 year/3000 device history” of utilizing various devices (i.e. Amplatzer and Gore)
to perform PFO and ASD closures. Defendant Sorensen often referred patients to his “research”
and “data” for PFO and ASD closures at www.sorensenmd.com.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
19.

The following general allegations are common to all claims alleged herein:

20.

As noted, Defendant Dr. Sorensen is a cardiologist and was practicing

interventional cardiology. He had privileges at Defendant IHC and at other hospitals. From roughly
2002 to 2012, Defendant Sorensen performed more than 4,000 PFO and ASD closures, the
majority of those at IHC. The administration at IHC was on notice because of the sheer volume
5
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of the procedures performed by Defendant Sorensen and because of complaints from other
practitioners and employees that Defendant Sorensen was engaged in a practice of regularly
performing unnecessary, invasive cardiac procedures on his patients. Defendants enriched
themselves by submitting false and fraudulent medical billing to insurance companies, including
Plaintiff’s, for medically unnecessary procedures.
21.

During the hiring and credentialing process at IHC, Sorensen advised IHC

representatives of the medical treatment he was qualified to perform, and specifically informed
IHC how he would perform PFO closures. These procedures would include performing PFO and
ASD closures on patients that did not have recurrent cryptogenic strokes. Despite this, Defendant
IHC gave Sorensen hospital privileges, hired and paid him, and allowed him to utilize their
catheterization laboratory to perform these PFO procedures.
22.

Sorensen’s cardiac privileges at IHC were suspended on or about June 27, 2011,

following an internal investigation concluded that Sorensen had performed multiple, medically
unnecessary PFO closures and that Sorensen represented a threat to the health and safety of the
patients treated at IHC.
23.

The letter from IHC to Defendant Sorensen informing him in writing of his

suspension (effective June 27, 2011 through July 11, 2011), stated that the suspension was “taken
in good faith to prevent a threat to the health or safety of patients” at IHC and to “provide the
Medical Executive Committee the opportunity to further evaluate the patient care you have
provided, your professional conduct within the hospital and [to] determine if additional action
regarding your membership and privileges should be taken beyond the 14 day suspension.”
24.

Dr. Sorensen’s suspension was the direct result of the IHC’s acknowledgement of

what it had known for years, that Sorensen had performed thousands of medically unnecessary
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PFO closures at IHC. The suspension was a reversal of sorts for IHC because it had long
encouraged, profited, and provided a haven for Defendant Sorensen’s practice.
25.

Further, Defendant Sorensen and IHC created false statements and documents to

conceal the fact that Sorensen was performing medically unnecessary closures. These statements
include documenting migraine or stroke history where none existed, such as Plaintiff’s case.
26.

Defendant IHC supplied Sorensen with its catheterization lab facilities, hospital

staff such as nurses, administrative, and other support staff, and privileges to perform these
procedures whenever he saw fit, including for Plaintiff Lisa Tapp’s PFO procedure in October
2008. For example, the Patient Information pamphlet passed on to Plaintiff (and many other
patients) touts “a dedicated, specialized team of echo, nursing, catheterization laboratory, and
physician members” as “Why Our Program May Be Right For You” (Slide 30).
27.

Sorensen would routinely mislead his patients, who had no previous strokes or

TIAs, into believing that they were at extreme risk of debilitating stroke because of their PFO or
ASD. He would further mislead them that a closure procedure would be effective and was
medically necessary in order to prevent strokes. These misrepresentations were made to the vast
majority of his patients, including Plaintiff.
28.

Despite his representations to his patients, Sorensen often created medical charts

that falsely reflected that the patients had suffered from, or were at risk of suffering from, recurrent
cryptogenic stroke in order to get insurance to pay for the procedure. The effort to disguise the true
diagnosis and reason for the closures shows that Sorensen was always aware of and understood
the true standard of care for these procedures. IHC knew or should have known through a cursory
review of the patients’ files that they did not meet the closure indications in the standard of care.
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IHC, SCG, and Sorensen engaged in a conspiracy and/or concert of action, with each other to profit
from the perpetuation of Sorensen’s medically unnecessary closures.
29.

In a report released to the entire Department of Cardiology at IHC, it reported that

the study showed that “compliance with the guidelines for performing PFO closures” at IHC was
“less than ideal.” The review showed that the Guidelines had been violated in many of the cases
reviewed.
30.

Even though it did not issue these Guidelines until 2011, at all times relevant to this

case, IHC knew that septal closures were rarely indicated. For years IHC ignored the loud
objections from its own medical staff and leadership, including the Director of the Catheterization
Laboratory, Dr. Revenaugh, and the Medical Director for Cardiovascular Services at
Intermountain Healthcare, Dr. Donald L. Lappe, as well as written warnings and complaints from
Professor Andrew Michaels of the University of Utah. Further, IHC was informed by Dr. Nancy
Futrell, a neurologist who was a co-investigator with Defendant Sorensen on a trial performed at
IHC for the closure devices used by Defendant Sorensen, that Defendant Sorensen was performing
unnecessary closures outside of the criteria set by the trials. She spoke with several individuals
associated with IHC regarding Dr. Sorensen, including Dr. Lappe, chief of cardiology; William
Hamilton, medical director; Jeffrey Anderson, associate chief of cardiology; and Liz Hammond.
31.

After Sorensen’s 14-day suspension, he returned to work at IHC on or about July

12, 2011. It immediately became apparent that Sorensen had no intention of complying with the
IHC Guidelines for PFO closures, and that he would continue to perform medically unnecessary
procedures on patients not suffering from recurrent cryptogenic stroke despite optimal medical
therapy. Because Sorensen refused to comply with the Guidelines and represented an immediate
threat of harm to his patients, IHC moved to suspend Sorensen from practice in September 2011.
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Sorensen and IHC entered a Settlement Agreement, which was designed to prevent his permanent
suspension. However, within days of entering the Agreement, Sorensen was notified by IHC that
he was in violation of the Agreement. IHC threatened to take immediate action to suspend him,
and to report his misconduct to the National Practitioner Database. Sorensen promptly resigned to
avoid these adverse consequences.
32.

In Fall 2011/Winter 2012, Dr. James L. Orford, listed in the Cardiology Department

at Intermountain Health Center, authored an article “Understanding the Heart Defect – Patent
Foramen Ovale” in The Classroom on Intermountain’s website.

This publication lists

“Intermountain Medical Group” with a link at the bottom.
33.

Speaking on behalf of Intermountain, Dr. Orford states the following:


“Because PFO is very common and never causes any problems in most patients,
undergoing surgery to possibly prevent migraines and/or stroke usually isn’t worth
the risk.”



“It has been noted that PFO is more common in patients who experience migraine
with aura, but may patients with a PFO do not have migraine headaches and many
migraine patients do not have a PFO.”



“Furthermore, there is no conclusive evidence that fixing a PFO will benefit
migraines.”



“In a few cases, where patients have already suffered a confirmed cryptogenic
stroke without any possible cause, closing a PFO may be a viable option to prevent
future strokes.”



“However, it is important to consult with a neurologist and a cardiologist to
determine all of your options and whether surgical closure is recommended.”
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“Patients are also encouraged to enroll in a clinical trial so their response to
treatments can be studied, allowing scientists to learn more about this condition.”



“As leaders in cardiology, Intermountain Healthcare is always very conscientious
regarding how new technology is applied. For this reason, the Intermountain
Medical Group instituted specific “Guidelines for Percutaneous Closure of Septal
Defects” throughout all our hospitals and clinics.”



“We believe it is important to have clear, positive evidence for both the short-term
and long-term consequences of any procedure.”

Despite this publication and clear recognition, IHC did nothing to alert patients, including Lisa
Tapp, that no “clear, positive” evidence existed that PFO closure was effective for stroke
prevention in absence of a history of cryptogenic strokes or for migraine headache prevention.
34.

Defendant IHC also published “Fact Sheet for Patients and Families – PFO and

ASD Closure in the Cath Lab” with a publication range of 2011-2016. Among the recognized
risks of a PFO or ASD Closure include: temporary leg numbness or weakness in the first few
hours, bruising, bleeding, infection, or blood vessel damage whether cathether(s) were inserted,
damage to the heart muscle that may require open heart surgery, abnormal heart rhythm, blood
clots, heart attack or stroke, negative reaction to anesthetic or dye, and unforeseen complications.
While these risks are “uncommon” they are present for PFO and ASD Closures. The Fact Sheet
for Patients and Families also states the following:


“Why Might I need a PFO or ASD Closure? You might need a PFO closure if you’ve
had a stroke that is related to PFO.”
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“What are the benefits of a PFO or ASD closure procedure? PFO Closure has not been
found to reliably reduce migraines. Also, it is not indicated unless you’ve had a
previous TIA or stroke.”

35.

Despite the results of this audit, patient literature representations, stated opinion of

IHC cardiologists, and ample evidence that Defendant Sorensen had performed thousands of PFO
closures, Defendant IHC deliberately and consciously chose not to expand its audit to other PFO
closure patients from past years, including Plaintiff Lisa Tapp Defendant IHC never released
information to the public that Sorensen had performed medically unnecessary PFO procedures, as
this information was kept internal.
36.

IHC made a deliberate and conscious decision not to inform patients that they may

have had a medically unnecessary surgery, and chose not to reimburse Plaintiff Lisa Tapp, her
insurance company, (or any patients) who had procedures performed unnecessarily. Instead, IHC
kept the profits for itself.
PLAINTIFF LISA TAPP’S PFO CLOSURE AND INJURIES
37.

Plaintiff Lisa Tapp was 43 years old when she underwent the percutaneous closure

of a patent foramen oval at Intermountain Medical Center in Salt Lake County on September 18,
2008. The procedure was performed by Defendant Sherman Sorensen, M.D. using an 18 millimeter
Amplatzer septal occlude device—a device not approved by the FDA for use in this manner. The
safety and efficacy for using the Amplatzer device in a PFO closure to prevent strokes on patients
without recurrent cryptogenic stroke has never been established, even to this day.
38.

In fact, at all material times the Amplatzer septal occcluder has been indicated for

patients with “echocardiographic evidence of ostium secundum atrial septal defect.”

The
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Amplatzer instructions for use unequivocally state, “The use of this device has not been studied in
patients with patent foreman ovale.”
39.

Prior to Lisa’s percutaneous closure, she underwent a neurological history and

physical by Walter Reichert M.D. on August 15, 2008. The patient described a two-month history
of continuous paresthesias in the back of the neck and head. She also described “mild numbness
in her right thumb and hand while she is seated.” Importantly, a detailed neurological exam did
not show any abnormalities; specifically, there were no motor/strength deficits and no sensory
deficits.
40.

On August 20, 2008, a brain MRI, MRA of the intracranial arteries and an MRI of

the cervical spine were performed at Western Neurological Associates, where Dr. Reichert
practiced. The brain MRI was interpreted to show about fifteen bilateral non-specific white matter
lesions. A differential diagnosis is given for this finding: “includes demyelinating disease,
migraine headaches, vasculitis/inflammatory disease, chronic microvascular ischemic disease,
hypertension and post-traumatic sequela.” The differential diagnosis did not include embolic
strokes or events.
41.

On September 2, 2008, Lisa received a transthoracic echocardiogram and

transcranial doppler study in Defendant Sorensen’s office, SCG. The transthoracic echo is
interpreted to show an abnormal bubble study consistent with a right to left shunt across the atrial
septum and the transcranial doppler study is interpreted to show 5/5 conductance with a valsalva
maneuver. The 5/5 conductance is used to place the patient at “high risk stratification for stroke.”
42.

On this same day, Defendant Sorensen performed a history and physical on Lisa.

Among Defendant Sorensen’s findings, he concluded that Lisa did not have hyper coagulability
(despite a lack of testing for this), that she developed “well-defined symptoms of hemisensory”
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(despite no evidence of this in Lisa’s neurological exam), and that she had a history of migraines
(despite Lisa’s own claims to the contrary). Defendant Sorensen went on to state that Lisa had “a
change in her level of consciousness” and that her “right-sided weakness has been persistent.”
None of these findings were reflected in Lisa’s neurological exam. Defendant Sorensen claims the
non-specific white matter lesions seen on Lisa's brain MRI “are, therefore, most likely embolic.”
Defendant Sorensen made this diagnosis with virtually no medical support.
43.

To persuade Plaintiff to undergo a PFO closure, Defendant Sorensen represented

to Plaintiff that she was at high risk of a debilitating stroke due to the presence of her PFO/ASD.
In truth, the mere presence of the defect, without more, including a history of cryptogenic stroke,
is not a significant risk factor for stroke. Further, Sorensen passed out a Patient Information Patent
Foreman Ovale (PFO) handout to Plaintiff. Sorensen’s patient literature contained fraudulent
misrepresentations, unsupported data and statistics, outright falsehoods, and other misleading
statements, such as the following:


“Until recently, 40% of all strokes were unknown cause. We now know that most of
these unexplained strokes may be caused by a PFO (Patent Foramen Ovale)” (Stroke
and PFO Slide 2).



“Strokes resulting from septal defects have a 50% mortality rate.”



“PFO is diagnosed in 50-70% of patients with stroke of unknown cause” (What is
Known About PFO and Stroke Slide 12).



“Continued lifelong risk of stroke ranging from 2-9% each year.” (PFO Treatment
Options Aspirin/Plavix/Coumadin Slide 17).



“Stroke reduction to less than 1%” (PFO Treatment Options Catheter Closure of PFO).



“Septal Defect Closure Safety and Efficacy” (Slide 28).
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“Our rigorous Program requirements assure that you are informed and receive the safest
and most effective treatment” (Why Our Program Might Be Right For You Slide 30).

These statements induced and persuaded Plaintiff to undergo a PFO closure at IHC by inducing
fear of an imminent and debilitating stroke, downplaying safer and accepted treatment options,
misrepresenting the indication for PFO in the medical community, and downplaying the risks of
PFO closure.
44.

Further, Plaintiff’s medical records authorized by Defendant Sorensen are replete

with fraudulent misrepresentations, falsehoods, and other misleading statements containing
information presented to Plaintiff to induce her to have the closure procedure. These statements
include:


“Our approach is a preventative strategy. It is scientifically based, but it is an
aggressive strategy.” In fact, Dr. Sorenson’s method has never been accepted in any
scientific journal, organization, been approved for a randomized clinical trial, and/or
the peer review process for his data and proposed indication for PFO closure. “We,
therefore follow a preventative strategy and risk stratify patients based on the
studies…proposed by the American Academy of Neurology.” That is false; the AAN
did not recommend closure outside of clinical trials and encouraged patients to
participate in research protocols.



“8 studies demonstrate that very high flow is the main feature of stroke risk.” In fact,
the AAN Practice Parameter did not find an association, much less causation, of
shunting and risk of stroke recurrence.
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“Randomized trials are not available currently.” In reality, the Closure I trial was
opened in Salt Lake City, Utah. It was halted due to Defendant Sorensen’s medically
unnecessary off-label PFO procedures of patients outside the trial.



“Coumadin is considered to be unsafe and ineffective…based on studies.” In fact, the
SPIRIT, WASID and WARRS studies showed no such thing.



Within Plaintiff’s medical records, Sorenson noted that Ms. Tapp had a history of
migraine. That too was false, misleading, and inaccurate. Dr. Sorenson made this
notation without any objective evidence.



Defendant Sorenson certified that his echocardiography lab was certified by ICAEL
(Intersocietal Commission for Accreditation Laboratories) using the ICAEL logo on
his echochardiogram. In fact, his lab was never accredited by ICAEL and this was
false.

Plaintiff was unaware of the misrepresentations and falsehoods in her medical records and instead
trusted what the Defendants had told her during her of treatment. Further, and even if she had been
aware of some the factual mischaracterizations, as non-expert she could not have understood their
implications as it relates the appropriateness of her medical treatment.
45.

Ultimately, Defendant Sorensen performed the percutaneous closure on September

18, 2008, at Defendant IHC’s Cardiac Catheterization Laboratory. The following day, a
transthoracic echocardiogram was performed at Defendant IHC on Lisa prior to discharge. A
color-flow doppler test was not performed to evaluate the atrial septum for a residual shunt, which
was ostensibly one of the reasons for closing Lisa’s PFO.
46.

In a patient with strong or definitive evidence for embolic stroke, the standard of

care requires a comprehensive evaluation for all of the causes of embolic stroke. This was not
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performed by Dr. Sorensen in his care of Plaintiff. A comprehensive evaluation for causes of
"cryptogenic" stroke includes an MRI of the brain (which was done in this case), imaging of the
extra cranial and intracranial cerebral arteries, 3-4 week rhythm monitoring to look for paroxysmal
atrial fibrillation, imaging of the aorta to look for atherosclerotic disease, lower extremity venous
doppler/ultrasound, MRV of the abdominal and pelvic veins, and a hyper coagulability workup.
Sorensen did not conduct this evaluation on Plaintiff.
47.

Defendant IHC was aware that this type of off-label medically unnecessary PFO

closure was being performed on hundreds of patients, including Plaintiff, during this time of
October 2008 as Defendant Sorensen had informed Defendant IHC he would perform the
procedure in this manner.
48.

On October 15, 2008, Lisa Tapp was seen by Defendant Sorensen for a follow-up

visit. Lisa complained of palpitations and a rapid heart rate. Defendant Sorensen did not screen
Lisa for atrial fibrillation, which carries with it the risk of stroke.
49.

Because of Defendants’ conduct, Lisa suffered damages, including undergoing an

unnecessary surgical procedure and hospital stay, as well as medical expenses, physical pain, and
emotional anguish.
50.

Despite IHC’s awareness of Sorensen’s fraudulent and/or negligent practices, it did

nothing to notify Plaintiff. Instead, IHC actively allowed Sorensen’s practice to continue in order
to profit from the thousands of unnecessary procedures performed on patients like Plaintiff. In fact,
IHC has to this day actively concealed its knowledge about Sorensen’s rogue and fraudulent
practices at its facility from patients, third party payers, and the public, and has retained the money
earned off of Sorensen’s medically unnecessary surgeries.
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51.

The FDA issued a warning about serious erosion events with Amplatzer Septal

Occluder devices in October 2013. Although erosion events are not currently an issue for Lisa
Tapp, the Amplatzer Septal Occluder device is permanently implanted and carries this risk.
52.

IHC sent a letter to patients around February 2014 alerting patients who had an

Amplatzer Septal Occluder device implanted about the FDA’s findings with a link to the FDA
announcement and St. Jude patient advisory. The letter sent to patients did not mention anything
about Dr. Sorensen, the PFO closure procedure itself, or that medical malpractice may have
occurred. Nor did the letter inform patients, including Lisa Tapp, that the PFO closure was
medically unnecessary to begin with, that the use of this device for PFO closure had not been
studied, accepted, and/or approved in the medical community, and that Defendant Sorensen had
asserted misrepresentations, falsehoods, half-truths, and engaged in other deceptive acts.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF: NEGLIGENCE (HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE)
53.

Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully

54.

Defendants, individually, collectively, and through the acts and omissions of their

herein.

agents, servants, employees, physicians, nurses, therapists, and technologists (hereinafter
collectively “Defendants”) accepted Plaintiff as a patient, and thereby assumed various duties of
care.
55.

At all relevant times, Defendants held themselves out as being able to provide full

care and treatment for patients requiring medical care of the type that Plaintiff required, including,
but not limited to, paresthesias in the back of the neck and head and non-specific white matter
lesions, among other things.
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56.

The degree of care and treatment provided to Plaintiff fell below the acceptable

standards of care for the types of medical care and treatment required by Plaintiff and provided by
Defendants.
57.

Specifically, Defendants breached the applicable standards of care in multiple ways

including, but not limited to:
a. Falsifying Plaintiff’s medical records to indicate that Plaintiff was an appropriate
candidate for closure;
b. Misleading Plaintiff regarding the risks and benefits associated with closure and
regarding the necessity of treatment;
c. Failing to obtain an adequate history which resulted in an improper medical
diagnosis that Plaintiff was an appropriate candidate for closure;
d. Failing to conduct an adequate physical and to obtain appropriate diagnostic testing,
which resulted in an improper medical diagnosis that Plaintiff was an appropriate
candidate for PFO closure; Performing a medically unnecessary medical procedure
with a device that was not FDA approved for this use;
e. Failing to test for residual shunting after performing the PFO closure; and
f. Failing to screen Plaintiff for atrial fibrillation when she presented with palpitations
and a rapid heart rate.
58.

As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of Defendants’ acts and omissions,

Defendants caused Plaintiff to undergo unnecessary medical procedures, testing, and follow-up
visits, incur unnecessary medical expenses, and experience physical injuries and emotional
anguish.
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59.

As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of Defendants’ acts and omissions,

Plaintiff has suffered personal injuries, including by not limited to unnecessary medical
procedures, testing, follow-up visits, medical expenses, and emotional anguish.
60.

Plaintiff has therefore been injured and is entitled to recover general and special

damages in an amount to be determined at trial.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF: NEGLIGENCE
61.

Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully

62.

At all relevant times, Defendants owed Plaintiff various duties of care, including

herein.

but not limited to common law and statutory duties.
63.

Defendants, individually and collectively, breached these duties of care.

64.

As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of Defendants’ acts and omission,

Defendants caused personal and other injuries to Plaintiff.
65.

Plaintiff has been injured and is entitled to recover general and special damages in

amounts to be determined at trial.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF: NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
66.

Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully

67.

Defendants, individually and collectively, represented to Plaintiff that medical

herein.

procedures, testing, and follow-up visits were medically necessary.
68.

Defendants’ representations that Plaintiff’s medical procedures, testing, and

follow-up visits were medically necessary was, in fact, not true.
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69.

Defendants failed to use reasonable care to determine whether the representations

regarding the necessity of Plaintiff’s medical care was true.
70.

Defendants were in a better position than Plaintiff to know the true facts regarding

Plaintiff’s medical procedures, testing, and follow-up care.
71.

Defendants had a financial interest in performing medically unnecessary

procedures, testing, and follow-up care on Plaintiff.
72.

Plaintiff relied on Defendants’ representations, and it was reasonable for her to do

73.

Plaintiff has therefore been injured as a result of relying on Defendants’

so.

representations and is entitled to recover general and special damages in an amount to be
determined at trial.
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: NEGLIGENT CREDENTIALING
74.

Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully

75.

Defendant IHC owes a duty to patients to exercise reasonable care in the selection

herein.

of its medical staff and in granting specialized privileges to them. It also has the duty to periodically
monitor and review the qualifications and competency of its medical staff.
76.

Defendant IHC breached its duty to exercise reasonable care in its selection of its

medical staff, and in granting specialized privileges to and periodically monitoring and reviewing
the qualifications and competency of its medical staff.
77.

As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of its breach, Defendant IHC caused

harm to Plaintiff.
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78.

Plaintiff has been injured and is entitled to recover general and special damages in

an amount to be determined at trial.
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: FRAUDULANT NON-DISCLOSURE/CONCEALMENT
79.

Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully

80.

Defendants owed a duty to Plaintiff to disclose important facts, such as the medical

herein.

necessity of Plaintiff’s medical care, to Plaintiff.
81.

Defendants knew that the medical care Defendants provided to Plaintiff was not

medically necessary, and failed to disclose this to Plaintiff.
82.

Plaintiff did not know that the medical care provided by Defendants was not

medically necessary.
83.

Defendants’ failure to disclose the fact that Plaintiff’s medical care was not

necessary was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s damages. Had Plaintiff known that her
closure surgery was not necessary, Plaintiff would not have undergone the surgery.
84.

Plaintiff has been injured and is entitled to recover general and special damages

in an amount to be determined at trial.
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: FRAUD
85.

Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully

86.

At all relevant times, Defendants had a duty and obligation to disclose to Plaintiff

herein.

true facts concerning the medical care provided to Plaintiff by Defendants.
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87.

Defendants intentionally concealed material facts concerning Plaintiff’s medical

care from Plaintiff including, but not limited to the following:
a. Falsifying Plaintiff’s medical records to indicate that she was an appropriate
candidate for closure;
b.

Performing medically unnecessary medical procedures with a device that was not
FDA approved for this use; and

c. Concealing from Plaintiff that medical procedures, testing, and follow-up care was
unnecessary.
88.

Defendants made false statements and misrepresentations about important facts

regarding Plaintiff’s medical care.
89.

Defendants made these false statements and misrepresentations described above

knowing that the statements were false, or with reckless disregard for their truth.
90.

Defendants made the false statements and misrepresentations to Plaintiff, with the

intent that Plaintiff would rely on the statements.
91.

Plaintiff did reasonably rely on the false statements and misrepresentations made

by Defendants.
92.

As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of Defendants’ false statements and

misrepresentations, Plaintiff has suffered personal injuries, including but not limited to
unnecessary medical procedures, testing, follow-up visits, medical expenses, and emotional
anguish.
SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: CIVIL CONSPIRACY
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93.

Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully

94.

Defendants were acting in a conspiracy to commit fraud, thereby increasing their

herein.

profits through the performance of medically unnecessary procedures on patients, including
Plaintiff.
95.

There was an agreement and meeting of the minds among Defendant Sorensen,

Defendant SCG, and Defendant IHC to misrepresent the need for and induce patients, including
Plaintiff, into undergoing medically unnecessary procedures, testing, and follow-up. Defendants
agreed to act in concert in making these misrepresentations about the necessity of medical
procedures to Plaintiff.
96.

There were multiple unlawful, overt acts by Defendant Sorensen, Defendant SCG,

and Defendant IHC in furtherance of their scheme, including without limitation, Defendants’
fraud.
97.

As a result of this conspiracy, Defendant Sorensen, Defendant SCG, and Defendant

IHC, should be held jointly and severally liable for the conduct of the other co-conspirators and
the damages that Plaintiff sustained as a proximate result thereof, including without limitation
personal injuries and other injuries.
98.

Plaintiff would further show that Defendant Sorensen and Defendant SCG were

operating as alter egos for the purpose of perpetrating the above described conspiracy. There was
such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the company and the
individual did not exist. Observing the corporate form will sanction this conspiracy, promote
injustice, and allow an inequitable result.
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EQUITABLE TOLLING/FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT
99.

Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully

100.

Because of Defendants’ concealment of material facts and misleading conduct,

herein.

Plaintiff was not aware of her causes of action.
101.

Plaintiff found out about her cause of action only after learning of Defendants’

conduct through lawyer advertising in 2017.
102.

Defendants took affirmative steps to conceal Plaintiff’s cause of action. Given

Defendants’ concealment and misleading conduct, a reasonable plaintiff would not have
discovered the cause of action earlier.
103.

IHC, through its employees, physicians, internal audit, and Sorensen’s own

representations was well aware that Sorensen had performed medically unnecessary PFO and ASD
closures on patients such as Plaintiff, but chose not to conduct a more expansive audit and/or
inform patients that had an unnecessary surgery.
104.

Neither Sorenson, nor IHC ever notified Plaintiff that she had received an

unnecessary procedure, that she was never indicated for the surgery to begin with, that the device
implanted into Plaintiff was never medically necessary, was retained in her body for no medical
purpose, and that the informed consent contained fraudulent, misleading, and/or incomplete
statements. Neither Sorenson, nor IHC, ever compensated Plaintiff for the unnecessary medical
surgery she underwent by reimbursing the costs of the procedure.
105.

Neither Sorensen, nor IHC, ever made a public statement, sent a letter, made a

public announcement, or issued a press release to inform patients, such as Plaintiff Lisa Tapp, may
have had a medically unnecessary PFO closure at IHC at any time.
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106.

Defendants’ misrepresentations and misleading conduct constitutes fraudulent

concealment that equitably tolls any proffered statute of limitation that may otherwise bar the
recovery sought by Plaintiff.
107.

Plaintiff did not know, nor should have known, of the causes of action against

Defendants prior to being put on notice of Defendants’ potential liability in 2017. She neither
discovered, nor reasonably should have discovered, the facts underlying her causes of action before
any proffered statute of limitations period expired.
108.

As a result of Defendants’ concealment of the true character, quality and nature of

their conduct, they are estopped from relying on any statute of limitations defense. Defendants’
affirmative acts and omissions, before, during, and/or after their actions causing Plaintiff’s injury
prevented Plaintiff from discovering the injury or cause thereof until recently in 2017. Such
conduct tolls the limitations pursuant to the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act 78B-3-404(b).
109.

Defendants’ conduct, because it was purposely committed, was known or should

have been known by them to be dangerous, heedless, reckless, and without regard to the
consequences or the rights and safety of Plaintiff.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for a judgment (under URCP: Tier 3) against Defendants in an
amount to be determined by the trier of fact for the following damages:
a. For special damages in an amount to be determined at trial;
b. For general damages in an amount to be determined at trial;
c. For pre and post judgment interest on all special damages pursuant to Utah law;
d. For costs and attorney fees to the extent allowed by law; and
e. For such other relief as the Court deems appropriate.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21st day of November 2017.
/s/ Rhome D. Zabriskie
Rhome D. Zabriskie
ZABRISKIE LAW FIRM, LLC
899 North Freedom Blvd, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84604
Tel: (801) 375-7680
Fax: (801) 375-7686
Email: rhomelawyer@yahoo.com
FLEMING, NOLEN & JEZ, LLP
Rand P. Nolen (Pro Hac Vice submission in
progress)
David L. Hobbs (Pro Hac Vice submission in
progress)
2800 Post Oak Blvd., Suite 4000
Houston, TX 77056-6109
Telephone: (713) 621-7944
Facsimile: (713) 621-9638
Email: rand_nolen@fleming-law.com
Email: david_hobbs@fleming-law.com
Counsel for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that that a true and exact copy of the foregoing has been served on the following
via the Court’s ECF filing system and/or Email on 21ST day of November, 2017:
Alan C. Bradshaw
Sammi V. Anderson
John (Jack) T. Nelson
Mitch M. Longson
Manning, Curtis, Bradshaw & Bednar PLLC
136 East South Temple, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Phone: 801-363-5678
Fax: 801-364-5678
abradshaw@mc2b.com
sanderson@mc2b.com
jnelson@mc2b.com
mlongson@mc2b.com
Attorneys for IHC Health Services, Inc.
Michael J. Miller
Strong & Hanni
102 South 200 East, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
mmiller@strongandhanni.com
Attorney for Defendants Sherman Sorensen, M.D. and Sorensen Cardiovascular Group
/s/ Rhome D. Zabriskie
Rhome D. Zabriskie
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Addendum E

Rhome D. Zabriskie
ZABRISKIE LAW FIRM, LLC
899 North Freedom Blvd, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84604
Tel: (801) 375-7680
Fax: (801) 375-7686
Email: rhomelawyer@yahoo.com
Counsel for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT – SALT LAKE CITY
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PIA MERLO-SCHMUCKER,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
v.
SHERMAN SORENSEN, M.D.;
SORENSEN CARDIOVASCULAR
GROUP; AND ST. MARK’S HOSPITAL,
Defendants.

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
(Tier 3 Filing)
(Jury Demanded)

Civil No. 170906130
Judge Matthew Bates

COMES NOW Plaintiff, by and through counsel, and hereby complain for causes of action
against the above-captioned Defendants, alleging as follows:
PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE
1.

Plaintiff Pia Merlo-Schmucker is, and at all relevant times has been, a resident of

Davis County, State of Utah.
2.

Defendant SHERMAN SORENSEN, M.D. was, at all relevant times, a licensed

physician providing health care services in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
1
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3.

Defendant SORENSEN CARDIOVASCULAR GROUP (SCG), was at all material

times, a Utah professional corporation in the business of providing health care services to residents
of Utah. Defendant SCG’s principal place of business is located at 5169 Cottonwood Street, No.
610, Murray, Utah. Defendant Sherman Sorensen owned and operated SCG as his primary medical
practice.
4.

Defendant ST. MARK’S HOSPITAL. (St. Mark’s) is a for-profit corporation based

in Salt Lake City, Utah with its principal place of business and corporate office at 1200 E 3900 S
Salt Lake City, UT 84124. St. Mark’s Registered Agent for Service CT Corporation System, 1108
E South Union Ave., Midvale UT 84047.
5.

Upon information and belief, at all material times, each of the Defendants were, or

may have been, an agent, servant, employer, employee, joint venture, partner, and/or alter ego of
one or more of each of the remaining Defendants, and were at all times acting within the purpose
and scope of such agency, servitude, joint venture, alter ego, partnership, or employment, and with
the authority, consent, approval, and/or ratification of each remaining Defendant.
6.

At all material times, Defendants were health care providers within the meaning of

the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-401 et seq., and each Defendant
provided health care services to Pia Merlo-Schmucker.
7.

This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-5-

8.

Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-307.

9.

In bringing this action, Plaintiff complied with all statutory requirements regarding

102.

pre-litigation review of this matter as set forth in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code
Ann. § 78B-3-416.
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BACKGROUND
10.

This case is one of more than a thousand cases that are presently working their way

through the prelitigation process, which involve the medically unnecessary heart surgery by Dr.
Sherman Sorensen related to two kinds of holes in the heart. One is called an atrial septal defect
(ASD), and the other is a patent foramen ovale (PFO). Both are holes in the wall of tissue (septum)
between the left and right upper chambers of the heart (atria). An ASD is considered a birth defect
and is a failure of the septal tissue to form between the atria, PFOs can only occur after birth when
the foramen ovale fails to close.1
11.

Life threatening ASD’s are generally discovered at birth and corrected

immediately. However, there are billions of adults who have small openings between the left and
right atriums of their hearts. The foramen ovale is an opening located in the wall separating the
two upper chambers of the heart, the atrial septum, which is used during fetal circulation to redirect
blood through the heart. In 75% of the population, the foramen ovale closes at birth when increased
blood pressure on the left side of the heart forces the opening to close. In those cases, where the
foramen ovale does not close at birth, a patent foramen ovale (PFO) results.
12.

Approximately 25% of the healthy population have a PFO and will never require

any treatment or evaluation. Apart from extremely rare cases, patients with a PFO remain
completely unaware of the presence of the PFO because it’s almost never associated with
symptoms. Persistent patency of the foramen ovale is considered a normal anatomic variation.

1

Dr. Sorensen at times earlier in his career referred to these two conditions interchangeably, but
for insurance reimbursement purposes decided that all PFO’s were ASD’s later in his practice.
Either way, and no matter what he called them, he closed holes indiscriminately and without
medical justification on thousands of people, including the Plaintiff.
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13.

Only if a patient has a recurrence of cryptogenic (originating from unexplained

causes) stroke or transient ischemic attack (TIA), likely due to paradoxical embolization through
a PFO, and despite optimal medical therapy, may it be appropriate to close the PFO. Generally,
this closure is performed through a percutaneous surgical procedure. In the percutaneous
procedure, a patient undergoes a cardiac catheterization to determine the size and location of the
PFO.
14.

There has long been general agreement in the medical community—as far back as

2003—that PFO closure is not medically necessary, except in the limited circumstances where
there is a confirmed diagnosis of a recurrent cryptogenic stroke or TIA, despite optimum medical
management. At all material times, no widely accepted medical group specializing in cardiology
in the United States has ever recommended, advised, or suggested that closure is appropriate for
stroke or migraine prevention to patients that have not had recurrent crypotogenic strokes.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
15.

The following general allegations are common to all claims alleged herein:

16.

As noted, Defendant Dr. Sorensen is a cardiologist and was practicing

interventional cardiology. He had privileges at Defendant St. Mark’s and at other hospitals. From
roughly 2002 to 2012, Defendant Sorensen performed more than 4,000 PFO and ASD closures,
many of those at St. Mark’s. Dr. Sorensen performed the procedures at a rate that dwarfed the rest
of the country by a factor of ten-to-twenty fold, making him a true outlier.
17.

The administration at St. Mark’s was on notice because of the sheer volume of the

procedures performed by Defendant Sorensen and because of complaints from other practitioners
and employees that Defendant Sorensen was engaged in a practice of regularly performing
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unnecessary, invasive cardiac procedures on his patients. St. Mark’s ignored obvious warnings to
halt these procedures so that it could secure and maintain a lucrative stream of income.
18.

Further, during the hiring and credentialing process at St. Mark’s, Sorensen advised

St. Mark’s representatives of how he would perform closures and under what conditions. And a
result, St. Mark’s was aware that he would be performing unnecessary closures on patients that
did not have recurrent cryptogenic strokes.
19.

Further, Sorensen’s cardiac privileges at another hospital were suspended on or

about June 27, 2011, following an internal investigation concluded that Sorensen had performed
multiple, medically unnecessary PFO closures and that Sorensen represented a threat to the health
and safety of the patients treated. And St. Mark’s CEO Steve Bateman and physician liaison Nikki
Gledhill were aware of Sorensen’s suspension.
20.

Defendants Sorensen and St. Mark’s created false statements and documents to

conceal the fact that Sorensen was performing medically unnecessary closures. These statements
include documenting migraine or stroke history where none existed. For instance, Sorensen often
created medical charts that falsely reflected that the patients had suffered from, or were at risk of
suffering from, recurrent cryptogenic stroke in order to get insurance to pay for the procedure. The
effort to disguise the true diagnosis and reason for the closures shows that Sorensen was always
aware of and understood the true standard of care for these procedures.
21.

Sorensen would routinely mislead his patients, who had no previous strokes or

TIAs, into believing that they were at extreme risk of debilitating stroke because of their PFO or
ASD. He would further mislead them that a closure procedure would be effective and was
medically necessary in order to prevent strokes. These misrepresentations were made to the vast
majority of his patients, including Plaintiff.
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22.

Despite the fact that St. Mark’s knew that Sorensen was performing medically

unnecessary closures, and knew that Sorensen had been suspended for performing medically
unnecessary closures at another hospital, St. Mark’s Hospital continued to court Sorensen’s
business, provide a platform and assistance to Sorensen, and advertise and promote Sorensen and
closure practice to the public for its own financial gain.
23.

In particular, the catheterization lab staff at St. Mark’s became financially

dependent on Sorensen’s incredible volume. The majority of patients at St. Mark’s cardiac
catheterization laboratory came from Sorensen, dwarfing all other cardiology business at St.
Mark’s. As a result, St. Mark’s provided special treatment to Sorensen with staffing and scheduling
in its catheterization lab, often to the detriment of true cardiac patients and other cardiologists. St.
Mark’s also provided open access for PFO industry representatives to the lab and
personnel. Industry provided order-in meals were available to those catheterization lab personnel
that were willing to share in the largesse.
24.

Ultimately, St. Mark’s made a deliberate and conscious decision not to inform

patients that they may have had a medically unnecessary surgery, and chose not to reimburse
Plaintiff, her insurance company, or any of its other patients who had procedures performed
unnecessarily. Instead, St. Mark’s kept the profits for itself.
PLAINTIFF’S CLOSURE AND INJURIES
25.

On December 21, 2010, a transthoracic echocardiogram (TTE) was performed on

Ms. Merlo-Schmucker in Dr. Sorensen's office. Medical records indicate that the patient was
referred by Tyler Williams MD and that the indication is cognitive changes and a murmur. A
transcranial doppler study (TCD) is performed as well. The echocardiogram was interpreted to
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show "severe right to left shunt after valsalva." The TCD study was interpreted to show 5+/5
conductance with calibrated respiratory strain."
26.

On December 28, 2010, a brain MRI was performed at Western Neurological

Associates. This did not conclusively demonstrate evidence of a previous stroke. A "tiny
nonspecific focus of flair sequence hyperintensity" is described. A differential diagnosis is given
that includes "embolic disease." But the radiologist also dictates "imaging artifact is not entirely
excluded."
27.

On February 10, 2011, a percutaneous closure of a septal defect was accomplished

using a 25 mm Gore HELEX ASD device. This was guided by intracardiac echo. Dr. Sorensen
referred to the septal defect as an atrial septal defect. Following deployment of the device, color
flow doppler showed no left to right flow and a contrast bubble study was negative for right to left
shunting.
28.

On February 11, 2011, prior to discharge from St. Mark’s, a transthoracic

echocardiogram was performed. The report states that color flow doppler "does not demonstrate
a residual shunt," but a bubble study was not performed.
29.

The accepted indications for closure of an atrial septal defect include right

ventricular chamber enlargement, which was not seen on Ms. Merlo-Schmucker's
echocardiograms, orthodeoxia-platypnea, which was not described by Dr. Sorensen, and
paradoxical embolism.
30.

In a patient with strong or definitive evidence for embolic stroke, the standard of

care requires a comprehensive evaluation for all of the causes of embolic stroke. This was not
performed by Dr. Sorensen in his care of Ms. Merlo-Schmucker. A comprehensive evaluation for
causes of "cryptogenic" stroke includes an MRI of the brain (which was done in this case), imaging
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of the extra cranial and intracranial cerebral arteries, 3-4 week rhythm monitoring to look for
paroxysmal atrial fibrillation, imaging of the aorta to look for atherosclerotic disease, lower
extremity venous doppler/ultrasound, MRV of the abdominal and pelvic veins, and a hyper
coagulability workup. But Sorensen did not perform the required comprehensive evaluation.
31.

To persuade Plaintiff to undergo closure, Defendant Sorensen represented to

Plaintiff that she was at high risk of a debilitating stroke due to the presence of her PFO/ASD and
that closure was medically necessary. In truth, the mere presence of the defect, without more,
including a history of cryptogenic stroke, is not a significant risk factor for stroke. Further,
Sorensen passed out a Patient Information Patent Foreman Ovale (PFO) handout to Plaintiff.
Sorensen’s patient literature contained fraudulent misrepresentations, unsupported data and
statistics, outright falsehoods, and other misleading statements, such as the following:


“Until recently, 40% of all strokes were unknown cause. We now know that most of
these unexplained strokes may be caused by a PFO (Patent Foramen Ovale)”



“Strokes resulting from septal defects have a 50% mortality rate.”



“PFO is diagnosed in 50-70% of patients with stroke of unknown cause”



“Continued lifelong risk of stroke ranging from 2-9% each year.”



“Stroke reduction to less than 1%”



“Septal Defect Closure Safety and Efficacy”



“Our rigorous Program requirements assure that you are informed and receive the safest
and most effective treatment”

In addition, to the handout Sorensen made other misrepresentations to Plaintiff both in orally and
in writing. These misrepresentations include:
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“Our approach is a preventative strategy. It is scientifically based, but it is an
aggressive strategy.” In fact, Dr. Sorenson’s method has never been accepted in any
scientific journal, organization, been approved for a randomized clinical trial, and/or
the peer review process for his data and proposed indication for PFO closure. “We,
therefore follow a preventative strategy and risk stratify patients based on the
studies…proposed by the American Academy of Neurology.” That is false; the AAN
did not recommend closure outside of clinical trials and encouraged patients to
participate in research protocols.



“8 studies demonstrate that very high flow is the main feature of stroke risk.” In fact,
the AAN Practice Parameter did not find an association, much less causation, of
shunting and risk of stroke recurrence.



“Randomized trials are not available currently.” In reality, the Closure I trial was
opened in Salt Lake City, Utah. It was halted due to Defendant Sorensen’s medically
unnecessary off-label PFO procedures of patients outside the trial.



“Coumadin is considered to be unsafe and ineffective…based on studies.” In fact, the
SPIRIT, WASID and WARRS studies referenced by Sorensen showed no such thing.



Defendant Sorenson certified that his echocardiography lab was certified by ICAEL
(Intersocietal Commission for Accreditation Laboratories) using the ICAEL logo on
his echochardiogram. In fact, his lab was never accredited by ICAEL and this was
false.

These false statements were intended to and did in fact induce Plaintiff to undergo closure at St.
Mark’s by inducing fear of an imminent and debilitating stroke, downplaying safer and accepted
treatment options, misrepresenting the indication for closure, and downplaying the risks of closure.
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32.

Despite St. Mark's awareness of Sorensen’s fraudulent and/or negligent practices,

it did nothing to notify Ms. Merlo-Schmucker. Instead, St. Mark's actively allowed Sorensen’s
practice to continue in order to profit from the thousands of unnecessary procedures performed on
patients like Ms. Merlo-Schmucker. In fact, St. Mark's has to this day actively concealed its
knowledge about Sorensen’s rogue and fraudulent practices at its facility from patients, third party
payers, and the public, and has retained the money earned off of Sorensen’s medically unnecessary
surgeries.
33.

Plaintiff could not have known that the information provided by Defendants was

false. Instead, she trusted that Defendants Sorensen and St. Mark’s, as her health care providers,
were being truthful. Further, even if she had been aware of some of the factual
mischaracterizations, as a non-expert she could not have understood their implications as it relates
the appropriateness of her medical treatment.
34.

Because of Defendants’ fraudulent statements and omissions, Plaintiff was until

recently unaware of her cause of action. In fact, Plaintiff only learned of the Defendants’
misconduct as a result lawyer advertising. Her diligent investigation resulted in the noticing and
filing of this action within the statutory period.
35.

Because of Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff suffered significant damages, including:

i.

undergoing an unnecessary surgical procedure and hospital stay,

ii.

paying significant medical expenses to Defendants,

iii.

physical pain, and
emotional anguish as a result of being told she was at immediate risk of a debilitating
or even deadly stroke.
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FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF: NEGLIGENCE (HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE)
36.

Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully

37.

Defendants, individually, collectively, and through the acts and omissions of their

herein.

agents, servants, employees, physicians, nurses, therapists, and technologists (hereinafter
collectively “Defendants”) accepted Plaintiff as a patient, and thereby assumed various duties of
care.
38.

At all relevant times, Defendants held themselves out as being able to provide full

care and treatment for patients requiring medical care of the type that Plaintiff required.
39.

The degree of care and treatment provided to Plaintiff fell below the acceptable

standards of care for the types of medical care and treatment required by Plaintiff and provided by
Defendants.
40.

Specifically, Defendants breached the applicable standards of care in multiple ways

including, but not limited to:
a. Falsifying Plaintiff’s medical records to indicate that Plaintiff was an appropriate
candidate for closure;
b. Misleading Plaintiff regarding the risks and benefits associated with closure and
regarding the necessity of treatment;
c. Failing to obtain an adequate history which resulted in an improper medical
diagnosis that Plaintiff was an appropriate candidate for closure;
d. Failing to conduct an adequate physical and to obtain appropriate diagnostic testing,
which resulted in an improper medical diagnosis that Plaintiff was an appropriate
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candidate for PFO closure; Performing a medically unnecessary medical procedure
with a device that was not FDA approved for this use; and
41.

As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of Defendants’ acts and omissions,

Defendants caused Plaintiff to undergo unnecessary medical procedures, testing, and follow-up
visits, incur unnecessary medical expenses, and experience physical injuries and emotional
anguish.
42.

As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of Defendants’ acts and omissions,

Plaintiff has suffered personal injuries, including by not limited to unnecessary medical
procedures, testing, follow-up visits, medical expenses, and emotional anguish.
43.

Plaintiff has therefore been injured and is entitled to recover general and special

damages in an amount to be determined at trial.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF: NEGLIGENCE
44.

Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully

45.

At all relevant times, Defendants owed Plaintiff various duties of care, including

herein.

but not limited to common law and statutory duties.
46.

Defendants, individually and collectively, breached these duties of care.

47.

As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of Defendants’ acts and omission,

Defendants caused personal and other injuries to Plaintiff.
48.

Plaintiff has been injured and is entitled to recover general and special damages in

amounts to be determined at trial.
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THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF: NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
49.

Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully

50.

Defendants, individually and collectively, represented to Plaintiff that medical

herein.

procedures, testing, and follow-up visits were medically necessary.
51.

Defendants’ representations that Plaintiff’s medical procedures, testing, and

follow-up visits were medically necessary was, in fact, not true.
52.

Defendants failed to use reasonable care to determine whether the representations

regarding the necessity of Plaintiff’s medical care was true.
53.

Defendants were in a better position than Plaintiff to know the true facts regarding

Plaintiff’s medical procedures, testing, and follow-up care.
54.

Defendants had a financial interest in performing medically unnecessary

procedures, testing, and follow-up care on Plaintiff.
55.

Plaintiff relied on Defendants’ representations, and it was reasonable for her to do

56.

Plaintiff has therefore been injured as a result of relying on Defendants’

so.

representations and is entitled to recover general and special damages in an amount to be
determined at trial.
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: NEGLIGENT CREDENTIALING
57.

Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully

herein.
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58.

Defendant St. Mark’s owes a duty to patients to exercise reasonable care in the

selection of its medical staff and in granting specialized privileges to them. It also has the duty to
periodically monitor and review the qualifications and competency of its medical staff.
59.

Defendant St. Mark’s breached its duty to exercise reasonable care in its selection

of its medical staff, and in granting specialized privileges to and periodically monitoring and
reviewing the qualifications and competency of its medical staff.
60.

As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of its breach, Defendant St. Mark’s

caused harm to Plaintiff.
61.

Plaintiff has been injured and is entitled to recover general and special damages in

an amount to be determined at trial.
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: FRAUDULANT NON-DISCLOSURE/CONCEALMENT
62.

Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully

63.

Defendants owed a duty to Plaintiff to disclose important facts, such as the medical

herein.

necessity of Plaintiff’s medical care, to Plaintiff.
64.

Defendants knew that the medical care Defendants provided to Plaintiff was not

medically necessary, and failed to disclose this to Plaintiff.
65.

Plaintiff did not know that the medical care provided by Defendants was not

medically necessary.
66.

Defendants’ failure to disclose the fact that Plaintiff’s medical care was not

necessary was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s damages. Had Plaintiff known that her
closure surgery was not necessary, Plaintiff would not have undergone the surgery.
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67.

Plaintiff has been injured and is entitled to recover general and special damages

in an amount to be determined at trial.
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: FRAUD
68.

Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully

69.

At all relevant times, Defendants had a duty and obligation to disclose to Plaintiff

herein.

true facts concerning the medical care provided to Plaintiff by Defendants.
70.

Defendants intentionally concealed material facts concerning Plaintiff’s medical

care from Plaintiff including, but not limited to the following:
a. Falsifying Plaintiff’s medical records to indicate that she was an appropriate
candidate for closure;
b.

Performing medically unnecessary medical procedures with a device that was not
FDA approved for this use; and

c. Concealing from Plaintiff that medical procedures, testing, and follow-up care was
unnecessary.
71.

Defendants made false statements and misrepresentations about important facts

regarding Plaintiff’s medical care.
72.

Defendants made these false statements and misrepresentations described above

knowing that the statements were false, or with reckless disregard for their truth.
73.

Defendants made the false statements and misrepresentations to Plaintiff, with the

intent that Plaintiff would rely on the statements.
74.

Plaintiff did reasonably rely on the false statements and misrepresentations made

by Defendants.
15
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75.

As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of Defendants’ false statements and

misrepresentations, Plaintiff has suffered personal injuries, including but not limited to
unnecessary medical procedures, testing, follow-up visits, medical expenses, and emotional
anguish.
SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: CIVIL CONSPIRACY
76.

Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully

77.

Defendants were acting in a conspiracy to commit fraud, thereby increasing their

herein.

profits through the performance of medically unnecessary procedures on patients, including
Plaintiff.
78.

There was an agreement and meeting of the minds among Defendant Sorensen,

Defendant SCG, and Defendant St. Mark’s to misrepresent the need for and induce patients,
including Plaintiff, into undergoing medically unnecessary procedures, testing, and follow-up.
Defendants agreed to act in concert in making these misrepresentations about the necessity of
medical procedures to Plaintiff.
79.

There were multiple unlawful, overt acts by Defendant Sorensen, Defendant SCG,

and Defendant St. Mark’s in furtherance of their scheme, including without limitation, Defendants’
fraud.
80.

As a result of this conspiracy, Defendant Sorensen, Defendant SCG, and Defendant

St. Mark’s, should be held jointly and severally liable for the conduct of the other co-conspirators
and the damages that Plaintiff sustained as a proximate result thereof, including without limitation
personal injuries and other injuries.
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81.

Plaintiff would further show that Defendant Sorensen and Defendant SCG were

operating as alter egos for the purpose of perpetrating the above described conspiracy. There was
such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the company and the
individual did not exist. Observing the corporate form will sanction this conspiracy, promote
injustice, and allow an inequitable result.
EQUITABLE TOLLING/FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT
82.

Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully

83.

Because of Defendants’ concealment of material facts and misleading conduct,

herein.

Plaintiff was not aware of her causes of action.
84.

Defendants took affirmative steps to conceal Plaintiff’s cause of action. Given

Defendants’ concealment and misleading conduct, a reasonable plaintiff would not have
discovered the cause of action earlier.
85.

Neither Sorenson, nor St. Mark’s ever notified Plaintiff that she had received an

unnecessary procedure, that she was never indicated for the surgery to begin with, that the device
implanted into Plaintiff was never medically necessary, was retained in her body for no medical
purpose, and that the informed consent contained fraudulent, misleading, and/or incomplete
statements. Neither Sorenson, nor St. Mark’s, ever compensated Plaintiff for the unnecessary
medical surgery she underwent by reimbursing the costs of the procedure.
86.

Neither Sorensen, nor St. Mark’s, ever made a public statement, sent a letter, made

a public announcement, or issued a press release to inform patients, such as Plaintiff, that they may
have had medically unnecessary closures.
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87.

Defendants’ misrepresentations and misleading conduct constitutes fraudulent

concealment that tolls any proffered statute of limitation that may otherwise bar the recovery
sought by Plaintiff.
88.

Plaintiff did not know, nor should have known, of the causes of action against

Defendants prior to being put on notice of Defendants’ potential liability recently. She neither
discovered, nor reasonably should have discovered, the facts underlying her causes of action before
any proffered statute of limitations period expired.
89.

As a result of Defendants’ concealment of the true character, quality and nature of

their conduct, they are estopped from relying on any statute of limitations defense. Defendants’
affirmative acts and omissions, before, during, and/or after their actions causing Plaintiff’s injury
prevented Plaintiff from discovering the injury or cause thereof until recently. Such conduct tolls
the limitations pursuant to the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act 78B-3-404(b).
90.

Defendants’ conduct, because it was purposely committed, was known or should

have been known by them to be dangerous, heedless, reckless, and without regard to the
consequences or the rights and safety of Plaintiff.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for a judgment (under URCP: Tier 3) against Defendants in an
amount to be determined by the trier of fact for the following damages:
a. For special damages in an amount to be determined at trial;
b. For general damages in an amount to be determined at trial;
c. For pre and post judgment interest on all special damages pursuant to Utah law;
d. For costs and attorney fees to the extent allowed by law; and
e. For such other relief as the Court deems appropriate.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of December 2017.
/s/ Rhome D. Zabriskie
Rhome D. Zabriskie
ZABRISKIE LAW FIRM, LLC
899 North Freedom Blvd, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84604
Tel: (801) 375-7680
Fax: (801) 375-7686
Email: rhomelawyer@yahoo.com
FLEMING, NOLEN & JEZ, LLP
Rand P. Nolen (Pro Hac Vice submission in
progress)
David L. Hobbs (Pro Hac Vice submission in
progress)
2800 Post Oak Blvd., Suite 4000
Houston, TX 77056-6109
Telephone: (713) 621-7944
Facsimile: (713) 621-9638
Email: rand_nolen@fleming-law.com
Email: david_hobbs@fleming-law.com
Counsel for Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that that a true and exact copy of the foregoing has been served on the following
via the Court’s ECF filing system and/or Email on 14th day of December, 2017:
Eric P. Schoonveld
Tawni J. Anderson
Nathan E. Dorsey
Hall Prangle & Schoonveld, LLC
111 East Broadway, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Phone: 801-320-0900
Fax: 801-320-0896
eric@hpslaw.com
tanderson@hpslaw.com
ndorsey@hpslaw.com
Attorneys for St. Mark’s Hospital
Michael J. Miller
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Strong & Hanni
102 South 200 East, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
mmiller@strongandhanni.com
Attorney for Defendants Sherman Sorensen, M.D. and Sorensen Cardiovascular Group
/s/ Rhome D. Zabriskie
Rhome D. Zabriskie
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Addendum F

Rhome D. Zabriskie
ZABRISKIE LAW FIRM, LLC
899 North Freedom Blvd, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84604
Tel: (801) 375-7680
Fax: (801) 375-7686
Email: rhomelawyer@yahoo.com
Counsel for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT – SALT LAKE CITY
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOHANNAH BRIGHT,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
v.
SHERMAN SORENSEN, M.D.;
SORENSEN CARDIOVASCULAR
GROUP; AND ST. MARK’S HOSPITAL,
Defendants.

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
(Tier 3 Filing)
(Jury Demanded)

Civil No. 170906790
Judge: Laura Scott

COMES NOW Plaintiff, by and through counsel, and hereby complain for causes of action
against the above-captioned Defendants, alleging as follows:
PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE
1.

Plaintiff Johannah Bright is, and at all relevant times has been, a resident of Davis

County, State of Utah.
2.

Defendant SHERMAN SORENSEN, M.D. was, at all relevant times, a licensed

physician providing health care services in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
1
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3.

Defendant SORENSEN CARDIOVASCULAR GROUP (SCG), was at all material

times, a Utah professional corporation in the business of providing health care services to residents
of Utah. Defendant SCG’s principal place of business is located at 5169 Cottonwood Street, No.
610, Murray, Utah. Defendant Sherman Sorensen owned and operated SCG as his primary medical
practice.
4.

Defendant ST. MARK’S HOSPITAL. (St. Mark’s) is a for-profit corporation based

in Salt Lake City, Utah with its principal place of business and corporate office at 1200 E 3900 S
Salt Lake City, UT 84124. St. Mark’s Registered Agent for Service CT Corporation System, 1108
E South Union Ave., Midvale UT 84047.
5.

Upon information and belief, at all material times, each of the Defendants were, or

may have been, an agent, servant, employer, employee, joint venture, partner, and/or alter ego of
one or more of each of the remaining Defendants, and were at all times acting within the purpose
and scope of such agency, servitude, joint venture, alter ego, partnership, or employment, and with
the authority, consent, approval, and/or ratification of each remaining Defendant.
6.

At all material times, Defendants were health care providers within the meaning of

the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-401 et seq., and each Defendant
provided health care services to Plaintiff.
7.

This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-5-

8.

Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-307.

9.

In bringing this action, Plaintiff complied with all statutory requirements regarding

102.

pre-litigation review of this matter as set forth in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code
Ann. § 78B-3-416.
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BACKGROUND
10.

This case is one of more than a thousand cases that are presently working their way

through the prelitigation process, which involve the medically unnecessary heart surgery by Dr.
Sherman Sorensen related to two kinds of holes in the heart. One is called an atrial septal defect
(ASD), and the other is a patent foramen ovale (PFO). Both are holes in the wall of tissue (septum)
between the left and right upper chambers of the heart (atria). An ASD is considered a birth defect
and is a failure of the septal tissue to form between the atria, PFOs can only occur after birth when
the foramen ovale fails to close.1
11.

Life threatening ASD’s are generally discovered at birth and corrected

immediately. However, there are billions of adults who have small openings between the left and
right atriums of their hearts. The foramen ovale is an opening located in the wall separating the
two upper chambers of the heart, the atrial septum, which is used during fetal circulation to redirect
blood through the heart. In 75% of the population, the foramen ovale closes at birth when increased
blood pressure on the left side of the heart forces the opening to close. In those cases, where the
foramen ovale does not close at birth, a patent foramen ovale (PFO) results.
12.

Approximately 25% of the healthy population have a PFO and will never require

any treatment or evaluation. Apart from extremely rare cases, patients with a PFO remain
completely unaware of the presence of the PFO because it’s almost never associated with
symptoms. Persistent patency of the foramen ovale is considered a normal anatomic variation.

1

Dr. Sorensen at times earlier in his career referred to these two conditions interchangeably, but
for insurance reimbursement purposes decided that all PFO’s were ASD’s later in his practice.
Either way, and no matter what he called them, he closed holes indiscriminately and without
medical justification on thousands of people, including the Plaintiff.
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13.

Only if a patient has a recurrence of cryptogenic (originating from unexplained

causes) stroke or transient ischemic attack (TIA), likely due to paradoxical embolization through
a PFO, and despite optimal medical therapy, may it be appropriate to close the PFO. Generally,
this closure is performed through a percutaneous surgical procedure. In the percutaneous
procedure, a patient undergoes a cardiac catheterization to determine the size and location of the
PFO.
14.

There has long been general agreement in the medical community—as far back as

2003—that PFO closure is not medically necessary, except in the limited circumstances where
there is a confirmed diagnosis of a recurrent cryptogenic stroke or TIA, despite optimum medical
management. At all material times, no widely accepted medical group specializing in cardiology
in the United States has ever recommended, advised, or suggested that closure is appropriate for
stroke or migraine prevention to patients that have not had recurrent cryptogenic strokes.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
15.

The following general allegations are common to all claims alleged herein:

16.

As noted, Defendant Dr. Sorensen is a cardiologist and was practicing

interventional cardiology. He had privileges at Defendant St. Mark’s and at other hospitals. From
roughly 2002 to 2012, Defendant Sorensen performed more than 4,000 PFO and ASD closures,
many of those at St. Mark’s. Dr. Sorensen performed the procedures at a rate that dwarfed the rest
of the country by a factor of ten-to-twenty fold, making him a true outlier.
17.

The administration at St. Mark’s was on notice because of the sheer volume of the

procedures performed by Defendant Sorensen and because of complaints from other practitioners
and employees that Defendant Sorensen was engaged in a practice of regularly performing
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unnecessary, invasive cardiac procedures on his patients. St. Mark’s ignored obvious warnings to
halt these procedures so that it could secure and maintain a lucrative stream of income.
18.

Further, during the hiring and credentialing process at St. Mark’s, Sorensen advised

St. Mark’s representatives of how he would perform closures and under what conditions. And a
result, St. Mark’s was aware that he would be performing unnecessary closures on patients that
did not have recurrent cryptogenic strokes.
19.

Further, Sorensen’s cardiac privileges at another hospital were suspended on or

about June 27, 2011, following an internal investigation concluded that Sorensen had performed
multiple, medically unnecessary PFO closures and that Sorensen represented a threat to the health
and safety of the patients treated. And St. Mark’s CEO Steve Bateman and physician liaison Nikki
Gledhill were aware of Sorensen’s suspension.
20.

Defendants Sorensen and St. Mark’s created false statements and documents to

conceal the fact that Sorensen was performing medically unnecessary closures. These statements
include documenting migraine or stroke history where none existed. For instance, Sorensen often
created medical charts that falsely reflected that the patients had suffered from, or were at risk of
suffering from, recurrent cryptogenic stroke in order to get insurance to pay for the procedure. The
effort to disguise the true diagnosis and reason for the closures shows that Sorensen was always
aware of and understood the true standard of care for these procedures.
21.

Sorensen would routinely mislead his patients, who had no previous strokes or

TIAs, into believing that they were at extreme risk of debilitating stroke because of their PFO or
ASD. He would further mislead them that a closure procedure would be effective and was
medically necessary in order to prevent strokes. These misrepresentations were made to the vast
majority of his patients, including Plaintiff.
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22.

Despite the fact that St. Mark’s knew that Sorensen was performing medically

unnecessary closures, and knew that Sorensen had been suspended for performing medically
unnecessary closures at another hospital, St. Mark’s Hospital continued to court Sorensen’s
business, provide a platform and assistance to Sorensen, and advertise and promote Sorensen and
closure practice to the public for its own financial gain.
23.

In particular, the catheterization lab staff at St. Mark’s became financially

dependent on Sorensen’s incredible volume. The majority of patients at St. Mark’s cardiac
catheterization laboratory came from Sorensen, dwarfing all other cardiology business at St.
Mark’s. As a result, St. Mark’s provided special treatment to Sorensen with staffing and scheduling
in its catheterization lab, often to the detriment of true cardiac patients and other cardiologists. St.
Mark’s also provided open access for PFO industry representatives to the lab and
personnel. Industry provided order-in meals were available to those catheterization lab personnel
that were willing to share in the largesse.
24.

Ultimately, St. Mark’s made a deliberate and conscious decision not to inform

patients that they may have had a medically unnecessary surgery, and chose not to reimburse
Plaintiff, her insurance company, or any of its other patients who had procedures performed
unnecessarily. Instead, St. Mark’s kept the profits for itself.
PLAINTIFF’S CLOSURE AND INJURIES
25.

On 9-21-07, Ms. Bright was seen in referral by Sorensen for migraine headaches

and a transesophageal echocardiogram reported to show right to left shunting across the atrial
septum. On 9-21-07, in Dr. Sorensen's office, Ms. Bright underwent a transthoracic
echocardiogram (TTE) with bubble study and a transcranial doppler study (TCD). The
echocardiogram was interpreted to show "severe rest and valsalva shunt by bubble study." The
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TCD was interpreted to show conductance grade of 4/5 at rest and 5/5 with calibrated respiratory
strain. Dr. Sorensen noted that the patient has described "minor palpitations."
26.

On 10-1-07, a brain MRI is performed at Western Neurological Associates. It was

interpreted as "normal contrast-enhanced MRI of the brain."
27.

On 11-28-07, Ms. Bright was seen in office follow-up by Dr. Sorensen. He did not

recommend closure of her septal defect: "The options for closure for stroke prevention [were]
reviewed but she [did] not have risk stratification features other than migraine." Dr. Sorensen
asked Ms. Bright to consider enrolling in a randomized trial called the PREMIUM trial. That
never occurred.
28.

On 11-4-09, a repeat consult was performed by Dr. Sorensen. Dr. Sorensen’s

neurologic exam on Ms. Bright was not comprehensive. For instance, it did not include a sensory
exam. In the impression section of this history and physical, Dr. Sorensen dictated: "This woman
has high risk features for stroke which include the presence of progressive migraine, moderately
severe persistent shunting, severe Valsalva shunting, and an interatrial septal aneurysm." This note
was contrary to his previous note of 11-28-07 in which he dictated: "but she does not have risk
stratification features other than migraine."
29.

On 12-15-09, Dr. Sorensen performed an intracardiac echo-guided septal defect

closure. He deployed a 20 mm Gore HELEX device.
30.

On 3-18-10, Ms. Bright underwent a TTE and a TCD in Dr. Sorensen's office. Both

studies demonstrated the presence of a residual shunt. A bubble study during the echocardiogram
showed "mild right to left shunt at rest" and moderate right to left shunt" after valsalva. The TCD
is interpreted to show a conductance grade of 2/5 at rest and 4/5 during calibrated respiratory
strain. Dr. Sorensen’s TCD reports gave slightly different guidelines for a "diagnostic TCD"
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versus a "post-device TCD." In the diagnostic TCD, a conductance grade of 4/5 is termed a "mild
to moderate" shunt with moderate probability for PFO, ASD, or AVM. There was a "low risk for
stroke." In the post device TCD, a conductance grade of 4/5 is termed a "mild residual shunt." A
conductance grade of 5 or 5+/5 in a post device TCD is termed a "significant residual shunt" and
"further evaluation is indicated."
31.

On or about June 28, 2010, Ms. Bright had a 6 month follow TTE and TCD. These

studies were interpreted to show a decrease in the magnitude of the residual shunt. The
echocardiogram was interpreted to show no right to left shunt at rest and a mild right to left shunt
with valsalva. The TCD was interpreted to show 1/5 conductance grade at rest and 3/5
conductance grade with calibrated respiratory strain. The guidelines included in the TCD report
indicates that a 3/5 conductance grade means "no significant shunt."
32.

The accepted indications for closure of an atrial septal defect include right

ventricular chamber enlargement, orthodeoxia-platypnea, and paradoxical embolism. Ms. Bright
did not have the first two. And, Dr. Sorensen failed to perform the appropriate assessment as to
the last.
33.

In a patient with strong or definitive evidence for embolic stroke, the standard of

care requires a comprehensive evaluation for all of the causes of embolic stroke. This was not
performed by Dr. Sorensen in his care of Ms. Bright. A comprehensive evaluation for causes of
"cryptogenic" stroke includes an MRI of the brain, imaging of the extra cranial and intracranial
cerebral arteries, 3-4 week rhythm monitoring to look for paroxysmal atrial fibrillation, imaging
of the aorta to look for atherosclerotic disease, lower extremity venous doppler/ultrasound, MRV
of the abdominal and pelvic veins, and a hyper coagulability workup. Here, Dr. Sorensen did not
meet this standard of care by, among other things, failing to give the details of alleged trans
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ischemic attacks that Sorensen (not a neurologist) diagnosed, failing to get a neurology
consultation, failing to have neuro-cognitive testing performed to document "cognitive decline,"
and failing to repeat a brain MRI to look for objective evidence of stroke. In short, Sorensen did
not perform the required comprehensive evaluation.
34.

To persuade Ms. Bright to undergo closure, Sorensen represented to her that she

was at high risk of a debilitating stroke due to the presence of her PFO/ASD and that closure was
medically necessary. In truth, the mere presence of the defect, without more, including a history
of cryptogenic stroke, is not a significant risk factor for stroke. Further, Sorensen passed out a
Patient Information Patent Foreman Ovale (PFO) handout to Ms. Bright. Sorensen’s patient
literature contained fraudulent misrepresentations, unsupported data and statistics, outright
falsehoods, and other misleading statements, such as the following:


“Until recently, 40% of all strokes were unknown cause. We now know that most of
these unexplained strokes may be caused by a PFO (Patent Foramen Ovale)”



“Strokes resulting from septal defects have a 50% mortality rate.”



“PFO is diagnosed in 50-70% of patients with stroke of unknown cause”



“Continued lifelong risk of stroke ranging from 2-9% each year.”



“Stroke reduction to less than 1%”



“Septal Defect Closure Safety and Efficacy”



“Our rigorous Program requirements assure that you are informed and receive the safest
and most effective treatment”

In addition, to the handout Sorensen made other misrepresentations to Ms. Bright both orally and
in writing. These misrepresentations include:
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“Our approach is a preventative strategy. It is scientifically based, but it is an
aggressive strategy.” In fact, Dr. Sorenson’s method has never been accepted in any
scientific journal, organization, been approved for a randomized clinical trial, and/or
the peer review process for his data and proposed indication for PFO closure. “We,
therefore follow a preventative strategy and risk stratify patients based on the
studies…proposed by the American Academy of Neurology.” That is false; the AAN
did not recommend closure outside of clinical trials and encouraged patients to
participate in research protocols.



“8 studies demonstrate that very high flow is the main feature of stroke risk.” In fact,
the AAN Practice Parameter did not find an association, much less causation, of
shunting and risk of stroke recurrence.



“Randomized trials are not available currently.” In reality, the Closure I trial was
opened in Salt Lake City, Utah. It was halted due to Defendant Sorensen’s medically
unnecessary off-label PFO procedures of patients outside the trial.



“Coumadin is considered to be unsafe and ineffective…based on studies.” In fact, the
SPIRIT, WASID and WARRS studies referenced by Sorensen showed no such thing.



Sorenson certified that his echocardiography lab was certified by ICAEL (Intersocietal
Commission for Accreditation Laboratories) using the ICAEL logo on his
echochardiogram. In fact, his lab was never accredited by ICAEL and this was false.

These false statements were intended to and did in fact induce Ms. Bright to undergo closure at St.
Mark’s by inducing fear of an imminent and debilitating stroke, downplaying safer and accepted
treatment options, misrepresenting the indication for closure, and downplaying the risks of closure.
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35.

Despite St. Mark's awareness of Sorensen’s fraudulent and/or negligent practices,

it did nothing to notify Ms. Bright. Instead, St. Mark's actively allowed Sorensen’s practice to
continue in order to profit from the thousands of unnecessary procedures performed on patients
like Ms. Bright. In fact, St. Mark's has to this day actively concealed its knowledge about
Sorensen’s rogue and fraudulent practices at its facility from patients, third party payers, and the
public, and has retained the money earned off of Sorensen’s medically unnecessary surgeries.
36.

Ms. Bright could not have known that the information provided by Defendants was

false. Instead, she trusted that Defendants Sorensen and St. Mark’s, as her health care providers,
were being truthful. Further, even if she had been aware of some of the factual
mischaracterizations, as a non-expert she could not have understood their implications as it relates
the appropriateness of her medical treatment.
37.

Because of Defendants’ fraudulent statements and omissions, Ms. Bright was until

recently unaware of her cause of action. In fact, Ms. Bright only learned of the Defendants’
misconduct as a result lawyer advertising. Her diligent investigation resulted in the noticing and
filing of this action within the statutory period.
38.

Because of Defendants’ conduct, Ms. Bright suffered significant damages,

including:
i.

undergoing an unnecessary surgical procedure and hospital stay,

ii.

paying significant medical expenses to Defendants,

iii.

physical pain, and
emotional anguish as a result of being told she was at immediate risk of a debilitating
or even deadly stroke.
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FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF: NEGLIGENCE (HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE)
39.

Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully

40.

Defendants, individually, collectively, and through the acts and omissions of their

herein.

agents, servants, employees, physicians, nurses, therapists, and technologists (hereinafter
collectively “Defendants”) accepted Plaintiff as a patient, and thereby assumed various duties of
care.
41.

At all relevant times, Defendants held themselves out as being able to provide full

care and treatment for patients requiring medical care of the type that Plaintiff required.
42.

The degree of care and treatment provided to Plaintiff fell below the acceptable

standards of care for the types of medical care and treatment required by Plaintiff and provided by
Defendants.
43.

Specifically, Defendants breached the applicable standards of care in multiple ways

including, but not limited to:
a. Falsifying Plaintiff’s medical records to indicate that Plaintiff was an appropriate
candidate for closure;
b. Misleading Plaintiff regarding the risks and benefits associated with closure and
regarding the necessity of treatment;
c. Failing to obtain an adequate history which resulted in an improper medical
diagnosis that Plaintiff was an appropriate candidate for closure;
d. Failing to conduct an adequate physical and to obtain appropriate diagnostic testing,
which resulted in an improper medical diagnosis that Plaintiff was an appropriate
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candidate for PFO closure; Performing a medically unnecessary medical procedure
with a device that was not FDA approved for this use; and
44.

As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of Defendants’ acts and omissions,

Defendants caused Plaintiff to undergo unnecessary medical procedures, testing, and follow-up
visits, incur unnecessary medical expenses, and experience physical injuries and emotional
anguish.
45.

As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of Defendants’ acts and omissions,

Plaintiff has suffered personal injuries, including by not limited to unnecessary medical
procedures, testing, follow-up visits, medical expenses, and emotional anguish.
46.

Plaintiff has therefore been injured and is entitled to recover general and special

damages in an amount to be determined at trial.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF: NEGLIGENCE
47.

Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully

48.

At all relevant times, Defendants owed Plaintiff various duties of care, including

herein.

but not limited to common law and statutory duties.
49.

Defendants, individually and collectively, breached these duties of care.

50.

As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of Defendants’ acts and omission,

Defendants caused personal and other injuries to Plaintiff.
51.

Plaintiff has been injured and is entitled to recover general and special damages in

amounts to be determined at trial.
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THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF: NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
52.

Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully

53.

Defendants, individually and collectively, represented to Plaintiff that medical

herein.

procedures, testing, and follow-up visits were medically necessary.
54.

Defendants’ representations that Plaintiff’s medical procedures, testing, and

follow-up visits were medically necessary was, in fact, not true.
55.

Defendants failed to use reasonable care to determine whether the representations

regarding the necessity of Plaintiff’s medical care was true.
56.

Defendants were in a better position than Plaintiff to know the true facts regarding

Plaintiff’s medical procedures, testing, and follow-up care.
57.

Defendants had a financial interest in performing medically unnecessary

procedures, testing, and follow-up care on Plaintiff.
58.

Plaintiff relied on Defendants’ representations, and it was reasonable for her to do

59.

Plaintiff has therefore been injured as a result of relying on Defendants’

so.

representations and is entitled to recover general and special damages in an amount to be
determined at trial.
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: NEGLIGENT CREDENTIALING
60.

Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully

herein.
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61.

Defendant St. Mark’s owes a duty to patients to exercise reasonable care in the

selection of its medical staff and in granting specialized privileges to them. It also has the duty to
periodically monitor and review the qualifications and competency of its medical staff.
62.

Defendant St. Mark’s breached its duty to exercise reasonable care in its selection

of its medical staff, and in granting specialized privileges to and periodically monitoring and
reviewing the qualifications and competency of its medical staff.
63.

As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of its breach, Defendant St. Mark’s

caused harm to Plaintiff.
64.

Plaintiff has been injured and is entitled to recover general and special damages in

an amount to be determined at trial.
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: FRAUDULENT NON-DISCLOSURE/CONCEALMENT
65.

Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully

66.

Defendants owed a duty to Plaintiff to disclose important facts, such as the medical

herein.

necessity of Plaintiff’s medical care, to Plaintiff.
67.

Defendants knew that the medical care Defendants provided to Plaintiff was not

medically necessary, and failed to disclose this to Plaintiff.
68.

Plaintiff did not know that the medical care provided by Defendants was not

medically necessary.
69.

Defendants’ failure to disclose the fact that Plaintiff’s medical care was not

necessary was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s damages. Had Plaintiff known that her
closure surgery was not necessary, Plaintiff would not have undergone the surgery.
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70.

Plaintiff has been injured and is entitled to recover general and special damages

in an amount to be determined at trial.
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: FRAUD
71.

Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully

72.

At all relevant times, Defendants had a duty and obligation to disclose to Plaintiff

herein.

true facts concerning the medical care provided to Plaintiff by Defendants.
73.

Defendants intentionally concealed material facts concerning Plaintiff’s medical

care from Plaintiff including, but not limited to the following:
a. Falsifying Plaintiff’s medical records to indicate that she was an appropriate
candidate for closure;
b.

Performing medically unnecessary medical procedures with a device that was not
FDA approved for this use; and

c. Concealing from Plaintiff that medical procedures, testing, and follow-up care was
unnecessary.
74.

Defendants made false statements and misrepresentations about important facts

regarding Plaintiff’s medical care.
75.

Defendants made these false statements and misrepresentations described above

knowing that the statements were false, or with reckless disregard for their truth.
76.

Defendants made the false statements and misrepresentations to Plaintiff, with the

intent that Plaintiff would rely on the statements.
77.

Plaintiff did reasonably rely on the false statements and misrepresentations made

by Defendants.
16
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78.

As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of Defendants’ false statements and

misrepresentations, Plaintiff has suffered personal injuries, including but not limited to
unnecessary medical procedures, testing, follow-up visits, medical expenses, and emotional
anguish.
SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: CIVIL CONSPIRACY
79.

Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully

80.

Defendants were acting in a conspiracy to commit fraud, thereby increasing their

herein.

profits through the performance of medically unnecessary procedures on patients, including
Plaintiff.
81.

There was an agreement and meeting of the minds among Defendant Sorensen,

Defendant SCG, and Defendant St. Mark’s to misrepresent the need for and induce patients,
including Plaintiff, into undergoing medically unnecessary procedures, testing, and follow-up.
Defendants agreed to act in concert in making these misrepresentations about the necessity of
medical procedures to Plaintiff.
82.

There were multiple unlawful, overt acts by Defendant Sorensen, Defendant SCG,

and Defendant St. Mark’s in furtherance of their scheme, including without limitation, Defendants’
fraud.
83.

As a result of this conspiracy, Defendant Sorensen, Defendant SCG, and Defendant

St. Mark’s, should be held jointly and severally liable for the conduct of the other co-conspirators
and the damages that Plaintiff sustained as a proximate result thereof, including without limitation
personal injuries and other injuries.
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84.

Plaintiff would further show that Defendant Sorensen and Defendant SCG were

operating as alter egos for the purpose of perpetrating the above described conspiracy. There was
such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the company and the
individual did not exist. Observing the corporate form will sanction this conspiracy, promote
injustice, and allow an inequitable result.
EQUITABLE TOLLING/FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT
85.

Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully

86.

Because of Defendants’ concealment of material facts and misleading conduct,

herein.

Plaintiff was not aware of her causes of action.
87.

Defendants took affirmative steps to conceal Plaintiff’s cause of action. Given

Defendants’ concealment and misleading conduct, a reasonable plaintiff would not have
discovered the cause of action earlier.
88.

Neither Sorenson, nor St. Mark’s ever notified Plaintiff that she had received an

unnecessary procedure, that she was never indicated for the surgery to begin with, that the device
implanted into Plaintiff was never medically necessary, was retained in her body for no medical
purpose, and that the informed consent contained fraudulent, misleading, and/or incomplete
statements. Neither Sorenson, nor St. Mark’s, ever compensated Plaintiff for the unnecessary
medical surgery she underwent by reimbursing the costs of the procedure.
89.

Neither Sorensen, nor St. Mark’s, ever made a public statement, sent a letter, made

a public announcement, or issued a press release to inform patients, such as Plaintiff, that they may
have had medically unnecessary closures.
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90.

Defendants’ misrepresentations and misleading conduct constitutes fraudulent

concealment that tolls any proffered statute of limitation that may otherwise bar the recovery
sought by Plaintiff.
91.

Plaintiff did not know, nor should have known, of the causes of action against

Defendants prior to being put on notice of Defendants’ potential liability recently. She neither
discovered, nor reasonably should have discovered, the facts underlying her causes of action before
any proffered statute of limitations period expired.
92.

As a result of Defendants’ concealment of the true character, quality and nature of

their conduct, they are estopped from relying on any statute of limitations defense. Defendants’
affirmative acts and omissions, before, during, and/or after their actions causing Plaintiff’s injury
prevented Plaintiff from discovering the injury or cause thereof until recently. Such conduct tolls
the limitations pursuant to the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act 78B-3-404(b).
93.

Defendants’ conduct, because it was purposely committed, was known or should

have been known by them to be dangerous, heedless, reckless, and without regard to the
consequences or the rights and safety of Plaintiff.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for a judgment (under URCP: Tier 3) against Defendants in an
amount to be determined by the trier of fact for the following damages:
a. For special damages in an amount to be determined at trial;
b. For general damages in an amount to be determined at trial;
c. For pre and post judgment interest on all special damages pursuant to Utah law;
d. For costs and attorney fees to the extent allowed by law; and
e. For such other relief as the Court deems appropriate.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21st day of December 2017.
/s/ Rhome D. Zabriskie
Rhome D. Zabriskie
ZABRISKIE LAW FIRM, LLC
899 North Freedom Blvd, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84604
Tel: (801) 375-7680
Fax: (801) 375-7686
Email: rhomelawyer@yahoo.com
FLEMING, NOLEN & JEZ, LLP
Rand P. Nolen (Pro Hac Vice submission in
progress)
David L. Hobbs (Pro Hac Vice submission in
progress)
2800 Post Oak Blvd., Suite 4000
Houston, TX 77056-6109
Telephone: (713) 621-7944
Facsimile: (713) 621-9638
Email: rand_nolen@fleming-law.com
Email: david_hobbs@fleming-law.com
Counsel for Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that that a true and exact copy of the foregoing has been served on the following
via the Court’s ECF filing system and/or Email on 21st day of December, 2017:
Eric P. Schoonveld
Tawni J. Anderson
Nathan E. Dorsey
Hall Prangle & Schoonveld, LLC
111 East Broadway, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Phone: 801-320-0900
Fax: 801-320-0896
eric@hpslaw.com
tanderson@hpslaw.com
ndorsey@hpslaw.com
Attorneys for St. Mark’s Hospital
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Michael J. Miller
Strong & Hanni
102 South 200 East, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
mmiller@strongandhanni.com
Attorney for Defendants Sherman Sorensen, M.D. and Sorensen Cardiovascular Group
/s/ Rhome D. Zabriskie
Rhome D. Zabriskie
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Addendum G

§ 78B-3-404. Statute of limitations--Exceptions--Application, UT ST § 78B-3-404

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 78b. Judicial Code
Chapter 3. Actions and Venue
Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Refs & Annos)
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-3-404
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-14-4
§ 78B-3-404. Statute of limitations--Exceptions--Application
Currentness
(1) A malpractice action against a health care provider shall be commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient
discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, whichever first occurs, but not
to exceed four years after the date of the alleged act, omission, neglect, or occurrence.

(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1):

(a) in an action where the allegation against the health care provider is that a foreign object has been wrongfully
left within a patient's body, the claim shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff or patient
discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the existence of the foreign object
wrongfully left in the patient's body, whichever first occurs; or

(b) in an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented from discovering misconduct on the part of a health
care provider because that health care provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged misconduct,
the claim shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use
of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the fraudulent concealment, whichever first occurs.

Credits
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 710, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2012, c. 384, § 4, eff. May 8, 2012.

Notes of Decisions (131)
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-3-404, UT ST § 78B-3-404
Current with the 2018 Third Special Session.
End of Document
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Addendum H

RULE 9. PLEADING SPECIAL MATTERS, UT R RCP Rule 9

West's Utah Code Annotated
State Court Rules
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos)
Part III. Pleadings, Motions, and Orders
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 9
RULE 9. PLEADING SPECIAL MATTERS
Currentness
(a) Capacity or Authority to Sue; Legal Existence.

(1) In General. Except when required to show that the court has jurisdiction, a pleading need not allege:

(A) a party's capacity to sue or be sued;

(B) a party's authority to sue or be sued in a representative capacity; or

(C) the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party.

(2) Raising Those Issues. To raise any of those issues, a party must do so by a specific denial, which must state any
supporting facts that are peculiarly within the party's knowledge.

(b) Unknown parties.

(b)(1) Designation. When a party does not know the name of an opposing party, it may state that fact in the pleadings,
and designate the opposing party in a pleading by any name. When the true name of the opposing party becomes known,
the pleading must be amended.

(b)(2) Descriptions of interest in quiet title actions. If one or more parties in an action to quiet title are designated in the
caption as “unknown,” the pleadings may describe the unknown persons as “all other persons unknown, claiming any
right, title, estate or interest in, or lien upon the real property described in the pleading adverse to the complainant's
ownership, or clouding its title.”

(c) Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may
be alleged generally.

© 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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(d) Conditions precedent. In pleading conditions precedent, it is sufficient to allege generally that all conditions precedent
have been performed or have occurred. When denying that a condition precedent has been performed or has occurred,
a party must do so with particularity.

(e) Official document or act. In pleading an official document or official act it is sufficient to allege that the document
was legally issued or the act was legally done.

(f) Judgment. In pleading a judgment or decision of a domestic or foreign court, a judicial or quasi judicial tribunal, or
a board or officer, it is sufficient to plead the judgment or decision without showing jurisdiction to render it.

(g) Time and place. An allegation of time or place is material when testing the sufficiency of a pleading.

(h) Special damage. If an item of special damage is claimed, it must be specifically stated.

(i) Statute of limitations. In pleading the statute of limitations it is not necessary to state the facts showing the defense
but it may be alleged generally that the cause of action is barred by the statute, referring to or describing the statute by
section number, subsection designation, if any, or designating the provision relied on sufficiently to identify it.

(j) Private statutes; ordinances. In pleading a private statute, an ordinance, or a right derived from a statute or ordinance,
it is sufficient to refer to the statute or ordinance by its title and the day of its passage or by its section number or other
designation in any official publication of the statute or ordinance. The court will take judicial notice of the statute or
ordinance.

(k) Libel and slander.

(k)(1) Pleading defamatory matter. In an action for libel or slander it is sufficient to allege generally that the defamatory
matter out of which the action arose was published or spoken concerning the plaintiff. If the allegation is denied, the
party alleging the defamatory matter must establish at trial that it was published or spoken.

(k)(2) Pleading defense. The defendant may allege the truth of the matter charged as defamatory and any mitigating
circumstances to reduce the amount of damages. Whether or not justification is proved, the defendant may give evidence
of the mitigating circumstances.

(l) Allocation of fault.

(l)(1) A party seeking to allocate fault to a non-party under Title 78B, Chapter 5, Part 8 must file:

(l)(1)(A) a description of the factual and legal basis on which fault can be allocated; and
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(l)(1)(B) information known or reasonably available to the party identifying the nonparty, including name, address,
telephone number and employer. If the identity of the non-party is unknown, the party must so state.

(l)(2) The information specified in paragraph (l)(1) must be included in the party's responsive pleading if then known or
must be included in a supplemental notice filed within a reasonable time after the party discovers the factual and legal
basis on which fault can be allocated. The court, upon motion and for good cause shown, may permit a party to file
the information specified in paragraph (l)(1) after the expiration of any period permitted by this rule, but in no event
later than 90 days before trial.

(l)(3) A party must not seek to allocate fault to another except by compliance with this rule.

Credits
[Amended effective November 1, 2003; May 2, 2005; November 1, 2008; November 1, 2011; November 1, 2016.]

Editors' Notes
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
The 2016 amendments deleted former paragraph (k) on renewing judgments because it was superfluous. The Renewal
of Judgment Act (Utah Code Sections 78B-6-1801 through 78B-6-1804) allows a domestic judgment to be renewed by
motion, and Section 78B-5-302 governs domesticating a foreign judgment, which can then be renewed by motion.
The process for renewing a judgment by motion is governed by Rule 58C.
Issues of capacity, conditions precedent, and statutes of limitation in paragraphs (a), (e), and (j) should be decided along
with other claims and defenses.

Notes of Decisions (126)
Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 9, UT R RCP Rule 9
Current with amendments received through February 15, 2019
End of Document

© 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

© 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

3

Addendum I

United States ex rel. Polukoff v. St. Mark's Hospital, 895 F.3d 730 (2018)
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895 F.3d 730
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
UNITED STATES of America EX REL.
Gerald POLUKOFF, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ST. MARK'S HOSPITAL; Intermountain
Healthcare, Inc.; Sherman Sorensen, M.D.;
Sorensen Cardiovascular Group; Intermountain
Medical Center, Defendants-Appellees,
and
HCA, Inc., a/k/a HCA, Defendant.
United States of America,
Amicus Curiae and Intervenor.
No. 17-4014
|
FILED July 9, 2018
Synopsis
Background: Relator brought qui tam False Claims Act
(FCA) action on behalf of the United States against
cardiologist and two hospitals where he worked, alleging
that cardiologist performed unnecessary heart surgeries
and received reimbursement through Medicare by
fraudulently certifying that the surgeries were medically
necessary. The United States District Court for the
District of Utah, Jill N. Parrish, J., 2017 WL 237615,
granted cardiologist's and hospitals' motions to dismiss.
Relator appealed.

Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Briscoe, Circuit Judge,
held that:
relator stated FCA claim against cardiologist;
relator stated FCA claims against hospitals; and
relator's claim against hospital was pleaded with sufficient
particularity.

Reversed and remanded.

Attorneys and Law Firms
Tejinder Singh, Goldstein & Russell, P.C., Bethesda,
Maryland (Thomas C. Goldstein, Goldstein & Russell,
P.C., Bethesda, Maryland; Rand P. Nolen, George M.
Fleming, Sylvia Davidow, Gregory D. Brown, David
Hobbs, and Jessica A. Kasischke, Fleming, Nolen & Jez,
LLP, Houston, Texas, with him on the briefs), appearing
for Appellant.
J. Scott Ballenger, Latham & Watkins LLP, Washington
DC (Alexandra P. Shechtel, Latham & Watkins LLP,
Washington DC; Katherine A. Lauer, Latham & Watkins
LLP, San Diego, California; Andrew A. Warth, W. David
Bridgers, and Wells Trompeter, Waller Lansden Dortch &
Davis LLP, Nashville, Tennessee, with him on the brief),
appearing for Appellee St. Mark’s Hospital.
Matthew L. Knowles, McDermott Will & Emery LLP,
Boston, Massachusetts (M. Miller Baker, McDermott
Will & Emery LLP, Washington, DC; Shamis Beckley and
Alexander J. Kritikos, McDermott Will & Emery LLP,
Boston, Massachusetts; Alan C. Bradshaw, Sammi V.
Anderson, and Christopher M. Glauser, Manning Curtis
Bradshaw & Bednar, PLLC, Salt Lake City, Utah; Daniel
S. Reinberg and Asher D. Funk, Polsinelli PC, Chicago,
Illinois, with him on the brief), appearing for Appellee
Intermountain Healthcare, Inc. and Intermountain
Medical Center.
Blaine J. Benard, Holland & Hart LLP, Salt Lake City,
Utah, and Gregory Goldberg, Holland & Hart LLP,
Denver, Colorado, on the brief for Appellees Sherman
Sorensen M.D., and Sorensen Cardiology Group.
Sarah Carroll, Attorney, Appellate Staff, Civil Division,
United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC
(Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC;
John W. Huber, United States Attorney for the District
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah; Douglas N. Letter
and Michael S. Raab, Attorneys, Appellate Staff,
Civil Division, United States Department of Justice,
Washington, DC), appearing for Intervenor and Amicus
Curiae United States of America.
Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, BRISCOE and
HARTZ, Circuit Judges.

*733 Appeal from the United States District Court for the
District of Utah (D.C. No. 2:16-CV-00304-JNP-EJF)
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obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the
Government, or knowingly conceals or knowingly and
improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or
transmit money or property to the Government,

Opinion
BRISCOE, Circuit Judge.
*734 This is a qui tam action alleging violations of
the False Claims Act (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33,
involving fraudulent reimbursements under the Medicare
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395–1395ccc. Plaintiff Gerald Polukoff,
M.D., is a doctor who worked with Defendant Sherman
Sorensen, M.D. After observing some of Dr. Sorensen’s
medical practices, Dr. Polukoff brought this FCA
action, on behalf of the United States, against Dr.
Sorensen and the two hospitals where Dr. Sorensen
worked (collectively, “Defendants”). Dr. Polukoff alleges
Dr. Sorensen performed thousands of unnecessary
heart surgeries and received reimbursement through the
Medicare Act by fraudulently certifying that the surgeries
were medically necessary. Dr. Polukoff further alleges
the hospitals where Dr. Sorensen worked were complicit
in and profited from Dr. Sorensen’s fraud. The district
court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss, reasoning
that a medical judgment cannot be false under the FCA.
Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we
REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings.

I
A. Statutory Background
“The FCA ‘covers all fraudulent attempts to cause the
government to pay out sums of money.’ ” United States ex
rel. Conner v. Salina Regional Health Ctr., Inc., 543 F.3d
1211, 1217 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States ex rel.
Boothe v. Sun Healthcare Grp., Inc., 496 F.3d 1169, 1172
(10th Cir. 2007) ). Specifically, any person who:
(A) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a
false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval;
(B) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or
used, a false record or statement material to a false or
fraudulent claim;
(C) conspires to commit a violation of subparagraph
(A), (B), (D), (E), (F), or (G); [or]
...
(G) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made
or used, a false record or statement material to an

is liable to the United States Government for a civil
penalty [and treble damages].
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1). The FCA defines the “knowingly”
scienter requirement as follows:
(A) mean[s] that a person, with respect to information—
(i) has actual knowledge of the information;
(ii) acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity
of the information; or
(iii) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of
the information; and
(B) require[s] no proof of specific intent to defraud ....
Id. § 3729(b)(1).
There are two options to remedy a violation of the FCA.
“First, the Government itself may bring a civil action
against the alleged false claimant.” *735 Vt. Agency of
Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765,
769, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000). “Second, as
is relevant here, a private person (the relator) may bring
a qui tam civil action ‘for the person and for the United
States Government’ against the alleged false claimant, ‘in
the name of the Government.’ ” Id. (quoting 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(b)(1) ). If a relator files a qui tam civil action,
the government may intervene and take over the case.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2). “If the government elects not to
proceed with the action,” the relator “shall have the right
to conduct the action.” Id. § 3730(c)(3). Depending on the
specific circumstances of the qui tam suit, the government
and the relator divide any proceeds derived from the suit.
Id. § 3730(d).
The FCA is applicable to many statutes that provide
for federal reimbursement of expenses. One such statute
is the Medicare Act, 1 which imposes requirements for
reimbursement of medical expenses. As relevant here, the
Medicare Act states that “no payment may be made ...
for any expenses incurred for items or services” that
“are not reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or
treatment of illness or injury or to improve the functioning
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of a malformed body member.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)
(A) (emphasis added). Physicians and medical providers
who seek reimbursement under the Medicare Act must
“certify the necessity of the services and, in some instances,
recertify the continued need for those services.” 42
C.F.R. 424.10(a) (Oct. 1, 2013) (emphasis added); see
also 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395f(a), 1395n(a) (listing the various
certifications).
1

The amended complaint also references the
“TRICARE/CHAMPUS Program.” App’x at 521–
22. This healthcare program benefits retired military
personnel and dependents of both active and retired
military personnel. Id. at 521; see also Baptist
Physician Hosp. Org., Inc. v. Humana Military
Healthcare Servs., Inc., 368 F.3d 894, 895 (6th
Cir. 2004). The amended complaint alleges that
Defendants “submitted Requests for Reimbursement
to TRICARE/CHAMPUS that were based on their
submissions to Medicare.” App’x at 522. We do
not distinguish this program from Medicare and
Medicaid in our analysis because Defendants failed to
argue for any relevant distinction.

The Secretary of Health and Human Services decides
“whether a particular medical service is ‘reasonable and
necessary’ ... by promulgating a generally applicable rule
or by allowing individual adjudication.” Heckler v. Ringer,
466 U.S. 602, 617, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984)
(emphasis added). The former course involves a “national
coverage determination” that announces “whether or not
a particular item or service is covered nationally.” 42
U.S.C. § 1395ff(f)(1)(B). In the absence of a national
coverage determination, local Medicare contractors may
issue a “local coverage determination” that announces
“whether or not a particular item or service is covered” by
that contractor. Id. § 1395ff(f)(2)(B).
The latter course allows “contractors [to] make individual
claim determinations, even in the absence of [a national
or local coverage determination], ... based on the
individual’s particular factual situation.” 68 Fed. Reg.
63,692, 63,693 (Nov. 7, 2003). In making an individual
claim determination about whether to reimburse a medical
provider, “[c]ontractors shall consider a service to be
reasonable and necessary if the contractor determines
that the service is: [ (1) ] Safe and effective; [ (2) ]
Not experimental or investigational ...; and [ (3) ]
Appropriate.” Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
(“CMS”), 2 Medicare *736 Program Integrity Manual §

13.5.1 (2015) (describing local coverage determinations);
see also id. § 13.3 (incorporating § 13.5.1’s standards
for individual claim determinations). One factor that
contractors consider when deciding whether a service is
“appropriate” is whether it is “[f]urnished in accordance
with accepted standards of medical practice for the
diagnosis or treatment of the patient’s condition or to
improve the function of a malformed body member.” Id.
§ 13.5.1.
2

CMS is an agency within Health and Human Services,
see Protocols, LLC v. Leavitt, 549 F.3d 1294, 1295
(10th Cir. 2008), and this agency administers the
Medicare Act, see United States ex rel. Sikkenga v.
Regence Bluecross Blueshield of Utah, 472 F.3d 702,
705 & n.1 (10th Cir. 2006).

B. Factual Background
“At the motion-to-dismiss stage, we must accept all the
well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and must
construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
Albers v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Jefferson Cty., 771 F.3d
697, 700 (10th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted). As a result,
we rely on Dr. Polukoff’s amended complaint. 3
3

Although Dr. Polukoff filed a motion (and later, an
amended motion) for leave to file a second amended
complaint, the district court denied the amended
motion. Thus, Dr. Polukoff’s amended complaint is
the operative complaint.

1. The PFO closure procedure
This case involves two very similar cardiac conditions:
patent foramen ovale (“PFO”) and atrial septal defect
(“ASD”). Both PFOs and ASDs involve a hole between
the upper two chambers of the heart, but they have
different causes. Most people are born with a PFO, as it
helps blood circulate throughout the heart while in the
womb, but for 75% of the population, the hole closes soon
after birth. ASDs, on the other hand, are an abnormality.
Regardless, both PFOs and ASDs allow blood to flow
in the wrong direction within the upper chambers of
the heart. In rare cases, they can lead to a variety of
dangerous complications, including stroke. Physicians can
“close” ASDs and PFOs through ASD and PFO closures
(collectively, “PFO closures”), a percutaneous surgical
procedure involving cardiac catheterization. In layman’s
terms, physicians insert a thin tube into a blood vessel
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to access the heart, rather than performing open heart
surgery.
The amended complaint makes specific reference to
industry guidelines published by the American Heart
Association and American Stroke Association (the
“AHA/ASA Guidelines”) in 2006 and 2011, related to
PFO closures. 4 The 2006 AHA/ASA Guidelines observed
that “[s]tudies have found an association between PFO
and cryptogenic stroke.” 5 App’x at 2077. They noted
“conflicting reports concerning the safety and efficacy
of surgical PFO closure” to treat cryptogenic stroke,
but after reviewing several studies, also noted that each
reported “no major complications.” Id. The 2006 AHA/
ASA Guidelines concluded: “Insufficient data exist to
make a recommendation about PFO closures in patients
with a first stroke and a PFO. PFO closure may be
considered for patients with recurrent cryptogenic stroke
despite optimal medical therapy ....” Id. at 2079. In other
words, the 2006 AHA/ASA Guidelines advised that (1)
for patients with two or more cryptogenic strokes, PFO
closures may be considered; (2) for patients with only one
cryptogenic stroke, there was insufficient data to make
a recommendation; and (3) for patients without a single
cryptogenic stroke, the *737 AHA/ASA Guidelines did
not contemplate the potential for PFO closures.
4

5

The amended complaint also references the 2014
AHA/ASA Guidelines. Those guidelines, however,
were published after all relevant conduct occurred in
this case, and thus are irrelevant.
A “cryptogenic stroke” describes a stroke for which
the cause is unknown.

The 2011 AHA/ASA Guidelines are similarly
inconclusive. In a table titled “Recommendations for
Stroke Patients With Other Specific Conditions,” the
guidelines stated: “There are insufficient data to make a
recommendation regarding PFO closure in patients with
stroke and PFO ....” Id. at 2125. The 2011 AHA/ASA
Guidelines did, however, observe that recent “studies
provide[d] new information on options for closure of PFO
and generally indicate[d] that short-term complications
with these procedures are rare and for the most part
minor.” Id. at 2126.
Relying on the AHA/ASA Guidelines, the amended
complaint alleges “[t]here has long been general agreement
in the medical community that PFO closure is not

medically necessary, except in the limited circumstances
where there is a confirmed diagnosis of a recurrent
cryptogenic stroke or TIA, [ 6 ] despite optimum medical
management.” Id. at 524.
6

A “TIA” is a “transient ischemic attack,” which is
a brief interruption of blood flow to the brain that
causes stroke-like symptoms.

2. The Defendants’ conduct
Dr. Sorensen practiced medicine as a cardiologist in Salt
Lake City, Utah. He was the principal shareholder of
Sorensen Cardiovascular Group (“SCG”). Dr. Sorensen,
through SCG, provided cardiology services at two
hospitals: (1) Intermountain Medical Center and (2) St.
Mark’s Hospital (“St. Mark’s”). Intermountain Medical
Center is part of a large network of hospitals in
Utah principally owned by Intermountain Healthcare,
Inc., a not-for-profit corporation (collectively, with
Intermountain Medical Center, “Intermountain”). St.
Mark’s, on the other hand, is a for-profit corporation
owned by HCA, Inc. Dr. Polukoff is a practicing
cardiologist who worked with Dr. Sorensen at both St.
Mark’s and Intermountain.
Dr. Sorensen started providing cardiology services at
Intermountain in December 2002. Later, in 2008, he
began working at St. Mark’s as well. Part of his practice
included performing a relatively high number of PFO
closures. For example, “[t]he Cleveland Clinic reported
that it had performed 37 PFO closures in 2010; during that
same time period [Dr.] Sorensen’s billing records indicate
that he had performed 861.” Id. at 542. The amended
complaint alleges that Dr. Sorensen performed so many
PFO closures because of “his medically unsupported belief
that PFO closures would cure migraine headaches or
prevent strokes.” Id. In addition, “Dr. Sorensen knew that
Medicare and Medicaid would not pay for PFO closures
to treat migraines, so he chose to represent that the
procedures had been performed based upon indications
set forth in the AH[A]/ASA stroke guidelines—the
existence of confirmed recurrent cryptogenic stroke.” Id.
The amended complaint describes Dr. Sorensen’s medical
notes and reasons for the large number of PFO closures:
Dr. Sorensen’s notes in his patients’ medical records
indicate that [Dr.] Sorensen fully understands, but
rejects, the standard of care for PFO/ASD closures
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set forth in the [AHA/ASA] Guidelines described
above. For example, Dr. Sorensen notes that closures
are considered medically necessary only for recurrent
cryptogenic strokes or TIA, secondary to paradoxical
embolization despite medical therapy, but argues that
while “[w]e do have experience with the two strokes
first and then closure approach, we *738 found
this very unsatisfactory as a very high number of
patients were disabled and disability is not reversed by
closure.” Dr. Sorensen notes that “[w]e therefore follow
a preventative strategy and risk stratify the patient. ...”
Dr. Sorensen notes that he considers waiting for a
stroke or TIA to reoccur before proceeding to closure
is “unethical.”
Id. at 607.
In early 2011, several doctors at Intermountain objected
to Dr. Sorensen’s approach to PFO closures, claiming
Dr. Sorensen was violating Intermountain’s internal
guidelines for PFO closures. In March 2011, in response
to the objections, Intermountain adopted new internal
guidelines for PFO closures that mirrored the AHA/ASA
Guidelines. In May 2011, Intermountain conducted an
investigation into Dr. Sorensen’s practice and internally
released an audit of the 47 PFO closures Dr. Sorensen
performed in April 2011. The audit concluded that “the
guidelines had been violated in many of the 47 cases
reviewed.” Id. at 535.
On June 27, 2011, following the internal investigation,
Intermountain suspended Dr. Sorensen’s cardiac
privileges. The suspension was effective until July 11,
2011. On July 12, 2011, Dr. Sorensen returned to
Intermountain, but continued to violate the hospital’s
internal guidelines for PFO closures. Intermountain
discovered the continued violations, and subsequently
entered into a settlement agreement with Dr. Sorensen
to avoid his permanent suspension. Intermountain later
found that Dr. Sorensen had violated the terms of the
settlement agreement and moved to permanently suspend
Dr. Sorensen, but Dr. Sorensen tendered his resignation
in September 2011.
After Dr. Sorensen left Intermountain, he moved his
entire practice to St. Mark’s. St. Mark’s knew of Dr.
Sorensen’s suspension from Intermountain, but courted
his moving his practice anyway. St. Mark’s allowed Dr.
Sorensen to continue his cardiology practice until he

retired from medical practice altogether a few months
later, on December 9, 2011.
Dr. Polukoff—the relator in this case—worked at both
Intermountain and St. Mark’s, but not directly for Dr.
Sorensen until 2011. On June 11, 2011, Dr. Polukoff
signed an employment agreement with SCG to learn PFO
closures from Dr. Sorensen, and on August 17, 2011,
actually began working for Dr. Sorensen at St. Mark’s.
While working for Dr. Sorensen, Dr. Polukoff “personally
observed [Dr.] Sorensen perform medically unnecessary
PFO closures on patients at St. Mark’s.” Id. at 536. He
alleges to have “observed [Dr.] Sorensen create a PFO by
puncture of the atrial septum in patients who were found
to have an intact septum during surgery.” Id.
The amended complaint further alleges that St. Mark’s
and Intermountain “signed or caused to be executed
provider agreements with Medicare that permitted each
Defendant to submit claims and accept payment for
services.” Id. at 518. Both hospitals “allowed and
encouraged Dr. Sorensen to perform and submit claims
to federal health benefit programs for PFO and ASD
procedures despite clear compliance red flags, including,
but not limited to, the fact that Dr. Sorensen was
performing these procedures at a rate that far exceeded
that of any other institution or physician.” Id. at 507.

C. Procedural Background
On December 6, 2012, Dr. Polukoff filed this qui tam
action under seal in the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Tennessee against: (1) Dr. Sorensen;
(2) Sorensen Cardiovascular Group; (3) Intermountain
Healthcare, Inc.; (4) St. *739 Mark’s Hospital; and (5)
HCA, Inc. On June 15, 2015, the government filed its
notice of election to decline intervention. On June 19,
2015, the district court unsealed the qui tam complaint. All
Defendants moved to dismiss the action.
Dr. Polukoff then filed an amended complaint against all
Defendants previously named, and added Intermountain
Medical Center. The amended complaint alleged four
separate violations of the FCA, corresponding to four
separate subsections of the FCA. Id. at 611–14 (citing
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)–(C), (G) ). All Defendants
moved to dismiss the amended complaint. The district
court dismissed the claims against HCA, and concluded
that, without HCA, venue in the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Tennessee was no longer
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proper. Consequently, the district court transferred the
case to the United States District Court for the District
of Utah, without ruling on the motions to dismiss as
to the remaining Defendants—Dr. Sorensen (both as
an individual and the Sorensen Cardiovascular Group);
Intermountain (both the individual hospital and the
nonprofit that owned it); and St. Mark’s.
The remaining Defendants filed renewed motions to
dismiss. Oral arguments were scheduled for November
10, 2016. The day before oral arguments, Dr. Polukoff
filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint.
The district court heard oral arguments as scheduled.
Before the district court ruled on the motions to dismiss,
Dr. Polukoff filed an amended motion for leave to file a
second amended complaint on January 18, 2017. The next
day, the district court granted Defendants’ motions to
dismiss, with prejudice, and denied Dr. Polukoff’s motion
for leave to amend.
As relevant to this appeal, the district court first addressed
Defendants’ Rule 9(b) argument that Dr. Polukoff had
failed to plead with particularity. The district court
determined that the proper standard was “whether Dr.
Polukoff has pled the who, what, when, where and
how of a fraudulent scheme perpetrated by each of
the defendants.” Id. at 2519. “In addition, the court
must decide whether the operative complaint provides
‘an adequate basis for a reasonable inference that false
claims were submitted as part of that scheme.’ ” Id.
(quoting United States ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare
of Utah, Inc., 614 F.3d 1163, 1172 (10th Cir. 2010) ).
The court concluded that Dr. Polukoff had adequately
pled his claims against Dr. Sorensen and St. Mark’s
but not against Intermountain because he failed to
identify a “managing agent” involved in the conspiracy at
Intermountain. Id. at 2519–22.
The court then turned to Defendants’ Rule 12(b)
(6) argument. Relying on language from this court’s
unpublished decision in United States ex rel. Morton v.
A Plus Benefits, Inc., 139 F. App’x 980 (10th Cir. 2005),
the district court concluded that “Dr. Polukoff must
show that the defendants knowingly made an objectively
false representation to the government that caused the
government to remit payment.” App’x at 2526. It observed
that “Dr. Polukoff’s FCA causes of action rest upon
his contention that the defendants represented (either
explicitly or implicitly) that the PFO closures performed

by Dr. Sorensen were medically reasonable and necessary
and that this representation was false.” Id. at 2524. But,
because “[o]pinions, medical judgments, and ‘conclusions
about which reasonable minds may differ cannot be
false’ for the purposes of an FCA claim,” id. at 2526
(quoting Morton, 139 F. App’x at 983), Dr. Sorensen’s
representations to the government could not be false
absent “a regulation that clarifies the conditions under
which it will or will not pay for a PFO closure,” id. at
2528. Thus, Dr. Polukoff’s *740 “FCA claims fail[ed]
as a matter of law and the court dismisse[d] all causes of
action asserted against the defendants.” Id. at 2529. The
court further determined that “leave to amend would be
futile,” id., so it dismissed the amended complaint with
prejudice.
Dr. Polukoff timely appealed. The government filed an
amicus brief in his support. All three Defendants—Dr.
Sorensen, St. Mark’s, and Intermountain—filed response
briefs. Of particular note, in Intermountain’s brief, it
argued that the qui tam provisions of the FCA violate
Article II of the U.S. Constitution. The government
intervened thereafter, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a), to
respond to Intermountain’s constitutional argument in an
additional brief as intervenor.

II
The district court relied upon Rules 12(b)(6) and 9(b) to
dismiss Dr. Polukoff’s amended complaint with prejudice.
We address the district court’s holdings in turn. 7
7

Intermountain argues, for the first time on appeal,
that “at least where the Government has not
intervened, a private relator’s prosecution of an
FCA case on behalf of the Government violates
the separation of powers.” Intermountain Br. at
54. Intermountain concedes it “did not assert a
constitutional challenge below.” Id. at 54 n.11. We
consider this argument forfeited. “It is the general
rule, of course, that a federal appellate court does not
consider an issue not passed upon below.” Singleton
v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49
L.Ed.2d 826 (1976). “[W]here the ground presented
here has not been raised below we exercise this
authority [to consider the newly raised argument]
‘only in exceptional cases.’ ” Heckler v. Campbell, 461
U.S. 458, 468 n.12, 103 S.Ct. 1952, 76 L.Ed.2d 66
(1983) (quoting McGoldrick v. Compagnie Generale
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Transatlantique, 309 U.S. 430, 434, 60 S.Ct. 670,
84 L.Ed. 849 (1940) ). “[T]he decision regarding
what issues are appropriate to entertain on appeal
in instances of lack of preservation is discretionary.”
Abernathy v. Wandes, 713 F.3d 538, 552 (10th
Cir. 2013). We decline to address Intermountain’s
separation of powers argument.

A. Rule 12(b)(6)
We first address the district court’s conclusion that,
absent a specific regulation addressing the necessity of the
treatment, a physician’s medical judgment concerning the
necessity of a treatment could not be “false or fraudulent”
under the FCA. As a result of this conclusion, the district
court dismissed Dr. Polukoff’s amended complaint under
Rule 12(b)(6), believing it failed to state a claim as a
matter of law, and then denied leave to amend, believing
amendment would have been futile. We disagree.
“We review the district court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)
(6) de novo.” Lemmon, 614 F.3d at 1167. “Although we
generally review for abuse of discretion a district court’s
denial of leave to amend a complaint, when this ‘denial is
based on a determination that amendment would be futile,
our review for abuse of discretion includes de novo review
of the legal basis for the finding of futility.’ ” Cohen v.
Longshore, 621 F.3d 1311, 1314 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Miller ex. Rel. S.M. v. Bd. of Educ. of Albuquerque Pub.
Schs., 565 F.3d 1232, 1250 (10th Cir. 2009) ).
“Enacted in 1863, the False Claims Act ‘was originally
aimed principally at stopping the massive frauds
perpetrated by large contractors during the Civil War.’
” Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel.
Escobar, ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 1989, 1996, 195 L.Ed.2d
348 (2016) (quoting United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S.
303, 309, 96 S.Ct. 523, 46 L.Ed.2d 514 (1976) ). “
‘[A] series of sensational congressional investigations’
prompted hearings where witnesses ‘painted a sordid
picture *741 of how the United States had been billed for
nonexistent or worthless goods, charged exorbitant prices
for goods delivered, and generally robbed in purchasing
the necessities of war.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v.
McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599, 78 S.Ct. 950, 2 L.Ed.2d 1001
(1958) ).
Today, the FCA generally prohibits private parties from
“knowingly” submitting “a false or fraudulent claim” for
reimbursement. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A). Unfortunately,
“Congress did not define what makes a claim ‘false’ or

‘fraudulent.’ ” Escobar, 136 S.Ct. at 1999. Without a
definition from Congress, the Supreme Court has turned
to common law. And “common-law fraud has long
encompassed ... more than just claims containing express
falsehoods.” Id. Consequently, the Court favors a more
expansive view of “false or fraudulent.”
As we have held, “false or fraudulent” includes both
factually false and legally false requests for payment.
See Lemmon, 614 F.3d at 1168. “Factually false claims
generally require a showing that the payee has submitted
an incorrect description of goods or services provided
or a request for reimbursement for goods or services
never provided.” United States ex rel. Thomas v. Black
& Veatch Special Projects Corp., 820 F.3d 1162, 1168
(10th Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted). “Claims arising
from legally false requests, on the other hand, generally
require knowingly false certification of compliance with
a regulation or contractual provision as a condition
of payment.” Id. In this case, Dr. Polukoff does not
allege Dr. Sorensen submitted factually false requests
because his claims do not focus on an inaccuracy of
the PFO closures performed. Instead, he claims the PFO
closures do not comply with Medicare’s “reasonable and
necessary” requirement, meaning Dr. Sorensen submitted
legally false requests for payment.
“Such claims of legal falsity can rest on one of
two theories—express false certification, and implied
false certification.” Id. at 1169 (quotation and brackets
omitted). “An express false certification theory applies
when a government payee falsely certifies compliance
with a particular statute, regulation or contractual term,
where compliance is a prerequisite to payment.” Conner,
543 F.3d at 1217 (quotation omitted). “By contrast, the
pertinent inquiry for implied-false-certification claims is
not whether a payee made an affirmative or express false
statement, but whether, through the act of submitting
a claim, a payee knowingly and falsely implied that it
was entitled to payment.” Thomas, 820 F.3d at 1169
(quotation and brackets omitted).
As relevant here, Dr. Polukoff brings express-falsecertification claims against Dr. Sorensen. The amended
complaint alleges Dr. Sorensen submitted express false
certifications when he signed and submitted CMS Form
1500, which states: “I certify that the services shown on
this form were medically indicated and necessary for the
health of the patient. ...” App’x at 518.
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The district court concluded that Dr. Polukoff’s expressfalse-certification claims were not legally cognizable under
the FCA. First, it held that “medical judgments and
‘conclusions about which reasonable minds may differ
cannot be false’ for the purposes of an FCA claim.”
App’x at 2526 (quoting Morton, 139 F. App’x at 983).
Second, the district court determined that a physician’s
certification that a PFO closure was “reasonable and
necessary” could not be false under the FCA—given
that it would constitute a medical judgment—absent “a
regulation that clarifies the conditions under which [the
government *742 ] will or will not pay for a PFO
closure.” Id. at 2528.
Morton is narrower than the district court suggests. First,
Morton involved the application of the FCA to ERISA,
not Medicare. Second, we explicitly cabined Morton to the
facts in that case:

We agree that liability under
the FCA must be predicated
on an objectively verifiable fact.
Nonetheless, we are not prepared
to conclude that in all instances,
merely because the verification of
a fact relies upon clinical medical
judgments, or involves a decision
of coverage under an ERISA plan,
the fact cannot form the basis of
an FCA claim. In this case, the
nature of neither the scientific nor
contract determinations inherent in
the formation and evaluation of
the allegedly “false” statement is
susceptible to proof of truth or
falsity.

intended to reach all types of fraud, without qualification,
that might result in financial loss to the Government,” and
“refus[ing] to accept a rigid, restrictive reading”). Second,
“the fact that an allegedly false statement constitutes the
speaker’s opinion does not disqualify it from forming the
basis of FCA liability.” United States ex rel. Loughren v.
Unum Grp., 613 F.3d 300, 310 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding, in
the Social Security benefits context, that “an applicant’s
opinion regarding the date on which he became unable
to work” can give rise to FCA liability); cf. Omnicare,
Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension
Fund, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 1318, 1326, 191 L.Ed.2d
253 (2015) (suggesting, in the securities context, that
a “false-statement provision ... appl[ies] to expressions
of opinion”). Third, “claims for medically unnecessary
treatment are actionable under the FCA.” United States
ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 355 F.3d
370, 376 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding relator’s complaint
“sufficiently allege[d] that statements were known to be
false, rather than just erroneous, because she assert[ed]
that Defendants ordered the services knowing they were
unnecessary”); cf. Frazier ex rel. United States v. Iasis
Healthcare Corp., 392 F. App’x 535, 537 (9th Cir.
2010) (affirming FCA claim was inadequately pled, but
suggesting an FCA claim could survive if the relator
“provide[s] ‘reliable indicia’ that [the defendant] submitted
claims for medically unnecessary procedures”).
As the government states in its amicus brief, “A
Medicare claim is false if it is not reimbursable, and
a Medicare claim is not reimbursable if the services
provided were not medically necessary.” Amicus Br. at
14. For a claim to be reimbursable, it must meet the
government’s definition of “reasonable and necessary,” as
found in the Medicare Program Integrity Manual. The
manual instructs contractors to “consider a service to be
reasonable and necessary” if the procedure is:
• Safe and effective;
• Not experimental or investigational ...; and

139 F. App’x at 983. We did not create a bright-line rule
that a medical judgment can never serve as the basis for
an FCA claim.
It is possible for a medical judgment to be “false or
fraudulent” as proscribed by the FCA for at least three
reasons. First, we read the FCA broadly. See United States
v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 232, 88 S.Ct. 959,
19 L.Ed.2d 1061 (1968) (observing that the FCA “was

• Appropriate, including the duration and frequency
that is considered appropriate for the item or service,
in terms of whether it is:
○ Furnished in accordance with accepted standards
of medical practice for the diagnosis or treatment
of the *743 patient’s condition or to improve the
function of a malformed body member;
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○ Furnished in a setting appropriate to the patient’s
medical needs and condition;
○ Ordered and furnished by qualified personnel;
○ One that meets, but does not exceed, the patient’s
medical need; and
○ At least as beneficial as an existing and available
medically appropriate alternative.
CMS, Medicare Program Integrity Manual § 13.5.1;
see also id. § 13.3 (incorporating § 13.5.1’s definition
of reasonable and necessary for individual claim
determinations).
We thus hold that a doctor’s certification to the
government that a procedure is “reasonable and
necessary” is “false” under the FCA if the procedure
was not reasonable and necessary under the government’s
definition of the phrase. We understand the concerns that
a broad definition of “false or fraudulent” might expose
doctors to more liability under the FCA, but the Supreme
Court has already addressed those concerns: “Instead of
adopting a circumscribed view of what it means for a claim
to be false or fraudulent, concerns about fair notice and
open-ended liability can be effectively addressed through
strict enforcement of the [FCA]’s materiality and scienter
requirements. Those requirements are rigorous.” Escobar,
136 S.Ct. at 2002 (quotation marks and some brackets
omitted).
In this case, Dr. Polukoff adequately alleges that
Dr. Sorensen performed unnecessary PFO closures on
patients and then knowingly submitted false certifications
to the federal government that the procedures were
necessary, all in an effort to obtain federal reimbursement.
Specifically, Dr. Polukoff alleges: (1) Dr. Sorensen
performed an unusually large number of PFO closures,
App’x at 542 (“The Cleveland Clinic reported that it had
performed 37 PFO closures in 2010; during that same time
period [Dr.] Sorensen’s billing records indicate that he
had performed 861.”); (2) these procedures violated both
industry guidelines and hospital guidelines, id. at 524–
26, 535; (3) other physicians objected to Dr. Sorensen’s
practice, id. at 535; (4) Intermountain eventually audited
Dr. Sorensen’s practice, and concluded that its “guidelines
had been violated in many of the 47 cases reviewed,” id.;
and (5) “Dr. Sorensen knew that Medicare and Medicaid
would not pay for PFO closures to treat migraines, so he

chose to represent that the procedures had been performed
based upon indications set forth in the AH[A]/ASA
stroke guidelines—the existence of confirmed recurrent
cryptogenic stroke,” id. at 542. Under these specific
factual allegations, Dr. Polukoff has pleaded enough to
state a claim as a matter of law and survive Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal against Dr. Sorensen.
We further hold the amended complaint adequately
states express-false-certification claims against St. Mark’s
and Intermountain, both of which allegedly “billed for
the hospital charges associated with” PFO closures. Id.
at 542–43. More specifically, the amended complaint
alleges St. Mark’s and Intermountain both requested
reimbursements for these procedures by submitting
annual Hospital Cost Reports. The reports require
hospitals to certify: “I further certify that I am
familiar with the laws and regulations regarding the
provision of health care services, and that the services
identified in this cost report were provided in compliance
with such laws and regulations.” Id. at 516. By
submitting a Hospital Cost Report, then, St. Mark’s
and Intermountain *744 expressly certified that every
procedure for which they sought reimbursement complied
with Medicare’s requirements. Because the complaint
adequately alleges that Dr. Sorensen’s surgeries and
any procedure associated therewith was not, in fact,
“reasonable and necessary,” the complaint adequately
alleges that St. Mark’s and Intermountain submitted false
claims for reimbursement to the government through their
Hospital Cost Reports.
Moreover, Dr. Polukoff adequately alleges St. Mark’s
and Intermountain submitted these false certifications
“knowingly.” As to St. Mark’s, Dr. Polukoff
alleges that he personally told the CEO about the
circumstances surrounding Dr. Sorensen’s suspension
from Intermountain for performing unnecessary PFO
closures. Nonetheless, according to Dr. Polukoff, St.
Mark’s continued to recruit Dr. Sorensen’s business:

Contemporaneously
with
his
suspension from Intermountain, St.
Mark’s executive management knew
that [Dr.] Sorensen had been
suspended for performing medically
unnecessary PFO closures. Dr.
Polukoff personally discussed the
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suspension with the CEO of St.
Mark’s Hospital, Steve Bateman,
and his physician liaison, Nikki
Gledhill. Despite the fact that
St. Mark’s knew that [Dr.]
Sorensen was performing medically
unnecessary PFO closures, and
knew that [Dr.] Sorensen had been
suspended from Intermountain for
performing medically unnecessary
PFO closures, St. Mark’s Hospital
continued to court [Dr.] Sorensen’s
septal closure business and provide
a platform and assistance to [Dr.]
Sorensen.

Id. at 540–41.
As to Intermountain, Dr. Polukoff alleges that, “at
all times relevant to this case, Intermountain knew
that septal closures were rarely indicated.” Id. at 535.
This is because, “[f]or years Intermountain ignored
the loud objections from its own medical staff and
leadership, including the Director of the Catheterization
Laboratory, Dr. Revenaugh, and the Medical Director for
Cardiovascular Services at Intermountain Healthcare, Dr.
Lappe, as well as written warnings and complaints from
Professor Andrew Michaels of the University of Utah.”
Id. Because Dr. Sorensen performed an excessively large
number of profitable PFO closures for Intermountain,
Dr. “Sorensen was given his own catheterization lab
room at Intermountain and provided with a handpicked
staff of Intermountain employees.” Id. at 610. “No other
cardiologist received this type of special treatment from
Intermountain.” Id.
The FCA requires a defendant submit a false claim
“knowingly,” which includes the submission of claims by
an entity who “acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or
falsity of the information” or “acts in reckless disregard of
the truth or falsity of the information.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)
(1)(A). At a minimum, the amended complaint adequately
alleges that St. Mark’s and Intermountain acted with
reckless disregard as to whether the PFO closures Dr.
Sorensen was performing were medically necessary.

B. Rule 9(b)

All Defendants also challenged the amended complaint
under Rule 9(b), arguing that Dr. Polukoff had failed to
plead his claims with sufficient particularity. The district
court denied the motions as to Dr. Sorensen and St.
Mark’s, but granted the motion as to Intermountain.
Dr. Polukoff appeals, arguing his amended complaint
pleaded allegations against Intermountain with sufficient
particularity to survive a *745 motion to dismiss under
Rule 9(b). We agree with Dr. Polukoff.
Rule 9(b) states: “In alleging fraud or mistake, a
party must state with particularity the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge,
and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged
generally.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). “Concerning the failure
to plead fraud with particularity under Rule 9(b), we ...
review a dismissal de novo.” Lemmon, 614 F.3d at 1167.
The purpose of Rule 9(b) is “to afford defendant[s]
fair notice of plaintiff’s claims and the factual ground
upon which [they] are based.” Id. at 1172 (quotations
omitted). “Thus, claims under the FCA need only show
the specifics of a fraudulent scheme and provide an
adequate basis for a reasonable inference that false claims
were submitted as part of that scheme.” Id. Practically
speaking, FCA claims comply with Rule 9(b) when they
“provid[e] factual allegations regarding the who, what,
when, where and how of the alleged claims.” Id. But, “in
determining whether a plaintiff has satisfied Rule 9(b),
courts may consider whether any pleading deficiencies
resulted from the plaintiff’s inability to obtain information
in the defendant’s exclusive control.” George v. Urban
Settlement Servs., 833 F.3d 1242, 1255 (10th Cir. 2016).
This reflects the principle that “Rule 9(b) does not
require omniscience; rather the Rule requires that the
circumstances of the fraud be pled with enough specificity
to put defendants on notice as to the nature of the claim.”
Williams v. Duke Energy Int’l, Inc., 681 F.3d 788, 803 (6th
Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted).
The district court dismissed Dr. Polukoff’s allegations
against Intermountain under Rule 9(b) because “vital
information regarding who knew what and when they
knew it [was] missing.” App’x at 2521–22. But, for many
of the same reasons the amended complaint survived
Rule 12(b)(6) against all Defendants, it survives Rule
9(b) as well. Rule 9(b) itself states: “Malice, intent,
knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may
be alleged generally.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (emphases
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added). Moreover, we excuse deficiencies that result from
the plaintiff’s inability to obtain information within the
defendant’s exclusive control. See George, 833 F.3d at
1255. Intermountain, 8 no doubt, knows which employees
handle federal billing for procedures reimbursable under
Medicare, and in particular, who reviewed reimbursement
claims for Dr. Sorensen during his decade there. 9
8

9

This applies with equal force to St. Mark’s.
But, because the district court determined that
Dr. Polukoff satisfied Rule 9(b)’s particularity
requirements as to St. Mark’s, we limit our discussion
of Rule 9(b) to Intermountain.
In discussing the legal background of Rule 9(b), the
district court stated: “Because both [Intermountain]
and St. Mark’s are corporations, this knowledge
must be held by a managing agent of either of these
corporate entities.” App’x at 2521. The district court
then failed to cite any authority for its “managing
agent” theory. To the extent the district court relied
upon the “managing agent” theory, we disagree. “It
is well established that a corporation is chargeable

End of Document

with the knowledge of its agents and employees acting
within the scope of their authority.” W. Diversified
Servs., Inc. v. Hyundai Motor Am., Inc., 427 F.3d
1269, 1276 (10th Cir. 2005); see also United States
ex rel. Jones v. Brigham & Women’s Hosp., 678 F.3d
72, 82 n.18 (1st Cir. 2012) (“We have long held that
corporate defendants may be subject to FCA liability
when the alleged misrepresentations are made while
the employee is acting within the scope of his or her
employment.”). Thus, under Rule 9(b), it suffices that
any employee, acting within the scope of his or her
employment, had knowledge.

III
Because Dr. Polukoff’s amended complaint satisfies the
pleading requirements *746 of Rules 12(b)(6) and 9(b),
we REVERSE and REMAND this case for further
proceedings.
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